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Table 4.2 summarises the results of the assessment of peace and conflict sensi-tivity in the NDDC institutional context, using Lange‘s framework. Table 4.3 summa-rises the answers to pertinent questions in determining the mainstreaming of PCS in the Commission‘s institutional context.
4.4.2 Peace and Conflict Sensitivity of the NDDC Intervention
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Table 4.2. Peace and Conflict Sensitivity in NDDC Institutional Context
S/N Concepts Indicators Results
1 Institutional commitment
Organisational leadership support for PCS No Development of peace and conflict-sensitive policies Yes Creating appropriate decision-making sys-tems/structures
Fair Committing staff time and financial resources to strengthening a peace and conflict-sensitive organisa-tional culture
No
2 Willingness to make changes in organisational cul-ture and institu-tional structure
Cross-organisational buy-in No
Participation and ownership No
Open communication channels on and between all levels of the organisation
No Facilitating the flow of knowledge and learning No Consistently incorporating peace and conflict-sensitive skills in staff training and recruitment proc-esses.
No
3 Support for staff capacity develop-ment
Development of tool/methodology for PCS No Staff training, appraisal and rewards for PCS pro-gramming
Weak training only for CRD Adoption of peace and conflict-sensitive evaluation
mechanisms and procedures.
No Requisite peace and conflict-sensitive skills for staff:
understanding of the particular geographical area [and its conflict issues]
knowledge of the relevant language(s)
relationship-building and analytical skills;
and
ability to deal with high stress levels
No Good NE*
NE NE
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S/N Concepts Indicators Results
Separate peacebuilding units or integrating it on all levels.
Separate Unit 4 Accountability
mechanisms
Appropriate appraisal and incentives systems that encourage peace and conflict-sensitive programming and balance individual accountability with the need for learning.
None
documenting and disseminating better practice None rewarding progress to create a positive energy for
moving forward
None
5 Conducive exter-nal
Relationships
Conducive relationships with groups and actors that influence the conflict sensitivity of the wider re-sponse:
local partner organisations
donors
INGOs, and national and international con-stituencies supporting the organisation
domestic and international policy environ-ments
funding constraints
partnerships relations
Fair NE Fair Unfair Partial N/E
Community buy-in or ownership of its intervention;
and
building community‘s capacity for peace and conflict sensitivity
No No
Coherence and seamless fit among the differ-ent stages
Sophisticated PCS planning system No
Staff and partners ownership of the PCS tool No
Capacity to use it No
Support to use it No
*Not Evaluated.
Source: Author‘s Assessment, 2013
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Table 4.3. Answers to Pertinent Questions on PCS in the NDDC Institutional Context
Source: Author‘s assessment, 2013
S/N Questions Answers
1 Is the NDDC committed and motivated for PCS main-streaming?
No
2 Is its organisational culture reflective of PCS? No
3 Does is build staff capacity for PCS? Very weakly and lim-ited to CRD personnel 4 Does it have accountability mechanisms for PCS? No
5 Does it enjoy conducive external relations? Not really
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Table 4.4. Peace and Conflict Sensitivity in the NDDC Intervention Programming S/
N
Stages of interven-tion
Indicators Results
1 Peace and conflict sensitive conception and planning
Incorporating peacebuilding and conflict-transformation principles into agencies‘ stra-tegic policies.
Yes
Linking conflict analysis with the objectives of the project in the project design.
No Ensuring all planning processes themselves are conflict-sensitive.
No Sacrificing some speed of delivery to ensure adequate conflict-sensitive planning.
Not ap-plicable
2 Peace and conflict sensitive implementa-tion
Using conflict-sensitive tools and methodologies. No Investing in developing, disseminating and pro-viding training in these.
No Hiring specialist, experienced and trained conflict advisors to support field and HQ staff.
No Cooperating closely with local partners in identi-fying and addressing conflict dynamics.
No Anticipating changing dynamics and developing contingency plans.
No
3 Peace and conflict sensitive monitoring and evaluation
Monitoring and evaluating programmes according to their impact on conflict and peace and vice versa.
No
Setting flexible indicators that cover the process and outcomes of the programme as well as its outputs.
No
Conducting joint monitoring and evaluation with local partners and communities.
No
Source: Author‘s Assessment, 2013
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The second indicator is linking conflict analysis with the objectives of the in-tervention during conception and planning stage. Inasmuch as the Master Plan was de-veloped as a response to, and based on, the analysis of the NDR conflict, in a sense, the Commission linked the analysis of the conflict with the objectives of its generic region-level intervention. However, this is not always the case in designing specific interventions at the community level. This is because, although the Commission de-pends largely on the Master Plan in conceiving and planning its programmes, the con-flict analysis of Odi community context was not done. The NDDC‘s practice was to intervene through ad-hoc peacebuilding interventions in response to open conflicts. A case in point is the supply of flying boats to certain people in Odi community in re-sponse to Odi youths‘ agitations when they obstructed the former NDDC chairman, Larry Koiyan, on Odi-Trofani Road (see section 5.1.3.2).
It appears that the interests of the NDDC board and management, politicians and contractors are paramount in the process of conceiving and planning the interven-tions. Community‘s interests have a narrow chance of consideration through the activi-ties of Ward 12 (See Sub-section 5.2.2). And finally, available data support the fact that the Commission does not do a peace and conflict-sensitive planning. So the ques-tion of sacrificing speed of delivery to ensure adequate peace and conflict-sensitive planning (as also required) does not arise. Hence, characteristic corruption and corpo-rate bad governance appear to be the major reason for the insensitivity of the concep-tion and planning processes to peace and conflict dynamics of the context.
In conclusion, the assessment of the peace and conflict-sensitivity of the con-ception and planning stage of the NDDC interventions was done using four indicators of peace and conflict-sensitive conception and planning (see section 2.4.1). They are incorporating peacebuilding and conflict-transformation principles into agencies‘ stra-tegic policies; linking conflict analysis with the objectives of the project in the project design; ensuring all planning processes themselves are conflict-sensitive; and sacrific-ing some speed of delivery to ensure adequate conflict-sensitive plannsacrific-ing. Empirical evidence shows that only the first indicator is present in the Commission‘s conception and planning stage of intervention. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 summarise the results of the as-sessment of the conception and planning.
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Table 4.5. Answers to Pertinent Questions about Mainstreaming PCS in the NDDC Intervention Programming
S/N Questions Answers
1 Is peace and conflict sensitivity mainstreamed in conception and planning?
No
2 Is peace and conflict sensitivity mainstreamed in implementation? No
3 Is peace and conflict sensitivity mainstreamed in monitoring and evaluation?
No
Source: Author‘s Assessment, 2013
163 4.4.2. 2 Implementation
The five indicators of peace and conflict-sensitive implementation as presented in sec-tion 2.4.1 include using conflict-sensitive tools and methodologies; investing in devel-oping, disseminating and providing training in these; hiring specialist, experienced and trained conflict advisors to support field and headquarters‘ staff; cooperating closely with local partners in identifying and addressing conflict dynamics; and anticipating changing dynamics and developing contingency plans. The corresponding questions to the five indicators include: does the Commission use peace and conflict-sensitive tools and methodologies (e.g. PCIA, CSA, SCA, or any of the frameworks or similar ones to those presented and/or discussed in chapter 2)? Does it invest in developing, dissemi-nating and providing training on these tools and methodologies? Does the NDDC hire specialist, experienced and trained conflict advisors to support field and headquarters staff? Does it cooperate closely with local partners in identifying and addressing con-flict dynamics? And finally, does the Commission anticipate changing dynamics and develop contingency plans?
Generally speaking, the answer to these questions is ―no‖. Only one NDDC staff interviewed has heard of peace and conflict impact assessment, conflict-sensitivity or any similar terms. However, he confirmed that the Commission does not use it or any similar methodology in programming its intervention. Analysis of the re-sponses of other staff indicates that they had no knowledge of any of such frameworks or terminologies. The same goes for the NDDC consultants and community people.
Community people confirmed that the NDDC interventions do not have elements of peace and conflict sensitivity incorporated into them. No community member remem-bered the usage of terms germane to peace and conflict sensitivity during the imple-mentation of any of the Commission‘s intervention. Mr Godwin Unumeri, an expert on PCIA and the Niger Delta describes NDDC implementation in the following terms:
They look at the communities and say, ‗Ok this community needs, maybe a school or a road or any other development project.‘ They just go there and they site the project without looking at the effect of this project on the enforcement or weakening of the peace structures. They don‘t look at that
(Fieldwork: Interview, 06/03/2011).
The participant quoted above is a Shell-trained expert on PCIA and a consultant for Peacebuild Canada on conflict-sensitivity programming in the Niger Delta. He is a Ni-ger Deltan and independent researcher with almost a decade experience in PCIA in the
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Niger Delta. He co-authored a resource material on conflict sensitivity in the Niger Delta. Confirming this view, an NDDC desk officer, a former NDDC Community and Rural Development personnel, said
… and that‘s why we have conflict otherwise there shouldn‘t be con-flict for the CRD [Directorate of Community and Rural Development]
to go and resolve. Because if a community is not aware of a project un-til a contractor arrives, they are bound to say ‗contractor come and give us marching ground‘ [money demanded by the locals to permit the con-tractors to work in their community] ok, so there is a gap between how it should be done and how it is being done presently. (Fieldwork: In-terview, 06/07/2011)
Deutsche Gesellschaftfür Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) International, a Germany-based organisation in conflict transformation was a lead consultant for the NDDC in drawing the Master Plan. This portrays conflict sensitivity in drawing the Master Plan. However, findings show that the NDDC does not hire specialist, experi-enced and/or trained conflict advisors to support field and headquarters staff for im-plementation of its intervention at the community level. Rather, personnel of the CRD intervene whenever conflicts arise as a result of an intervention. Findings show that the Commission does not work with potential local partners such as the Traditional Coun-cil, the Youth CounCoun-cil, the women‘s group and the community development council in identifying and addressing conflict dynamics. It only informs the Traditional Council at the point of implementing its interventions. Expectedly, this has negative impacts on the implementation of the interventions. A case in point is the conflict triggered be-tween Asanga and Tamanga by the concrete pavement of internal link roads in Odi (see section 5.4.1). Finally, whether the Commission anticipates changing dynamics and develops contingency plans could not be directly ascertained. One could only infer that using the Master Plan and other strategic documents as the main basis for concep-tion and planning intervenconcep-tion to the exclusion of the community people implies that the NDDC may not factor in the changing dynamics of peace and conflict in the NDR.
At the level of the community, the Commission intervenes when its intervention causes conflict with the hope of resolving it. Empirical data available is not sufficient to confirm or confute any other contingency plan for changing dynamics of peace and conflict.
In conclusion, using Maria Lange‘s five indicators of peace and conflict sensi-tive implementation, findings suggests that the implementation stage of the Commis-sion‘s intervention is not well-sensitised for peace and conflict dynamics. In other
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words, the NDDC does not use peace and conflict-sensitive tools and methodologies or invest in developing, disseminating and providing training in them. Also, it does not hire specialist, experienced and trained conflict advisors to support field and HQ staff.
Although as described earlier, it provides some training for CRD personnel, the train-ing is grossly inadequate. Furthermore, the Commission does not cooperate with local partners in identifying and addressing conflict dynamics or developing contingency plans on anticipated change in the dynamics of peace and conflict in the context of the intervention.
4.4.2.3 Monitoring and evaluation
Indices of peace and conflict-sensitive monitoring and evaluation include monitoring and evaluating programmes according to their impact on conflict and peace and vice versa; setting flexible indicators that cover the process and outcomes of the programme as well as its outputs; alongside conducting joint monitoring and evaluation with local partners and communities. The corresponding guiding questions here include, first, does the NDDC monitor and evaluate its interventions according to their impact on peace and conflict and vice versa? Second, does it set flexible indicators that cover the process and outcomes of the programme as well as its outputs? And third, does it con-duct joint monitoring and evaluation with local partners and communities?
Firstly, the Commission would be able to monitor and evaluate the impact of its interventions on peace and conflict and vice versa if it incorporated peace and conflict concerns in the earlier stages of the intervention programming. Incorporating peace and conflict concerns include setting indicators that cover the process and outcomes as well as outputs of intervention. However, as earlier discussed, the NDDC does not do this. In addition, monitoring and evaluation are not rigorous exercises. Monitoring is done by the NDDC state directorates and it is strictly to ensure that programmes and projects are executed in line with specifications other than peace and conflict concerns.
Evaluation is done by NDDC consultants. The NDDC only evaluates the evaluations of those consultants. The NDDC monitoring and evaluation, therefore, leaves out local partners and communities.
In conclusion, the monitoring and evaluation stage of the NDDC intervention is totally insensitive to peace and conflict concerns. This is partially as fallout of the in-sensitivity of the conception and planning, which fails to take into account peace and conflict indicators against which to monitor and evaluate the impact of the
interven-166
tion. Hence, projects and programmes are not monitored and evaluated according to their impact on conflict and peace and vice versa. Also, flexible indicators that cover the process and outcomes of the programme as well as its outputs are not set. Finally, monitoring and evaluation are not conducted with local partners and communities.
Table 4.4 summarises the assessment of the NDDC intervention programming for PCS and 4.5 summarises answers to pertinent questions regarding PCS in the Commission‘s intervention programming.