thus implying the possibility of a united front policy towards these intermediate countries. An inner-Party memorandum, written by Lu Ting-yi in January 1947,
advanced a more elaborate version of this argument, referring to a large 'neutral area' between the US and the Soviet Union and claiming that this meant that the contradiction between the two countries, although 'basic' was neither 'imminent' nor 'dominant'. This implied that
Mao Tse-tung, 'Talk With the American Correspondent
Anna Louise Strong', Selected Works, op. cit., vol. 4, p.99.
g
Lu Ting-yi, 'Explanation of Several Basic Questions Concerning the Post War International Situation', in L.P. Van Slyke (ed.), The China White Paper August 1949,
another contradiction was ’d o minant', which by united front logic suggested the existence of a 'core ally' for an
international united front. A year later, Liu Shao-ch'i continued to present a uniquely Chinese view of the
international situation. For example, instead of arguing a 'hard line' anti-neutralist thesis - 'all those not for us are against us' - he reversed this to argue, in effect, that 'all those not against us must be for u s ' :
When these two camps are in sharp conflict, people line up with one side or the other. That is, if one is not in the imperialist camp, if one is not assisting American imperialism and its accomplices to enslave the world or one's own people, then one must be in the anti-imperialist camp.^
Moreover, Liu urged Communists in colonial and semi colonial countries to form united fronts with 'that section of the national bourgeoisie which is still
opposing imperialism', adding that failure to do so would
g
constitute 'a grave mistake'. It is true that Liu, in accepting the 'two camps' thesis, had abandoned the earlier CCP formulations about a 'neutral a r e a ' , but he retained a relatively generous approach to the question of who qualified for membership of the 'peace camp'.
None of these analyses can be seen as a sophisticated application of the united front doctrine to international politics. However, they do appear to reflect the influence of certain facets of the doctrine. In particular, they suggest an assumption on the part of the CCP leadership that relationships of conflict are inherent in world politics (Proposition One of the united front m o d e l ) , a
long term conception of the process by which the major world contradictions were to be worked out (Proposition
T h r e e ) , an ultimate revolutionary objective (Proposition
7
Liu Shao-ch'i, Internationalism and Nationalism3 (Peking Foreign Languages Press, 1951), p. 32.
Four), an attempt to classify and evaluate information in terms of contradictions theory (Proposition Five), a tendency to relate international issues to the experience of the CCP's revolutionary war (Proposition Six), the
beginnings of a conception of an international united front strategy in which a 'principal enemy' would be opposed by a vast conglomeration of other forces, one of which would have the major role (Propositions Seven to Nine). There was no clear formulation of a 'unity and struggle' strategy within the united front, although it may be noted that in April 1945, when the Soviet Union was still refraining from criticising its allies, Mao had made it clear that he saw the anti-German alliance from the perspective of his long term notion of 'unity and struggle':
... within the camp now fighting fascist aggression there are forces which oppose democracy and oppress other nations and they will continue to oppress the people in various countries .... Therefore, after international peace is established, there will still be numerous struggles over the greater part of the world - between the
anti-fascist masses and the remnants of
fascism, between democracy and anti-democracy, between national liberation and national
oppression.y
Why then, if the CCP before 1949 appeared to have a relatively sophisticated and flexible approach to
international affairs, did it adopt the rigid position of 'uniting with' only the Communist states and not, as the united front doctrine would suggest, of seeking a much broader basis from which to oppose the United States? Part of the answer may be expressed in terms of the
'alliance model'. It could be argued, for instance, that China's desperate economic conditions and Peking's
perceived need for protection against the USA necessitated
Mao Tse-tung, 'On Coalition Government', Selected Works} op. cit., vol. 3, p. 207.
an alliance with a great power, and the Soviet Union was the only possible choice - as well as the only possible source of aid and advice for the building of a socialist economy. Hence, the alliance had to be accepted on
Soviet terms and 'these included the adoption of Moscow's line on international issues.
If this were a complete explanation of China's policy, it could be maintained that China, like the Soviet Union at Brest-Litovsk, had in its first international action been compelled to veer from its preferred course of
action because of the international realities which it faced. However, the matter is more complicated and it is difficult to dispose of ideological factors so easily.
In 1949 Stalin's ideological infallibility was still widely accepted by Communists so that following a Soviet line
could easily be justified on ideological grounds as well as those of expediency. Furthermore, in 1949 there did appear to be some prospect of Communist successes in Asia and Europe and in such circumstances 'united front from below' might have been seen as a more appropriate weapon
than a defensive and long term 'united front from above and below'.
More crucial than these considerations is the question of whether an alliance with the Soviet Union was in fact the best option open to Peking for advancing China's
security interests. The CCP had many reasons for feeling unsure about the degree of Moscow's attachment to its cause: Stalin's advice to it after 1945 to dissolve its army and seek a modus vivendi with Chiang Kai-shek-1"1”1 - exactly the same advice as Washington had rendered, the
patent Soviet ambition of regaining the concessions in China that it had lost to Japan in 1904 , ^ Moscow's refusal to
± V. Dedijer, Tito Speaksj (London, 1953), p. 331. M. Beloff, Soviet Policy in the Far East3 1944-1951j (London, 1953), p p . 25-37.
grant some of the CCP' s requests for military aid in 1948-49,12 and its activity in Manchuria and Sinkiang,^ to name only some of the most recent manifestations of Soviet ambivalence toward the CCP. Indeed, Stalin had made it very clear in his negotiations with Mao that he
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