Corporate social responsibility in practice: the timely relevance of Jacques Derrida

In this final section, a summary is provided of the major arguments presented in this chapter, in order to show why Derrida does indeed introduce new categories that can be applied to CSR and to business ethics. Moreover, it will be shown why these categories are more effective in helping us to

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navigate through some of the issues that arise in the context of CSR. The complexity-points, which were alluded to during the course of this chapter, and which will be expounded upon in the next chapter, are also briefly mentioned in this section. The section proceeds with summaries of the main objections against a deconstructive ethics that were presented in this chapter, each of which is then briefly responded to.

i) Derrida’s philosophy would hold more appeal for business ethicists and practitioners if his texts stated clearly what they mean, and if he presented clear arguments in support of his claims.

In response to this type of question, Derrida writes (1988a:119): ‘If things were simple, word would’ve gotten around’. Derrida warns against those who wish to simplify at all costs. He calls such people ‘dangerous dogmatists and tedious obscurantists’ (119). In chapter two, Cilliers (2005) was quoted as saying that if we accept the fact that the world is complex, then we need to demonstrate the difficulties that we are in, also in the way in which we talk about them. To fail to do so is not only a technical failure, but also a moral failure. Technically-speaking, language is constituted by the dynamic play of differences, which gives rise to complexity, implying that no matter how hard we try, we cannot completely map-out meaning. Morally-speaking, this means that we cannot fully control the meaning of our utterances, nor account for differences excluded from our specific, limited, and, hence, violent positions.

Taking cognisance of complexity, therefore, demands that we engage with the limitations and consequences of our concepts and paradigms, including the paradigm of CSR. CSR is a complex phenomenon, as demonstrated by Jones’s (2007) assertion that the current and urgent global struggles is testimony of the fact that we do not know what it might mean to live or work in a free economy or society. One way to acknowledge the trouble that we are in is through our discourse, even though this discourse is itself impure and impregnated with some of the most difficult and pressing ethico-political questions of our times, as will be discussed in chapter six (sec. 3.2.).

ii) Derrida’s writings are so puzzling and confusing that they are unlikely to add to the debate on CSR, which is currently characterised by arguments which have been developed along historical, justificatory, and critical lines.

Despite the amount of scholarship dedicated to developing our notions of CSR, there is still little clarity on what CSR should entail. This is confirmed by De George’s (2008: 83) statement that ‘[t]o

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the extent that it has had any success in improving the lot of human beings, CSR is a positive force in the business arena, even if poorly understood by its practitioners, even if rife with irresolvable conflicts, and even if it is always under the process of deconstructing itself.’ Instead of applauding our successes and continuing on the same trajectory, it is time (now more so then ever before) to move beyond our current conceptions of CSR in a bid to reinscribe our understanding of CSR in larger, more powerful, and more stratified contexts (Derrida, 1988a), in an attempt to move towards a better future. Derrida’s deconstructive ethics goes a long way towards providing us with tools for achieving this goal. In the next chapter, the idea of transgressing current modes of thinking, whilst simultaneously remaining critical of the provisionality of one’s own position is elaborated upon. iii) If Derridean scholars advocate reinscribing CSR in a manner that requires us to accept

formulations such as ‘one is only responsible when one is not sure if one is being responsible’; ‘responsibility involves undecidability’; or, ‘ethics is the experience of the impossible’, then business practitioners are in danger of developing an ‘anything goes’ approach to their corporate social responsibilities.

Derrida is not against employing ethical tools (including codes, normative theories, and governance reports – all of which advance responsible corporate actions). His concern is that an over-reliance on business ethics tools can numb the moral impulse to the extent that one forgets that ethics demands decision-making, and that each decision must be taken anew to account for the specificity of the situation. Derrida (1999) is not for relativism; rather, he is against conceptions of ethics that close us off to other ways of being. This represents a modest perspective, the importance of which is well-illustrated in the example of labour practices (Power, 2008) mentioned earlier in the analysis (see sec. 5.3.). In this regard, it is useful to also mention the case of Enron. Enron was awarded by the business community for its ethical behaviour and full compliance with all their explicit ethical requirements (Sims & Brinkmann, 2003: 243). Here are two good examples for why ethical tools cannot replace judgement. Responsibility cannot be embodied in a rule otherwise CSR is reduced to an expression of ethical positivism.

In order to be ethical one must assume responsibility for one’s decisions, even when this means confronting certain difficult choices, where no single option presents one with the ‘correct’ choice. Hence, the characterisation of ethics as an experience of the impossible: ethics can only ever find its expression in the irreducible singularity that characterises the moment of the decision. This, as will be illustrated in chapter six, is no easy feat, since ethics and responsibility not only require self- awareness, vigilance, and innovation in thought and action, but also mutual acceptance, trust, and

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tolerance of viewpoints other than one’s own. These virtues are typically the character traits embodied by those who realise that rules cannot account for all the different possibilities of what it means to be human.

iv) If ethical decision-making demands that one confronts the insolvable impasse, which characterise the moment of the decision, it is likely that the decision-maker will be reduced to an ‘undecided Hamlet’.

The ethical moment, on a Derridean interpretation, is characterised by asymmetry. If we cannot assimilate the other into our existing frames of meaning, then the ethical moment will involve a measure of disjuncture and undecidability. But such a moment is also the moment of vigilance. In today’s global world, our actions have far-reaching effects, many of which can only be determined retrospectively. Yet, in acting, we are also responsible for the consequences that our decisions have for distant and unseen stakeholders. To limit the notion of responsibility to only account for those who are well-represented in our conceptual schema, is to ignore all those who fall to the margins of the dominant discourse. This includes those disenfranchised stakeholders who do not necessarily have the economic clout or the social support systems to make their voices heard. As such, the over- determinations (i.e. the tensions and the competing interests) with which we have to grapple in order to be responsible, call for interpretation and imagination. A measure of undecidability is essential for ethical decision-making. In this sense, Derrida (1999) argues that Hamlet is the paradigm for action, because he understands what actions should be and goes through the process of undecidability. However, it must also be noted that undecidability can never be used as an argument for inaction. A similar argument will be made in the next chapter, at the hand of an analysis of the cybernetician, von Foerster’s, undecidable questions. With the help of Morin, it will also be shown why structure and constraints are necessary for exercising freedom and choice; and, hence, for deciding on undecidable questions.

v) If actions can only be taken beyond the certainty gained from knowledge it is impossible to judge the effectiveness of these actions.

Deconstruction, as stated before, is not against calculation. Before making any decisions we need to consider our moral tradition, including our concepts of justice, right, virtue, the good, and responsibility (Wood, 1999). However, reflecting on these concepts is not enough. We need to challenge these concepts, with the aim of finding a ‘better’ way forward. In other words, we need to be led by the regulative ideal of justice. Challenging the status quo also implies a measure of risk,

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because in going against tradition, we are negotiating with alterity and the unknown. This is why we must provide rigorous and clear arguments for changing the rules of the discourse (Derrida, 1988a). This point is particularly poignant in the context of the larger sustainability issues that we face today, which are also related to good corporate social responsibility practices. We are far from clear on how to proceed in the face of problems such as global warming, food security, financial security, or even infectious disease outbreaks. In this regard, the top management of big companies (including oil and gas companies, NGOs, banks, and pharmaceuticals) might benefit from Derrida’s ideas, even though these ideas cannot provide them with substantive answers, regarding the best way forward. Once again, complexity theory, which, as mentioned earlier, is characterised by a radical or perpetual ethics (Prieser & Cilliers, 2010), can help us to think more clearly through the implications of this point. In chapter seven (sec. 4), a complex understanding of sustainable development will be presented.

vi) If one accepts that the ethical relationship is non-subsumptive, and if one accepts that the goal is to transgress existing frames of meaning, then the ethical decision-maker is likely to be left powerless in the face of action.

Derrida (2002e; 2002a) is explicit about the fact that the infinite vigilance, which is demanded by ethical reflection, must always be interrupted by action. Ethics requires action, and moreover, urgent action. In other words, ethics without politics is impotent. We need position, we need to take a stance, and in so doing, to create institutions. However, the moment we create institutions is also the moment that we close ourselves off to the very alterity that we seek to safeguard. This is why we must always deconstruct anew (which is in itself a critical task). As Wood (1999) explains, our responsibility is not infinitely large, it is a recursive modality: an always renewable openness. What this implies is that CSR is as much a matter of signing off on policies and codes as it is of challenging these policies and codes. In other words, the complexity of the problem has to be constantly thought anew.

9. Conclusion

The British government recently ran an advertisement campaign to encourage the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions in households79_{. The campaign featured a father reading a bedtime story}

to his little daughter, in which the potential future consequences of global warming were illustrated.

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The consequences that featured in the bedtime story included temperature changes, which would result in heat waves and floods; and the possible disappearance of places, due to rising sea levels. The advertisement also stated that 40% of carbon dioxide emissions were caused by households (specifically heating and fuel consumption). The advertisement concluded with the little girl asking her father whether the story has a happy ending, and the punchline was that it is up to us how the story ends.

In an article that appeared in The Guardian, it was reported that the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) had received over two hundred complaints about the advertisement in the space of one week. Amongst the most popular reasons for the complaints were the claims that ‘there is no scientific evidence of climate change’ and that ‘there is a division of scientific opinion on this issue and therefore the ad should not have attributed global warming to human activity’ (Sweney, 2009). It is doubtful whether the British would outright object to the government dealing with the issue of climate change, since this issue may potentially impact on intergenerational welfare. Judging by the outrage, the manner in which the government went about dealing with the problem is, however, objectionable. The general opinion seems to be that – since we do not have clarity on what the consequences of global warming will be (or even whether climate change is a reality) – it is irresponsible and unethical to promote opinions as facts.

What this example illustrates is that our current scientific and business ethics tools are inadequate in helping us to navigate our way through the complexities presented by issues such as climate change. In terms of CSR, we can conclude that – given the problems currently topping the global agenda – CSR cannot be limited to drawing up policies against fraud, deception, or discrimination (all of which can be quite well circumscribed in a utilitarian, virtue, or rights-based framework). Assuming responsibility also means dealing with the uncertainties and complexities that confront the world today. Given the fact that we do not know how the story is going to end, a Derridean framework for CSR, which actively engages with this complexity, is a more robust and better-suited model for dealing with our problems than is a notion of CSR, which is premised on common human and individual moral experiences.

In this chapter it was argued that a complex, critical ethics, such as deconstruction, presents a better model for thinking about business ethics problems. In the following two chapters, the insights gleaned in part II of this study will be fleshed out in terms of the implications that such insights

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hold for characterising a complex ethics (chapter six); as well as for thinking about prominent business ethics themes80, and for teaching business ethics (chapter seven).

80 _{It is worthwhile noting that one of the business ethics themes to be addressed in chapter seven is CSR.} During the course of this analysis, emphasis will be placed on the specific responsibilities of boards and organisational members, as well as on how these responsibilities can, in principle, be met. Therefore, whereas the aim of the current chapter was to make the case for a critical and complex notion of CSR, the aim of the analysis undertaken in chapter seven is to provide substantive points on what such a notion of CSR entails, practically-speaking.

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Part III:

Implications

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Chapter 6: