Criticisms of Bernstein and his work

As with all scholars, Bernstein’s work has been subject to criticism, both during his lifetime and since. He is often regarded as a product of his time, forever associated (with Young) with the clash of ideologies played out

between the ‘new’ versus the ‘old’ sociology of education in the 1970s. During his lifetime he used his books and interviews to create a dialogue with other members of the research community and address and respond to the critiques of his work, as can be seen in the Introduction and Part III of his 2000 book and his interview with Solomon reproduced as chapter 11 in the same edition. Set out below is a brief overview of the main criticisms that are relevant to this research being, the inpenetrability of his writing and the slipperyness of his concepts; the lack of emphasis on human agency and his overly structuralist tendencies; the idea that his ideas are deterministic; and the limitations of his work due to it being an example of a white, male, middle class grand narrative (Singh, 2002).

To provide context, and as Rowland reminds us, “[all theories] should be treated with caution. They are all narratives. They each tell a story, but only one story. They may shed light on an aspect… but, in the process, cast others into shadow” (Rowland (1993) p16 cited in McLean, 2006, p. 14). My

dedication to adopting a Bernsteinian approach includes being mindful of this advice. Bernstein’s concepts are only one of the ways to shine a light on the issue I have identified. In the shadow, other equally useful research into University-level legal education can, and should, be conducted.

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As is the case for many researchers, when first reading Bernstein I found his abstract style rather impenetrable and off-putting. Beck & Young (2005, p. 186) make an analogy with reading Marx, observing that Bernstein’s more abstract theoretical statements can appear rather uncompromising. Similarly Power (2006) explains her frustration with the “slipperiness” of some of Bernstein’s ideas and the way they evolve in the way they are explained by Bernstein over time. Having now read and re-read Bernstein over a prolonged period of time I share Power’s view that “the frustrations can be many, but the intellectual challenges are important and worthwhile” (Power, 2006, p. 108). As Sadovnik (2011) explains, the sociology of education has mirrored the larger theoretical debates in the discipline of education, including the classical sociology of Marx, Weber and Durkheim and the more contemporary

influences including post modernism and critical theory. Reading this is never meant to be easy. Apple et al refer to this as a ‘discourse community’ which is defined and redefined by a set of theoretical and methodological disputes (M. Apple, 2000; M. W. Apple, Ball, & Gandin, 2010) and Bernstein’s work

continues to be central to the debate. It is notable that by returning frequently to the original source of Bernstein’s theory it becomes easier to identify when his ideas have been misappropriated in the work of newer members of the discourse community “for the purpose of a researcher’s requirements rather than of the author’s intentions” (2000, pxvii). I have been mindful of this concern throughout.

In part as a result of the timing of his research, there was initial criticism of the lack of emphasis on human agency in Bernstein’s concepts (Shilling, 1992). Following some of his earliest publications, Atkinson (1995) and Archer (Archer cited in Dale, 1983, p. 186) also wrote respectively about his

overemphasis and neglect of the structure of the education system. This focus on Bernstein’s perceived Durkheimian structuralism is also evident in the earlier work of Apple (M. W. Apple, 1979, p. 181). As with the comments about his stylistic impenetrability, Bernstein addressed these criticisms during his lifetime, which, in the case of Apple, led to a deepening of mutual respect that turned into friendship between the men. In his later work Apple referred to Bernstein’s “theoretically elegant analysis” (M. W. Apple, 2002, p. 608) and he continued to use Bernstein’s theories for his own research after Bernstein’s death, including studies of education in Singapore with Wong (T. H. Wong & Apple, 2002) who continues to produce Bernsteinian research (T.-H. Wong,

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2017). I am not concerned whether Bernstein’s work is perceived as

structuralist or not. It is uncontentious to state that both education and the law contribute to the structure of Western society but that the practice of law and education is mediated by the people acting within it. This means that this perceived criticism does not prevent Bernstein’s ideas being useful in this research.

A similar pragmatic approach can be taken in relation to the third criticism of Bernstein’s work, being that it is overly deterministic. As Arnot explains, the criticism here is that because it is, in effect, a theory of reproduction, it fails to demonstrate either the conditions in which social conflict occurs or the

mechanisms for social change (Arnot, 1995, p. 310). In this and subsequent work Arnot gives rather short shrift to this criticism, as it is in effect criticising Bernstein for not doing something that he never set out to do. She explains that Bernstein offers one of the most complex and challenging theories of cultural and symbolic orders in education (Arnot, 1995, p. 317) and

showcases his extraordinarily intuitive understanding of the workings of the social order (Arnot, 2002, p. 592). For this he can be forgiven for not finding the solution to social reproduction.

The final criticism is, for me, the most problematic. As Singh explains, some accuse Bernstein of contributing towards ‘white, male, middle class grand narratives’ (Singh, 2002) and it would appear that there is some truth in this. My understanding of critical and feminist approaches to research is that there is an inherent male centredness to grand theories, including Bernstein’s, which use classifications, polarisations, and dichotomies to make sense of the world. This emphasises the points highlighted by Arnot, but originally made by MacKinnon, Gilligan and other seminal feminist writers, about the

fragmentation and emotional distancing in male-ordered worlds (Arnot, 1995, p. 307). The relevance of my own feminism to my research is explored in more detail in the research integrity section at 3.2 below. For now, I am assured that Bernstein’s ideas continue to have resonance with a broad

spectrum of people. For example, Bernstein’s work is increasingly being used, discussed and critiqued in non-Western contexts including, as Takayama identifies amongst Japanese scholars (Takayama cited in M. W. Apple, Au, Gandin, & Apple, 2009, p. 362). Arnot explains that being a feminist is only one aspect of her identity and she speculates whether it was her Catholic upbringing which urged her to make sense of the world according to

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structures, rituals and order – and led her to Bernstein (Arnot, 1995, p. 298). Singh contextualises this criticism by stating that it is an opinion rarely articulated by people who knew Bernstein. She describes how he was a passionate supporter of the rights of disadvantage students, and had a nuanced understanding of how education can lead to the (re)production of social inequality. There was nothing Bernstein could do about being white, male and middle class. That does not mean that he should represent all that is wrong with the research tradition of others who share these characteristics. As can be seen, it is not realistic for one theorist or one theory to be the ‘grand narrative’ and provide the answer to everything. Theory merely

provides thinking tools that help to shed light on an aspect of the social world. Despite, or indeed because of, these criticisms Bernstein’s concepts can provide a useful theoretical backdrop to this study, where the emphasis is on the classification and framing of legal knowledge and the representations of the legal professional in the ORF and PRF of University-level legal education. For this there now needs to be further explanation of the meaning of

knowledge in the context of this research.

2.4 Knowledge, the region of law, and public law knowledge