Critiquing the methods

Phenomenological research appears to be critiqued in three key ways. The first concerns the balance between description and interpretation, with some scholars arguing for a more critical approach (Langdridge, 2008). Description in phenomenology is crucial, so that the researcher presents the essence of the phenomenon being studied, as it appears, without rushing to explain the data or to use theory to make sense of it. However, Langdridge (2008) argues that the drive towards more interpretative approaches to phenomenology (such as the three methods employed in the present study), stems from the ‘move to language’ in phenomenological research, where scholars argue for language not to be taken at face value as a simple reflection of lived experience. In the present study, rich description remains present in its presentation of the stories that are told. However, the methods also apply a

‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ to the participant narratives in order to study their function; that is to say how participants convey meanings through the language they use; and the purpose of the stories they tell. For example, some participants in the present study may not have wished to talk about some aspects of their experience in the research interview and therefore consciously or sub-consciously chose to leave them out of their story. Furthermore, given the context of the present study is the organizations in which people work, some participants may have tried to project a ‘professional’ self-image within their narrative. This crafting of a self-identity within the stories that are told is inevitable since all stories are self-projections.

The second critique of phenomenological research concerns the treatment of researcher subjectivity. Our experience of the world inevitably affects the way in which we interact with a phenomenon; therefore the connection between the researcher and the researched is an important part of phenomenology. However, the attempt to remain scientifically ‘open’ whilst engaging with participant experience is a challenge in phenomenology and some scholars argue that the pursuit of ‘bracketing’ is an impossible endeavour (Dahlberg, 2006). Instead, some call for reflexive ‘bridling’ (Berlin Hallrup, Albertsson, Bengtsson Tops, Dahlberg and Grahn, 2009; Dahlberg, 2006), whereby the researcher attempts to ‘slacken’ their

subjectivities so that they do not rush to explanations or draw conclusions too quickly and instead remain ‘open’ to new meanings as they arise. Several scholars call for a reflexive approach so that the researcher can move between their own experience and the

phenomenon that is being studied, whilst warning against reflexivity becoming an exercise in navel gazing which privileges the researcher over the participants (Cunliffe, 2003; Finlay, 2009; 2002; Weick, 2002). The present study moves between different reflexive positions at different stages in the research process so as to prevent me from projecting my own

(potentially) solipsistic voice; and to bring other voices to the fore that can challenge my subjectivities and offer conflicting interpretations of the lifeworld of the participants. The stories that ensued in the present study represent thoughtful accounts of the teller’s trauma experience, which are subjective in themselves and may include distorted memories and idealised future projections, as opposed to being ‘objective facts’. The narratives that

emerged in the present study were a ‘version’ of their story. Aspects of the story may change if it was told again in another situation to a different person. The stories that were told in this study, however, carried a clear purpose and positioned the speaker in relation to their own particular cultural or organizational milieu (Langdridge, 2007:138), therefore it was important that different hermeneutics were brought into the frame, through the use of ‘blind’

interpretative panels when analysing their accounts.

The third area of concern within narrative approaches to phenomenology is when words fail to describe individual experience, particularly in experiences of illness or trauma (e.g. Hydén and Brockmeier, 2008). As Polkinghorne explains:

“The validity threats arise in narrative research because the language description given by participants of their experienced meaning is not a mirrored reflection of this meaning.”

(2007:480)

There may be some aspects of human experience that cannot be put into words. This may be because participants do not fully understand their experiences. Experience is embodied. It is not simply a surface phenomenon. It permeates through the body and psyche, but

participants may not be able to access parts of those meanings and sensations through reflection and language. As Merleau-Ponty (cited in Polkinghorne, 2007) suggests:

“If participants are asked to shine the light of reflection into a well, the light only carries so far, and the well is deeper than the light can penetrate. This deeper portion remains in the dark and, thus, cannot be observed.” (2007:481)

The stories that are gathered in the present study are snapshots of experience and these snapshots are limited by the depth to which a participant is able to go in their reflections and understandings of their experience. These stories are bound further by the limitations of language in being able to accurately convey the meanings of these experiences. It is for these reasons that in the present study, I also examined non-verbal clues (such as displays

of emotion) to help try and move beyond language to build a broader understanding of the meanings of their experiences.

Finally, there have been criticisms of narrative research when interpretations become

‘prescriptions’ and judgements are made about the extent to which ‘good’ stories represent successful life adjustment (Squire, 2008:46). This is suggested in post-traumatic growth theory, where narrative coherence is seen as the litmus test of growth (Calhoun and

Tedeschi, 2006; Neiymeyer, 2006) and is one of the reasons why an open approach to data collection was used in the present study. Here, participants were asked to tell their own story in their own way, without any prompting on my part. Some of the narratives were fragmented or contradictory; however, no judgements were made about story ‘quality’. As Andrews et al (2003) explain:

“There is no such thing as a coherent story… Moreover, human subjectivity itself is diverse, fragmented, and carries within it the pushes and pulls of various available narratives, which are contingent upon social and cultural positioning.” (Andrews et al, 2003:12).

In the next chapter, it is Edgar’s story that is described and interpreted. Edgar is the first case in the present study, which is analysed in full before moving on to explore Bill, Diane and Peter’s stories, the three other participants involved in this study.