CR’s Methodological considerations

Given CR’s ontological assumptions, critical realists differentiate between methodological approaches for natural and social science (Smith, 2003:297;

Robson, 2005). Indeed, social scientists relate to social phenomena before

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researching them in ways that natural scientists cannot and deal with open systemic phenomena (Robson, 2005:34). The goal of critical realist research is to study and understand research objects that exist in the real and possess real internal mechanisms that can be actualised to produce certain outcomes, whilst remembering that their essential nature may vary over time and space (Bhaskar, 2008). As these objects can and do produce a range of effects, research is an ongoing process that is irreducible to the identification of a coincidence between an independent and a dependant variable (Robson, 2005). Mechanisms may exist, but go unactivated, unperceived or be counteracted by other mechanisms (Baert, 2005:93). The inability to detect or measure a mechanism, or the non-realisation of a posited mechanism, is insufficient to signify its non-existence and room must be left for absence.

Critical realism encourages the critical examination of the intransitive and transitive objects of research (Bhaskar, 2008).⁵ In critically examining an object, it is useful to establish whether social phenomena have essential and accidental properties and how to differentiate between these aspects. For example, regarding groups as essentially having the same properties is risky (Sayer, 2000:86). As the world is dynamic and social phenomena change, these can be subject to reinterpretation. However, where phenomena do have essential properties, and are prone to act in certain ways as a function of their basic structure, this can help to explain causation.

Understanding social phenomena and gaining access to the meanings that guide behaviour requires critical examination, as these are infused by social meanings such as intentions, motives, beliefs, rules and values (Hammersely

& Atkinson, 1995:8). Social phenomena such as actions, texts and institutions are concept-dependent and subject to causal explanation, even if they are not concept-determined (Danermark et al., 2002:38).

Methodologically, from this conceptual framework, objects should be

5 Science needs intransitive objects that exist and act independently of our descriptions including real structures, processes and mechanisms, which are mostly independent of us to avoid the epistemic fallacy (Archer et al, 1998:292). Transitive objects include models, theories and methods used to acquire new knowledge (Bhaskar,2008:21; Hartwig, 2007:263-265).

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criticised in their existent and potential forms, their preconditions, reliance upon another object and what enables the object to do specific things (Sayer, 2000:16). This is complicated as objects can be physical or structural and can generate activity and events (Sayer, 2000:11), so that objects are “often themselves the subjects of power struggles over who may control the rules, relations and resources that constitute them in the first place” (May, 1997:35).

Individual decisions lack the predictability of actions in the natural sciences.

Agency is both facilitated and constrained by social structures, some of which are a necessary condition for human agency (Bhaskar, 1989), determining the conditions for action and yet also requiring reproduction (Cruickshank, 2002:1; Robson, 2005). Archer (2007) offers an interesting contribution on the structure-agency dilemma, elevating the importance of an often neglected agential reflexivity in deliberately responding to certain structures, which links macro and micro scale social theorising. This is directly applicable to the selected case studies in explaining deviance from prevalent universally received ideological stances and the development of counter-ideology. It also highlights the importance of not taking for granted a structure's influence over an agent. Whilst structures are formed of their constituents, they may exist without generating regular patterns of events (Sayer, 2000:11).

Moreover, structures may precede and be unobservable to an agent and yet the agent, when given knowledge of them, may continue to (re)produce them through his/her activity or decide to dismantle them (Fay, 1996; Cruickshank, 2004:574; Sayer, 1992:122-123).

Bhaskar (1998:37) notes that an “ontological hiatus” exists between structures and agents as neither is reducible to the other and both are real independently. Social structures are emergent properties as they birth through individual agency and thereafter become causal powers themselves (Cruickshank, 2004:574). Underlying strata can also combine to create new objects with their own structures and powers known as emergent powers (Danermark et al., 2001:60). Sayer (1992:89) usefully distinguishes between external or contingent relations and internal or necessary relations. In the latter, individuals or groups are so intrinsically linked together that “the

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existence of one necessarily presupposes the other”. Such relations (which in the context of this thesis include those between MNOCs and stakeholders) are for Bhaskar (1998:41) the main focus of social explanation, and help to explain power balances between agents. Importantly, in this context, some agents are more powerful than others. As Harré (2009:134-135) notes, “The next state of the world does not just happen- it is brought about by the activity of powerful particulars”; hence the prime rule in science: “Cherchez la puissance!”

Whilst critical realists do not propose a handbook of methods, nor favour intensive or extensive research design, many critical realists have argued for methodological pluralism in order to deal with the complexity in the world (Sayer, 2000:21; Olsen, 2009:14; Carter & New, 2004). In order to take a truly critical approach, however, methods must be critically selected in order to appropriately fit their object and conditions of study. In uncontrolled research conditions, the methods selected should enable social scientists to critically cross-examine data. In choosing methods, researchers should try not to disturb the social world being examined in order that data are not affected by their presence (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995:6). It is also important that a researcher uses methods that best help to identify underlying social issues or conditions, which acknowledge both conscious and subconscious motivations of the researched (Bhaskar, 1989). Given the complexity of agency and the plurality of unequally weighted causal powers, reliance upon quantitative or qualitative data alone does not appear to suffice. Quantitative research alone can restrict experience (Bhaskar, 1986:30-31). Over-reliance on quantitative methods may hinder the capturing of a real meaning of social behaviour, failing to grasp the social nature of acting individuals with wishes, perceptions and interests. Agency cannot be explained by quantitative methods alone.

In CR, immanent critique and knowledge are intertwined in a way that has emancipatory potential (Harvey, 1990:3; Sayer, 2000:18; Bhaskar, 1993:335;

Hartwig, 2007:24-27). Critical realists argue that it is important not just to observe the world or acquire knowledge for the sake of knowledge, but they re-inject Kantian moral duty into research (Hostettler & Norrie, 2003). In this

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sense, CR is not just a philosophy, but aims to promote freedom by enabling individuals that inhabit social structures to consciously reflect upon them and choose whether to maintain or transform the actions that produce them, using knowledge from social scientific research (Bhaskar, 1986:170).

Indeed, Bhaskar proposes that in order for knowledge to emancipate, the researcher should depend on research to explain what is, why it became so and how it ought to be. Hume stated that ought cannot always be logically derived from is and, indeed, it is difficult to always understand what is socially beneficial (Hammersley, 2002:42). Whilst emancipation is not the central thread that ties this thesis together, nevertheless, DCR’s emancipatory pulse with its notion of human flourishing has enriched my reflexive process, providing me with a conceptual measuring stick against which to view social agency and praxis, and encouraging me to reflect upon how things could be.