The exercise of integrating and rationalizing existing and planned infrastructure needs to respond to a number of different requirements:
3.1
User requirements
The most rationalized network will only have one provider as this is undoubtedly the cheapest way to create a network. But experience has shown that having only one network infrastructure provider will not lead to competitive prices at an intra-regional or international level, any more than having a single monopoly provider at a national level does. Therefore it will not contribute to better access prices for all users and particularly lower business costs for Government and the private sector.
Landlocked countries with only one external fibre operator will not be able to take full advantage of competitive prices. The danger is that they will find themselves in the hands of single “regional hub operators” who will become the “gatekeeper” for international bandwidth. With only one provider, it will not be in the interest of that “gatekeeper”
To address this issue, the rationalized and integrated network needs to provide capacity where the price is not controlled by existing incumbent companies alone and/or there is at least one other competitive network. The landscape of African telecoms is changing very rapidly as market liberalization continues to deepen. In the future Second (or third) National Operators (SNOs), specialized wholesale carriers and cellular companies will likely play a far larger part in the development of infrastructure when they are given the opportunity to do so.
Therefore the rationalized and integrated network shown in the map provided is superimposed over the top of all existing infrastructure. In addition to this
infrastructure, also included are the proposed plans of EASSY, COMTEL and SRII; as well as the plans for electricity supply with accompanying fibre from the SAPP group and its members (Zambia’s ZESCO, Zimbabwe’s Powertel and Tanzania’s TANESCO).
Creating a competitive network will need both Governments and operators to adopt a more flexible approach to how the infrastructure is both owned and operated. For example, incumbent companies could lease capacity on the SAPP network. These electricity operators do not have international gateway licences and so cannot carry traffic across borders directly, however this can be resolved if the incumbent companies simply lease capacity from them as they do have international gateway licences. Alternative competitive access could also be provided by any cellular operator who wanted to create regional infrastructure, as well as via and fibre laid along railway or pipeline infrastucture.
3.2
Regulatory requirements
Of the 21 countries affected by this study (see appendix A4), only seven have given international carrier licences to more than one operator. In three of these (Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe), the SNO licence has been granted but is not yet operational. In market terms, these countries vary from the relatively small (Uganda) to the very large (South Africa). Scale does not appear to be a barrier to the granting
of these licences. A small number of the remainder have plans to grant further international licences.
Without an international licence, there is no incentive for privately-owned cellular operators and data carriers to build this kind of network. Governments and regulators have rightly welcomed the positive impact that competitive cellular companies have had on the provision of telephone services. Without competition of this kind at the national level, it is unlikely that the fixed line operators would have provided similar services.
In regulatory terms, the argument is the same at the intra-regional level. There will likely need to be competition amongst different providers to finance intra -regional and international infrastructure. It is possible to argue that the existing market failure can be largely explained by the absence of this kind of competition.
In the case of EASSy and COMTEL there are two separate sets of regulatory bottlenecks. For EASSy, the main bottlneck is the terms and cost of backhaul from landlocked operators to submarine cable landing stations. For COMTEL, the main bottleneck is that upstream fibre connectivity is restricted to either South Africa, Djibouti or Egypt and that it needs to transport international traffic through the entire length of the system (for example Botswana to Cairo) to reach the intercontinental landing point. COMTEL has the potential to resolve the backhaul problems for EASSy through a single operating company which would establish interconnect between carriers. EASSy meanwhile provides diversity in the landing point options and opens additional landing stations through Mozambique, Tanzania and Kenya. This creates shorter routes, less prone to failure, to submarine cable landing stations and also brings competitive pressure on other landing point operators.
Africa lacks the kind of regional regulatory mechanisms found elsewhere. In Europe, if there is a competition issue with international infrastructure, the matter can be referred to the Competition Commission. Although this is not an ideal mechanism, it does provide some degree of regulatory oversight on international issues. There have been discussions within SADC and TRASA along these lines and it is important in the long-term that they reach a successful conclusion.
3.3
Technical requirements:
The rationalized and integrated network shown on the map suggests a series of “self healing” rings between the proposed infrastructure providers. (eg Mombasa - Nairobi - Dodoma - Dar es Salaam - Mombasa; Dar es Salaam - Blantyre - Maputo - Dar es Salaam). The network would bear some resemblance to a ladder in which the rungs provided the redundant or ‘self-healing’ elements.
A “self-healing” ring allows sufficient alternative routings to enable the network to function, even if a part of the network goes down. Since the network must reflect African realities, it is vital that it contains a strong element of this kind of redundancy. The examples of the SAT3/WASC cable break outside Lagos and the destruction of a similar cable during an earthquake in Algeria illustrate the likely consequences. There would be nothing worse than having an infrastructure that became largely non-