Creativity

Typical definitions of creativity run along the lines of ‗having the ability or power to create‘ (Collins English Dictionary 1994) and ‗involving the use of skill and the imagination to produce sth new or a work of art‘ (Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary 2000). However, as Carter (2004: 24-30) argues, although creativity has since the 1700s been associated with originality, individualism, genius and invention, its semantic roots suggest this has not always been the case.1 Modern Western ideas of the individual and autonomy restrict current notions of creativity to talented individuals, obscuring discussion of collaborative, contextualised creativity emerging from everyday interaction (Carter 2004b: 30). Carter‘s (2004: 54-8) argument that our parallel association of creativity with written ‗literary‘ language arises primarily through the greater value placed on writing over speaking, and the greater priority granted to its analysis, reflects arguments made by linguists exploring spoken grammar (Brazil 1995; Halliday, 1989; Biber et al 1999; Carter and McCarthy 2006;

1 _{The idea, for example, of the artist or writer as a lone individual is a recent concept which disregards the} collaborative, co-creating work of writers such as Shakespeare or, indeed, of artists such as DJs who sample previous artists‘ work (Pennycock 2007); similarly, invention derives from the Latin in-venir (to come into) and implies an intervention, a building on existing knowledge within the particular circumstances and needs of a particular social group rather than any novel construct (Carter 2004b).

O‘Keeffe et al 2007).1

The implication of Carter‘s work is not that speech is necessarily as creative as literature, but that literary written language exploits the potential for all language to be manipulated and all language users to be creative (Swann 2006: 18). The instinctive reaction to this may be to object to any notion that Shakespeare has parallels with everyday conversation, but the important point is that Carter‘s use of creativity is free from consideration of social or cultural merit. Instead, the same resources which Shakespeare draws on to craft imagery and complex ideas are exploited spontaneously in conversation to fulfil less explicitly socially-valued tasks such as signalling involvement.

This definition of creativity therefore has a larger remit than language play, encompassing covert pattern construction as well as deliberate, playful manipulation of forms. If creativity need not be novel or humorous, however, the question remains as to what it does involve and how we can recognise it.

6.2.2 Defining creativity

Creativity can be defined as the manipulation of language form, in unexpected and yet contextually appropriate ways. It is therefore through manipulation of forms, rather than semantic meaning, that intended effects are achieved. This definition, to borrow Maybin and Swann‘s (2007) terms, can however be broken down into textual (formal), contextual and critical (evaluative) aspects. This chapter takes the view that creativity must initially be identified through formal properties, but that probable contextual and critical factors must be considered when exploring each instance.

6.2.2.1 Textual aspects

That creativity can be defined (at least in part) as ‗manipulation of language form‘ is generally accepted across the literature, even among those who do not take a textual (data- based) approach (Cook 1994; 1997).2 Swann (2006: 6), for example, suggests that in creative language ‗[s]ome formal aspect of language – such as sound, rhythm, grammar,

1 _{Carter (2004: 56-7) draws on Halliday (1985/1989) to point out that, with the advent of tape recorders, not} only can spoken language now be explored, but so can Halliday‘s assertion that spoken language is in fact richer, more fluid, and more spontaneous than writing.

2

Cook‘s assertion, for example, that natural language can be ‗preparatory, repetitive, artificial, removed from reality, and focused on the rules of the game‘ (Cook 1997: 230) leads him to argue against the accepted wisdom of current English language teaching (ELT) practices which prioritise meaningful communication over form-based instruction. The fact that language users often focus on grammar and phonology rules rather than semantic meaning can be seen, Cook argues, in the apparent significance of formal properties in texts as diverse as nursery rhymes and advertising.

meaning – is highlighted and this makes the utterance stand out‘. Forms which are ‗highlighted‘ through being repeated or non-canonical impact on listeners, thus achieving intended social effects. In Cook‘s (2000: 137) words, ‗meaning and effect are dictated by patterning of forms, rather than the other way round‘; and this is echoed by Carter‘s (2004: 81) claim that creativity: ‗depends for its effects on particular patterns of language form‘. Although seemingly excluding consideration of language play on a semantic level, as in the creation of fantasy worlds, the formal definition in fact allows us to position fiction as a function of language manipulation (Cook 2000: 58). Cook argues that our ability to disassociate syntax from semantics and operate them separately enables us to use syntax as a basis on which to create syntactically-correct but semantically-unreal situations. Cook‘s (2000) argument is limited somewhat in that he applies it only to children‘s stories and nonsense rhymes, in which the disassociation of semantics and syntax is evident, and it is not clear how it relates to more realist fiction. Nonetheless, for present purposes, our definition of creativity as the manipulation of forms would allow us to explore how it is used, alongside images, sound, and semantics, to create fictions, much as it is used to signal involvement.1

The validity, however, of assuming all language manipulation to be creative, including (as Carter and Tannen do) covert patterning, is questioned on the grounds that it renders the concept diluted and meaningless (Swann 2006: 9). Maybin and Swann (2007), who would not describe all repetition as creative, avoid this by perceiving occurrences of creativity as performances framed by unexpected language forms and marked off from everyday interaction. However, as Carter points out in personal communication to Swann (2006: 9), the issue here is how creativity is defined and valued. If creativity is seen as collaborative and co-creating, building on existing knowledge and within particular contexts rather than as novel inventiveness, then it can be perceived as a common feature.2 The problem remains however that defining creativity so broadly risks the interesting paradox that it is both unusual or unexpected and common (Pennycook 2007: 583-4).3

1 _{Similar points can be made regarding the hindering of identification of creative practices at the level of} discourse (Holmes and Marra 2002).

2

Swann‘s (2006) assertion that ‗while it [everyday creativity] may have certain interactional effects, it is not creative; however, it may be drawn on in literature to creative effect‘ suggests an association of creativity with the originality, individualism, genius and invention arises from Western ideas of the individual and of

autonomy (Carter 2004b: 26). See section 6.2.1.2 above. 3

Pennycook describes it as an: ‗apparently paradoxical state of affairs whereby the breaking of language norms may be the norm (which undermines the notion of the norm)‘.

The argument can nonetheless be made that the decision to label all language manipulation as inherently creative neglects consideration of its functions and how it is perceived by participants (Carter 2004b: 148). Holmes and Marra (2002: 70-73 in Swann 2006: 21-26), for example, identify functions of humour in the workplace through sociocultural clues which indicate how utterances are received and responded to. A sociocultural approach to creativity acknowledges, Swann (2006: 26) concludes, that people in different cultures and contexts may interpret humour differently; and also that participants‘ perspectives can differ from external researchers (Carter 2004b: 151). This in turn raises questions as to whether features can be defined post-hoc by researchers as creative if, used unconsciously by participants, they pass unnoticed at the time. I would argue that they can, on the basis that although most other linguistic features operate below the consciousness of language users, this does not preclude their functions or significance.1 The extent to which sociocultural clues can or should be incorporated into predominantly formal investigations is returned to below.

6.2.2.2 Contextual aspects

The contextual level can be understood both in reference to cultural backgrounds shared by participants and to the fact that creativity is seen as arising from interaction in local contexts (Maybin and Swann 2007: 498). The role of shared cultural knowledge is illustrated in the following exchange, in which a hostess apologises for a lack of vegetables.

Figure 6.2 Shared cultural knowledge (Carter 2004b: 100)

<S 01> And so I‘m afraid we‘re a it sort of erm challenged greenwise.. <S 02> Greenly challenged.

<S 01> We‘re greenly challenged so erm sorry about that.

As Carter points out, creativity here not only draws on British concerns with political correctness and speakers‘ awareness as to how politically-correct terms tend to be phrased, but also shows how creativity can be jointly created within the context of particular interactions: the second speaker picks up on the first‘s use of greenwise and corrects it to

greenly, which the first accepts.

1

A good example of a feature of language escaping native-speaker intuition is semantic prosody (Louw 1993) whereby things that are caused, for example, are nearly always bad: fires, problems (Stubbs 1994).

The need to explore spoken creativity in terms of its functions in particular contexts emerges from recognition that creativity can only be defined as such if the manipulation of formal properties is both unexpected within the context of the interaction, and appropriate to it (Carter 2004b: 148; North 2007). This raises again the question as to whether identification of language use as creative depends on its interpretation as such by listeners.1 For North, the impact on other participants online is highly significant, and she distinguishes ‗successful humour‘ as that which builds social cohesion by responding to and being responded to by other participants (North 2007: 548). Participants need not explicitly signal that they find instances of creativity ‗coherent‘ but this must at least become apparent by their smooth insertion into the exchange.

Another implication of the role of context is that the nature and function of creativity may differ across contexts.2 In North‘s (2007) investigation of online MSN discussions, for example, she notes that creativity may be encouraged by the particular need in online chat to keep talking (North 2007: 544). Inevitably, creative language occurs more frequently in certain contexts such as intimate discourse, where participants share experiences and ideas within symmetrical relationships (Carter 2004b: 151-164). Online communication, for example, has been described, in North‘s words, as ‗particularly playful‘, not only because of its textual resources but because time delays allow participants to craft responses and prepare puns (North 2007: 546). The fact that previous messages can be viewed at leisure must also contribute to participants maintaining creative threads. Online creativity is also encouraged, as Carter (2007: 598) suggests, by the need to construe new identities and negotiate interactive practices. As we shall see in CorTxt, however, creativity does not always differ across contexts solely in terms of degree,3 but also in different ways.1

1 _{Carter‘s call for further research into the role of context in shaping creative language use focuses (among} other things) on the need to document listener characteristics and contributions as well as those of speakers, despite inherent problems in accessing and evaluating such information (Carter 2007: 606). Doing so, suggests Carter, would reflect the shift in literary studies towards the idea that ‗definitions of literature‘ lie as much with readers as with writers; and the shift from one abstract and timeless value to various context- dependent values (Carter 2007: 601). The shift means that conversational creativity need not be evaluated in comparison with socially-valued literary works but in terms of its own value as perceived, perhaps, by participants in the interaction (Maybin and Swann 2007: 514). These are important points which challenge or at least contextualise the notion of literary merit and which have implications extending beyond the remit of this thesis.

2 _{Carter‘s (2004) stated aim is therefore to explore creative functions across various social and generic} contexts (in and beyond CANCODE), involving different speakers and types of interaction, including IRC (Internet Relay Chat) interaction.

3

Carter‘s focus appears to be on ‗the extent to which creative language use is evident in different speech genres‘ (Carter 2004b: 149).

Incorporating context into investigations of creativity is however far from straightforward. Practical problems include accessing and recording contextual factors, especially those relating to participants‘ intentions and motivations (Carter 2007: 606), as well as initially defining what constitutes context. North (2007: 550), for example, draws on Colby (1987: 452) in suggesting online creativity be understood not only within the context of the current exchange, but within the wider, online experience shaping participants‘ practices.2

The issue is arguably more complicated with spoken interaction, in which speakers may draw on various interactions or shared experiences (Maybin and Swann 2007: 514). Similarly, contributors to CorTxt tend to have relationships extending to other mediums of communication including face-to-face (see Chapter 2) which potentially shape their intentions and interpretations when texting. The other issue is that, even where researchers can access various contextual factors, those they foreground may not be those prioritised by participants (Maybin and Swann 2007: 514). Carter (2004b) acknowledges that his conclusions rest on informed speculation over essentially private, contextually-bound exchanges. The present attempt to relate uses of creativity to the nature and affordances of texting similarly acknowledges that it is only one post-hoc interpretation of the interaction.

6.2.2.3 Critical aspects

The third level to creativity encompasses the evaluative or interpersonal functions fulfilled or foregrounded by creativity (Maybin and Swann 2007: 498).3 Functions which creative language fulfils in everyday interaction were described previously as those not only of fun or amusement but also signalling involvement (Tannen 1989), creating convergence between speakers, indicating a sense of belonging or group membership, displaying identity and offering new perspectives (Carter 2004b) as well as conflict or competition (Cook 2007). According to Maybin and Swann, creativity serves to signal or frame evaluative 1

For example (but see below), the repetition of nouns (but not the determiner they initially occur with) as a cohesive devise serving to make connections between messages given the time delay (section 6.4.2.3) and the ability of texters to comment on their own utterances and, unlike spoken utterances, leave a record of this (section 6.5.5 below).

2

In fact, North (2007: 545) suggests that in the MSN discussions the only context that exists is that constructed textually and collaboratively by participants. This raises the more fundamental challenge which questions the notion of an external and unchanging context which impacts in observable ways on internal features of the text (Maybin and Swann 2007: 501). Maybin and Swann highlight a contradiction in studies of creativity which simultaneously acknowledge, as Carter does, that creativity varies between interactions depending on shifting purposes, expectations and relationships and yet seeks to explain language forms through fixed contextual factors. However, their challenge also seems to be one they direct more generally at the investigation of large language corpora and lies out of the scope of the current discussion.

3

In their words, ‗the potential for linguistic creativity to foreground, in various ways, the kinds of critical/evaluative stances that are evident in all language use‘ (Maybin and Swann 2007: 498).

functions or performances, in turn evaluated by the audience. The role that creativity plays in fulfilling these functions (in spoken and texted interaction) is explored in greater depth later in this chapter.

Of significance here, however, is the question as to why manipulation of language patterning in the form it takes is necessary for marking stance and other interpersonal functions. The reason, according to Cook (2000: 137-8), lies in the randomness of the relationship between form and meaning. Forms combine randomly to produce meanings through which users convey information or perform tasks. In certain situations, however, where language is needed primarily to collaborate or compete, the focus is not on conveying content and, in the absence of any need to be factually accurate or meaningful, grammatical or phonological patterns themselves become the focus of concern. This can be seen, for example, in nursery rhymes, pre-fight exchanges, and verbal duelling in the British House of Commons, where ‗words are used like the ball in a contest‘ (Cook 2000: 67). As formal patterns take on greater importance, they are no longer dictated by semantic meanings but become independent concerns: form bypasses semantic meaning to directly produce intended social or interpersonal effects (Cook 2000: 137). Given our observations above regarding different values and interpretations of creativity, the effects must be understood in highly-contextualised terms. However, although Cook‘s theory can only remain as Swan (2006) puts it, ‗(informed) speculation‘ and is not based on wide or systematic data study, it seems particularly relevant to texting where such factors as interpersonal functions, relaxed prescription regarding standard forms, and lack of resources other than the written word combine to encourage a focus on, and manipulation of, form.

6.2.2.4 Summary

Discussion of everyday creativity raises challenging issues not yet fully resolved. However, while discussion of these issues enhances our understanding of creativity, in order to proceed with investigations of this phenomenon, decisions must be made by each researcher regarding how creative language is to be defined. In this chapter, creativity is defined as ‗the manipulation of language form in unexpected yet contextually appropriate ways to achieve an intended effect‘. This reflects the aspects of creativity identified by Maybin and Swann (2007): textual, contextual and critical; and Carter‘s (2004: 148) recognition that formal definitions of creativity are insufficient without consideration of

local purposes. However, the definition also allows for creativity to be initially identified and retrieved in terms of formal properties: a method compatible with the focus on data in this thesis.