The use of the single word “Macedonia” suggests a unified entity, which is an inaccurate conclusion for much, perhaps most, of the ancient history of the region. Only during the reign of Philip II was control extended substantially beyond the central plain border-ing on the Thermaic Gulf of the Aegean. And in the contest for control following Alexander’s death, that unity was quickly under-mined. While kings preceding Philip had succeeded in adding ter-ritory northward of the small, earliest settlement of the Makednians
Map 2.1 Regions, Natural Features and Sites of Macedonia
in Pieria, their possession of authority was regularly and severely challenged from all directions.
Our earliest reliable accounts concern the reign of Amyntas I (540–498 bce), whose status was recognized even by the Persian kings, who established diplomatic relations with the Argead ruler.
But the relationship was not between equals; in fact, the kingdom of Macedon might well be described as subject to Persian power during this period even if not formally brought under control as a satrapy, or province. A few years later, Xerxes used Macedonia as a staging ground for his assault on the Greek states in 480–479.
Somewhat paradoxically, it may have been the enhanced status of the Persian alliance that allowed Amyntas to bring the regions of Elimeia, Orestis, Lynkestis, and Pelagonia into nominal confederacy with Macedon. His son and successor, Alexander I, whom Herodotos describes as especially clever and forceful, was able to consolidate additional territory westward toward the Pindos moun-tains and reaching north along the Axios River, at the head of the Thermaic Gulf, during his reign from 498 to 454. In his account of the Peloponnesian War in the last third of the fifth century, Thukydides describes the Lynkestians, the Elimiotes, and other
“ethne” further inland as subjects and allies of the Macedonians (II.99.2). Also attributed to the first Alexander by some is signifi-cant innovation in infantry tactics and the relationship of foot-soldiers with the Macedonian king. Alexander had witnessed the success of the Greek hoplites in confronting the Persian forces, and certainly Macedon needed a strong military force to build then maintain the confederacy, to ward off other militant neighbors, and to withstand the intensifying Greek interests – particularly those of Athens – in the northern Aegean during and beyond the reign of Alexander I.
On the death of Alexander I, the succession was contested by his several sons – a frequent occurrence in Macedon in the fifth and fourth centuries, and even during the Hellenistic period following the death of Alexander the Great. Perdikkas II was the successful heir but only after eliminating two of his brothers and, probably,
the sons of one of those brothers. He ruled to 414/13 and, during his reign, all the potential threats mentioned above materialized. In fact, Perdikkas experienced even more interest on the part of out-siders in Macedonian territory and resources than his father had known, in large part due to the situation in Greece: the start of his rule coincided with the conversion of the voluntary alliance of Greek states headed by Athens into an involuntary association. That conversion, in turn, resulted in a growing division among the Greek states that led to 27 years of civil war (431–404) between Athens and her allies/subjects on the one hand, and Sparta as leader of the Peloponnesian League, on the other.
Macedonia’s strategic location and its timber for ships and weapons were vital to both parties in the Greek conflict. The Athenians established a permanent presence at Amphipolis on the lower Strymon River in 437. The Spartans responded to requests for aid from Perdikkas II in his struggle with Thracian incursions into the Axios region. The confederate kingdom of Lynkestis took the opportunity to separate from the fragile Macedonian coalition and became the strongest tribal state in the region during the second half of the fifth century. Under its own king, Arrhabaios, the Lynkestians proved a powerful army against the combined force of the Macedonians under Perdikkas, the Spartan commander Brasidas with 3,000 hoplites and 1,000 cavalry, and a complement of Chalkidian troops. In spite of such severe problems, the core of the Macedonian kingdom remained intact.
Perdikkas’ son and successor, Archelaos (414–400/399), benefited from developments in Greece that turned the attention of the rival states to other parts of the Mediterranean and Aegean. He is cred-ited with strengthening the core of the kingdom by the construc-tion of border forts to guard the kingdom’s integrity, and of roads linking parts of the territory with one another. Archelaos may also have been responsible for establishing a city at the gates of the Axios river; atop a steep hill on the opposite banks stood a watch tower within an extensive circuit wall. Another major contribution was the cultivation of Hellenic culture in the Macedonian capital. Just
as Alexander I had entertained the Greek lyric poets Pindar and Bakkylides, and Perdikkas II had received visits from Hippokrates and the poet Melanippides, so too reputed visitors at the time of Archelaos included the Athenian poets Euripides and Agathon, the painter Zeuxis, and the musician/lyric poet Timotheos. Socrates was invited to visit Pella but refused on the grounds that he could not repay such hospitality. This Argead ruler was the first Macedonian to win a wreath at the quadriga (four-horse chariot) races in Olympia in 408 bce. Archelaos also enlarged the settlement at Pella, which became the capital during the reign of Philip II, if not earlier.
The end to Archelaos’ endeavors came at the hand of a bitter Macedonian noble who took Archelaos’ life, leaving an heir who was but a child. In the four decades that followed, the kingdom barely managed to survive the internal and external challenges that confronted its seven or eight rulers during the period.
In less than a decade, kingship changed hands among members of three branches of the Argead clan. Initially, the young son of Archelaos, Orestes, was recognized as king, with Aeropos – perhaps his uncle – acting as regent. Aeropos became king in his own right for four years after he had done away with his nephew. On his death, Amyntas II of the line of Alexander I ruled briefly until he was killed by a Derdas of Elimeia in upper Macedonia. A son of Aeropos, Pausanias, succeeded to the kingship for a few months until he was removed by treachery. The names are not as important as the cycle of rules accompanied by intrigue and murder. To be the eldest son of a ruling Argead was not a guarantee of peaceful suc-cession or, if one were successful in being acclaimed king, of a long or unchallenged reign.
A son in the line of Amyntas reaching back to Alexander I had survived the struggle for power; he became king as Amyntas III in 393. Although his reign endured to 370/69, it was troubled inter-nally and exterinter-nally. An Illyrian invasion of Macedon in 388/7 drove Amyntas to abandon the kingship, and for an interlude one Argaios – perhaps a son of King Archelaos – ruled briefly. With the aid of Thessalian Greeks in a three-month campaign, Amyntas regained the
kingship in 387/6. In addition to the Illyrian invaders, he faced an incursion of Greeks from Olynthos on the Chalkidike peninsula in 383/2, a drive that even captured Pella. Amyntas turned to Sparta for alliance and for aid in the struggle between Macedon and Olynthos, which was not resolved until the reign of Philip II.
Twin credits are due to Amyntas for his staying power in such circumstances and for his progeny: Alexander II, who succeeded him for two years (369–368): Perdikkas III, who endured nearly seven years (368–359); and Philip II, who created the massive kingdom of Macedon in his 23-year reign (359–336). Alexander II faced civil war at home, was drawn into ongoing Greek affairs in neighboring Thessaly, and was murdered. His younger brother, Perdikkas III, suc-ceeded him, although a regent exercised real power for several years.
In addition to internal threats to his power, the main external threats demanding Perdikkas’ leadership were Athenian activities in the northern Aegean and the invasions of the Illyrians, who were suc-cessfully pressing eastward from the Adriatic. In determining to meet the threat of the Illyrians, Perdikkas and some 4,000 Macedonians perished in battle in 360/59.
Given the history of rivalry for power recounted above, the choice of successor may have been uncertain. Perdikkas had a young son who might have been declared king. He also had a brother, Philip II. Other rivals included Pausanias and Argaios from other lines of the Argead clan, both of whom had briefly been kings in the 390s and early 380s respectively. After dealing with Pausanias and Argaios, Philip may have been selected as regent for the minor son of his brother or he may have been acclaimed king in his own right. Lively debate surrounds this question, but what is important is the outcome: Philip II became the next leader of the fragile Macedonian state. Here are the powerful words of Charles Edson:
It was this moment of catastrophe and desperation which forged a nation out of the Macedonian people. All elements of society could now apprehend that mere survival depended upon willing obedience to the royal authority . . . The meteoric rise of Macedonia to the
position of a great power under the genial rule of Perdikkas’ younger brother, the famous Philip II, remains a classic instance of courageous and successful response to seemingly insurmountable external pressures. (1970: 43)
Philip could not afford to be constantly genial in an attempt to restore the integrity of the extensive region of which Thukydides wrote “the whole is called Macedonia” (II.99.6). Much of that whole in upper Macedonia had separated from the alliance forged by Alexander I or had been claimed by others – Illyrians, Thracians, and Greeks. He also faced rivalry for power from five pretenders.
To lead an army, his first task was gaining legitimacy; in a word, dealing with rivals and cementing his own right to command. In the meantime, he made treaties rather than war with the Illyrian king and the Athenian demos. By 358, Philip could exchange diplomacy for military action in his dealings with outside powers:
a successful campaign in Illyria followed by marriage to the daugh-ter of the defeated Illyrian king mollified that threat, at least tem-porarily, and an incursion into Thessaly and marriage to a woman of a noble Thessalian family began the Macedonian entrance into Greek affairs. In the following year, an alliance – again strengthened by marriage to the daughter of the king – initiated strong Macedonian ties with Epiros. Closer to the core of Macedonia, upper Macedonia was reunited with the kingdom in 358, and Philip began to use force in an effort to impede Greek, especially Athen-ian, presence in the territory of the northwest Aegean; in 357 he attacked and captured the Athenian settlement of Amphipolis by the River Strymon, a thorn in Macedon’s eastern side for 80 years.
A similar scheme of alliance supplemented by marriage, diplo-macy, and campaign continued throughout Philip’s career. Essential to any hope of success was adequate military strength; consequently, while developments cannot be precisely dated, it is more than likely that rebuilding and reforming the army that had been so decimated in 359 were an immediate priority for Philip. He had had the advantage of learning at first hand the major reform of the hoplite
phalanx accomplished by Thebes, when he had been a hostage in Thebes (367–364) at the age of young manhood, i.e. ages 15–18.
The significance of this knowledge is shown by its success in allow-ing Thebes to create an empire of its own after defeatallow-ing the hith-erto superior Spartan army in 371. The changes to the Macedonian force are discussed more fully in the account of Alexander’s inher-itance from Philip in chapters 3 and 5. Here we may note the major features: a more mobile infantry equipped with a longer spear;
expanded cavalry; special squadrons of light infantry and light cavalry; and development of siege machinery. As the territory of the kingdom expanded – whether through conquest or alliance – more troops became available. And with efficient use of resources, they could be constantly in the field either on campaign or in drill.
Philip helped his own cause but he also benefited from the actions and attitudes of his enemies. Aid from his enemies took the form of disunity. Apart from the alliances increasingly reaching out from Macedon, there was little unity among the various peoples of the Balkans, or Thracians, or Greeks, among whom war against one another was a fact of life. Philip understood and used these inter-nal conflicts to his advantage in expanding his sphere of influence further south into Greece; eastward against the Greek states of the Chalkidike peninsula and then into Thrace as far as the Black Sea;
west to the shore of the Adriatic; and north into the Balkans.
Thessaly and the Chalkidian states continued to occupy him during the 350s. By 352, campaigns in Thessaly had met with enough success – although not complete victory – that he assumed the Thessalian position of tagos, leader of the military levies of all four regions of Thessaly. Philip’s capture of the center of the Chalkidian League at Olynthos in 348, and the subsequent destruc-tion of that city as well as perhaps more than 30 other settlements, effectively brought the Chalkidike into the Macedonian sphere.
Since southern Greeks – particularly the Athenians – were active in the northern Aegean, Philip’s action virtually promised ongoing confrontation with the major Greek poleis. At the same time, these more remote Greeks appreciated the force of the Macedonian army;
it might be used to aid the cause of one party in the never-ending wars between the poleis, wherever they were located.
The first half of the fourth century saw a continuation of the ruinous civil war between Athens and Sparta and their allies, from 431 to 404. In a kaleidoscope of attempts at overlordship on the part of major and minor states alike, participants moved from posi-tions of power to the status of defeated subjects. In the process, former enemies became allies while former allies took the field against one another. As Greeks fought one another, their attention was, first, distracted from Macedonia and, later, turned to Philip and his army as tools in their own efforts. Philip used the situation adroitly. When invited to settle the war ranging between Phokis and other states in central Greece, Philip accepted that invitation. Phokis was defeated in 346 with Philip gaining another official position, namely membership in the council protecting the sacred site of Delphi.
Philip could not ignore other traditional enemies: Macedonian armies marched against the Illyrians in the north, advanced to Epiros in the west, and into Thrace and then Skythia in the east. New agreements were made, such as an alliance with the king of the Getai, who dwelt in the region between Thrace and the Danube;
new colonies were founded. With southern Greece, at least for the moment, relations were not military. Philip sent and received embassies particularly to and from Athens, while supporting pro-Macedonian elements in various parts of Greece. The states of Messenia and Megalopolis in the Peloponnese, for example, were invited to join the Delphic Amphiktyony alongside the other Greek states and Philip.
Notwithstanding such diplomacy, fear of Philip’s intentions was increasing, again particularly in Athens, whose own interests in the Black Sea were jeopardized by Macedonian assaults. However, con-frontation would involve more than Macedon and Athens and it would not be located in the Propontis. Rather, when fighting in central Greece flared again early in the 330s, Philip led his Macedonians back to Greece as both Macedonian king and Greek
official. Growing concern about Philip’s ultimate intentions pro-duced a coalition led by Athens and Thebes, with the participation of Boeotian allies of Thebes and contingents from Achaian states.
At the site of Chaironeia in Boeotia, some 30,000–35,000 Greek troops met a roughly equal number of Macedonians commanded on the right wing by Philip and on the left by his son, Alexander, who held command of the cavalry. The Macedonian victory was decisive; Greek survivors fled homeward, expecting retaliation.
In place of retaliation the affairs of the Greek states were settled by the foundation of the League of Corinth, into which all, with the notable exception of Sparta, were drawn for offensive and defen-sive purposes. Sparta’s absence is telling: the presence of the once supreme hoplite state of all Greece was no longer necessary for the functioning of a kingdom that, by 336, reached from Illyria in the northwest to the west coast of the Black Sea in the southeast, and from the southern Balkans in the north through the Greek main-land in the south. The territorial size of the kingdom is estimated to have been 16,680 square miles (43,210 km2) – over 12,000 square miles (31,500 km2) of which were effectively possessed and 4,500 square miles (11,710 km2) directly controlled. At the end of the Peloponnesian war, the size had been 8,400 square miles (21,750 km2), while during the reign of Alexander I it had been 6,600 square miles (17,200 km2). Members belonged by conquest, alliance cemented by marriage to the Macedonian king, and part-nership in shared goals planned by council meetings of delegates from all the participants. At the center of every link was Philip II, reaching out in various ways and many directions from his capital at Pella.
The new order had barely begun when Philip was assassinated in 336. It is a validation of Philip’s planning that his son and succes-sor, Alexander III, was able to reaffirm his father’s arrangements during the first two years of his kingship. Revolts erupted – from Illyria, where Alexander led the Macedonian army in 335, and from Greece, centered on Thebes. The new king dealt with both, quickly
and effectively: Thebes was destroyed. The kingdom of Macedonia was under control and its northern borders had been secured when he began the campaign against Persia in 334.
However, it is important to remember that the unification was very recent and that tensions not only remained but had been inten-sified in the creation of the expansive kingdom, which, under Philip, had grown so significantly in territorial size and population. Various congeries of people now drawn together by conquest or alliance remembered themselves as separate entities – separated both by natural features of the land and by culture. Most, if not all of those groups remembered their independence. Separatist movements that had been a problem for earlier Argead rulers would continue to trouble Alexander. Moreover, patterns of life still differed
However, it is important to remember that the unification was very recent and that tensions not only remained but had been inten-sified in the creation of the expansive kingdom, which, under Philip, had grown so significantly in territorial size and population. Various congeries of people now drawn together by conquest or alliance remembered themselves as separate entities – separated both by natural features of the land and by culture. Most, if not all of those groups remembered their independence. Separatist movements that had been a problem for earlier Argead rulers would continue to trouble Alexander. Moreover, patterns of life still differed