• No results found

Crux of the Position

In document 4 Secrets of Positional Play (Page 184-195)

O

topics with the former world champion n one occasion , when discussing chess Boris Spassky, the author heard a very interesting description of the play of another great chess player, Robert Fischer. I espe­

cially remember that Spassky singled out only one relative weakness in the play of the American champio n : even Fischer did not always manage to sense the critical , turni ng­

points of a game. What, the n , can be said about mere mortals!

How often do we ponder over a position and seek a solution, where we simply need to make a normal move, or, on the contrary, quickly skip over a situation in which there is a direct way to our goal. The ability to concentrate at the required moment, and to understand or sense when it is possible to decide the game or at least direct it along desirable lines - this is a distinguishing trait of a great player.

How many times have I heard or myself said , in explanation of a failure: ' I didn't under­

stand what was going o n ! ' I n nearly every game of chess one can pick out decisions, moves, which rad ically i nfluenced the result (here, of course, we are not talking about blunders or serious positional mistakes). B ut when a player is able to grasp the essence of a position , whether it be a veiled tactical

nuance or a positional idea , by holding on to this guiding thread he is often able to change the course of the play i n his favour.

Wang Zili -Yusupov Olympiad , Novi Sad 1 990

Ruy Lopez

1 e4 e5

2 lt:lf3 lt:lc6

3 .i.b5 a6

4 .i.a4 lt:lf6

5 0-0 lt:lxe4

6 d4 b5

7 .i.b3 d5

8 dxe5 ..te6

9 lt:lbd2 lt:lc5

1 0 c3

This is a well-known position from the Open Variation of the Ruy Lopez. Now Black has a choice between 1 0 .. . d4 and the move in the game.

10 ... .i.e7

11 .i.c2

The pawn sacrifice 1 1 lt:ld4 is a standard idea , but here it is clearly premature because of 1 1 . . . lt:lxe5 1 2 f4 lt:lc4 1 3 lt:lc6 'i!Vd7 1 4 lt:lxe7 lt:le3 ! .

1 1 . . . .i.g4

A forced move, since now 1 1 .. . 0-0 is very strongly met by 1 2 liJd4 ttJxe5 1 3 'ii'h5 tiJg6 14 f4 f5 1 5 h4.

12 .Ue1 0-0

Nowadays 1 2 .. . 'ifd7 1 3 tiJf1 l:d8 , supporting the d5-pawn , is more usual.

13 tiJf1

The other developing move is 1 3 tiJb3!?.

13 . . . J:te8! ? A n interesting continuation, the point of which is to begin play against the e5-pawn .

1 4 tiJe3

White has a variety of possibilities: 1 4 h3, 1 4 i..f4, 1 4 b4?! and 1 4 tiJg3. The Chinese player begins a tactical operation , but Black is well enough prepared for the immediate clash of the forces.

1 4 . . . ttJxe5

After serious thought Black decided to go along with his opponent's idea, rightly as­

suming that the resulting position would promise him at least equal chances. The alternative 14 . . . .i.xf3 1 5 'ii'xf3 ttJxe5 1 6 'iVxd5 is also acceptable for Black, only now he should not continue 1 6 .. . tiJcd3 in view of 1 7 l:td 1 , but 1 6 .. . i..f8, obtaining counterplay thanks to the weakness of the d3-square.

15 i..xh7+!

This intermediate check is the point of

White's idea: in this way he regains the pawn.

15 . . . 1 6 'ifc2+

<t>xh7

�g8

It is extremely dangerous to play 1 6 .. . tiJed3 1 7 tiJxg4 f5 ( 1 7 . . . <t>g8 ! ) , since, along with 1 8 tiJge5 ttJxe 1 1 9 'ii'xf5+ with a guaranteed draw, there is also 1 8 l:.d 1 fxg4 1 9 tiJe5, and White stands better.

1 7 ttJxe5 .i.e6

1 8 tiJc6

It is important to deprive Black of the advantage of two bishops.

1 8 . . . 'ii'd6

1 9 tiJxe7+ J:txe7

The outcome of White's tactical operation can be assessed : he has not gained any advantage. Black is not badly developed and given the opportunity he is ready to seize the initiative.

20 b3!

A subtle move, creating the unpleasant threat of a pin by 2 1 i..a3.

20 . . . tiJd7!

One of the most difficult moves in the game.

It is always unpleasant to have to retreat, but the natural 20 .. . tiJe4 is weaker, since after 21 .i.b2 .l:r.ae8 (if 2 1 ... c5, then 22 c4) 22 liad 1 the black centre is under fire: c3-c4 is

Crux of the Position

l2J

1 85

threatened , and 22 . . . c6 is not possible i n view o f 23 'ifxe4. It transpires that the knight on e4 prevents Black from consolidating his position i n the centre.

21 �b2?!

Played too abstractly. White will be unable to advance c3-c4 i n view of the reply . . . d5-d4.

It follows that at b2 the bishop stands badly.

21 a4 came into consideration, bringing the rook i nto play. After 21 . . . �b8 22 axb5 axb5 the position is roughly equal. Perhaps Black should change his plan by choosing 21 . . . .l:r.ee8!?, and if 2 2 ii.a3, then 2 2 .. . c5.

21 . . . l:tae8

22 l:tad 1 23 f3?!

c5

White made this move after a serious consideration of the position . However, if the Chinese player had taken Black's counter­

actions into account, he would probably have restricted himself to the safe move 23 'YWd2, maintaining approximate equality.

At this, perhaps the decisive moment of the game, I thought for more than half an hour.

The train of my thinking was roughly as follows:

What does the opponent want? It would appear that White has devised a n i nteresting pla n : he wants to play his queen to g3, force the exchange of queens, and obtain a good

endgame in view of the weakness of the d5-and c5-pawns.

How can the opponent's plan be prevented?

The direct 23 .. .f5 (24 tL!xf5?? ..txf5) did not appeal to me because of the simple 24 'ii'd2, and Black has somewhat weakened his position.

How can I strengthen my position? The black pieces are not badly placed , but the position of the knight is rather passive.

What are the drawbacks of White's set-up?

Thinking in this way, I gradually managed to discover a weak point in the opponent's position - the d3-square! I n deed , the inva­

sion there of the knight after . . . c5-c4, combined with action on the e-file and on the a7-g 1 diagonal, may decide the outcome of the battle. This means that 23 .. . ttJe5 fol­

lowed by . . . c5-c4 and . . . tLld3 is tempting.

Even so, it was not easy for me to evaluate the consequences of this pla n , u ntil I discovered a strong possibility on the 26th move. General considerations may prove faulty, therefore they should be supported by specific calculation .

23 . . . ttJe5!

24 'ii'f2

If 24 c4!? Black had the reply 24 . . . d4 (but not 24 .. . bxc4 because of 25 �xe5!), and after 25 cxb5 (25 b4 'i!i'c7! ) not 25 .. . axb5 i n view of 26 b4! 'fie? (or 26 .. .'i!fb8) 27 'ii'xc5, but the subtle 25 .. . 'ii'c7! 26 tLlf1 (26 ltJc4?? ..txc4 27 bxc4 tL!xf3+) 26 .. . ..td5 with the advantage.

[ This is not altogether so: White maintains the balance by 27 11xe5! 'iixe5 28 'ii'xc5 or 27 .. J1xe5 28 �xd4. Therefore Black does better to play 26 .. . iLd7 (with the threat of 27 .. . ttJxf3+) 27 <i;h 1 iLxb5. Even stronger, apparently, is 25 .. . iLc8! (instead of 25 . . . "ill c 7) 26 iLa3 (the knight cannot move because of 26 .. . ttJxf3+) 26 .. . "ikh6! 27 ii.xc5 ttJxf3+ 28 gxf3 l:txe3 29 if..b4 (the only defence) 29 .. . axb5 with a great advantage - Dvoret­

sky.]

24 . . . c4!

!Dd4 with compensation) 27 �xd6 !Dxd 1 28 :Xd 1 .l:td7 29 �b4 White would have blocked the position and retained good drawing chances. Thus if 29 .. . .l:ta8 there follows 30 �a5, and 30 . . . cxb3 3 1 axb3 d4? is not dangerous in view of 32 .l:txd4.

25 . . . f6

26 .l:td4?!

The most principled continuation, with which I had to reckon with first of all when beginning the operation to play my knight to d3. But 26 !Dc2 'il'b6+ 27 !Dd4 !Dd3 28 l:te2 was nevertheless stronger, although after 28 .. . a5!? Black's advantage is undisputed . [Instead of 28 l:te2 possible is 28 i.a3! with good equalising chances, and therefore it makes sense to advance the a-pawn a move earlier: 27 .. . a5!? -Dvoretsky.]

26 . . . 'ii'c5!

won , although White can still put up a tough resistance. 26 .. .'ii'b6 was less accurate on account of 27 �a3 with counterplay. But now Black renews the th reat of . . . !Dd3 and at the

Unnecessary complications would have re­

sulted from 28 . . . �f5 29 �a3 !Dxf3+ 30 'i'xf3 the opponent's defences. By undermining White's centre, Black achieves his goal more simply and quickly.

29 i.a3 b4

30 cxb4 'il'a7

The point of Black's idea . The rook is still pinned and deprived of support; the threat is 3 1 . . . !Dc6.

31 b5 .l:td7

The simplest. 31 . . . i.f5? 32 �xe7 �xc2 did not work because of 33 i.xf6 ! .

3 2 .l:tee4

Wang Zili was in serious time-trouble, but in any case White's position can no longer be

Crux of the Position

lLJ

1 87 which it was aiming 1 3 moves earlier! White

resigned .

In this game I was able t o concentrate at critical moments and come to successful decisions on the 1 4th , 20th and 23rd moves.

After the 23rd move the game was controlled by Black, who found and carried out the good plan of playing his knight to d3. This positional idea became the guiding thread which led him to his goal.

The quiet system of development chosen by Black is not altogether in the spirit of the Grunfeld Defence. In contrast to the main variations, here he does not aim to u nder­

mine the opponent's centre immediately, but restricts himself to a solid but rather passive position. 1 7 .l:lc5 with the better game. What operates here is a standard consideration in such structures: White should delay the exchange of c-pawns as long as the knight is still on b8, in order not to allow its development on the However, 1 3 lDe5!? came into consideration, with favourable complications.

1 3 . . . ltld7

An important moment in the game. White is at the cross-roads: he can either block the queenside, or exchange on d5. However, for the moment neither of these continuations promises a clear advantage. After 14 c5 'ii'd8 1 5 'ii'b4 the simple reply 1 5 .. . 'il'c8 is good , but Black can also consider 1 5 .. . .txf3 1 6 .i.xf3 e5 1 7 dxe5 lDxe5 1 8 .txe5 .txe5 1 9

1Wxb7 1i'f6 b3 a5. And in the event of 1 4 cxd5 i.xd5 15 e4 i.xe4 16 i.xh6 i.xh6 17 'ii'xh6 i.xf3 1S i.xf3 l"Df6 1 9 .l:.fd 1 .l:.adS the opponent begins attacking my weak pawns.

What does Black want? His most natural plan is to exchange on f3 and c4 and then attack the centre with . . . e7-e5, simplifying the game. It turns out that with a simple developing move I can parry this threat and simultaneously prepare 1 5 cxd5.

1 4 .l:.fd1 !

Such prophylactic moves are always un­

pleasant for the opponent. Especially since he cannot reply in the same style: the careless 14 . . . l:.adS?? loses immediately to 1 5 c5.

1 4 . . . dxc4

After 1 4 .. . a5 White can now play 1 5 cxd5 i.xd5 1 6 e4 i.xe4 1 7 .txh6 .txh6 1 S 'ii'xh6 i.xf3 1 9 i.xf3, when after 1 9 .. . l"Df6 he has the unpleasant 20 h4, while if 1 9 .. . 'ii'xb2 , then 20 h4 'ii'xa2 2 1 h5 'ife6 22 d5 1i'f6 23 hxg6 is good , with the possible variation 23 .. . fxg6?! 24 dxc6 t"De5 25 cxb7 .:tabS 26 l:tc7 l"Dxf3+ 27 gxf3 with advantage to White.

1 4 .. . .txf3 1 5 i.xf3 dxc4 1 6 .l:.xc4 e5 is no better in view of 1 7 .tg3 exd4 1 S exd4 with the threat of 1 9 l:tb4, and if 1 S .. . a5, then 1 9 d5. With the move in the game Black makes concessions in the centre, but retains a solid position.

15 i.xc4 i.xf3

1 6 gxf3 a5

The point of White's idea is revealed in the variation 1 6 .. . e5 1 7 dxe5 t"Dxe5 1 S i.xe5 .txe5 1 9 'ii'c2 ! with advantage. For example, 19 .. . 'ittg7 20 .l:.d7 'ii'xb2 (20 .. . .l:.adS 2 1 .l:.cd 1 :Xd7 22 lhd7 .txb2 23 i.b3 with the better game) 2 1 'ii'xb2 .txb2 22 lic2 ! (but not 22 l:tb 1 ? in view of 22 .. . b5!) 22 .. . .ta 1 (22 .. . b5 23 i.b3) 23 .l:.xb7 a5 24 l:td2 .l:!.abS 25 Ita?

.:.as 26 .l:.dd7 l:txa7 27 .l:txa7 .tc3, and now the best is 2S h4! , to be able to answer 2S .. . g5 with 29 h5.

Instead of the move in the game, 16 ... .l::!.ad8 was more accurate, fighting against 1 7 e4, on which there would have followed 17 .. . g5 1 S .te3 t"De5 1 9 i.e2 l"Dg6, although in this case too after 20 d5 White would have retained the better chances. 1 7 'ii'c2 'it>h 7 1 8 'itth 1 e5 1 9 dxe5 t"Dxe5 20 i.xe5 i.xe5 2 1 f4 was also not bad , with a minimal advantage for White.

1 7 'ii'c2

I was wrong to avoid the consistent 1 7 e4, since after 1 7 .. . 'it>h7 1 S .te3 'ii'b4 1 9 'i'e2 the thematic 1 9 .. . e5 can be strongly an­

swered by both 20 dxe5 t"Dxe5 2 1 i.b3 'ike?

22 f4 t"Dd7 23 e5, and 20 d5. But now the play takes on a closed , manoeuvring character, where it is harder for White to probe the weak points in his opponent's defences.

1 7 . . . e6

1 8 'itth1 l:ifd8

1 9 .l:!g1

With the primitive threat of 20 .txe6, which, of course, Black easily parries.

1 9 . . . l"Df8 20 i.b3 ! ?

Prophylactic play b y White. He prevents the opponent from gaining space on the queen­

side with 20 .. . a4 followed by . . . .l:ta5 .

20 . . . 'iib5

21 a4 'ii'b4

Crux of the Position

t2J

1 89

With the threat of 22 . . . c5. This advance is the key to the position : after it my advantage my completely vanish. White's subsequent actions become understandable: he actively fights against the opponent's intentions.

What will look like an attack on the kingside is in fact a defence of the queen side.

22 l:tg4! llac8

If 22 .. . c5 Black did not like the reply 23 j_c7 . However, after the exchange sacrifice 23 .. . h5 24 l:.e4 (or 24 j_xd8 l:.xd8) 24 ... cxd4 25 i.xd8 .l:.xd8 he would have retained quite good defensive chances. Thus if 26 l:.d 1 , then 26 . . .f5 is quite acceptable. He could also have considered the more modest 22 . . . l:.d7!? 23 j_g3 We7 with a minimal advantage for White.

23 j_g3 'ii'b6

If 23 .. . h5 I would not have played 24 l:!g5 in view of 24 .. . c5 25 .U.xc5 .U.xc5 26 dxc5 l:td2 , but 2 4 .l:te4. Now after both 2 4 .. . c 5 25 d5 (25 dxc5 'i!fd2 26 l:tc4 j_xb2 is unclear) 25 .. . c4 26 l:txc4 l:.xc4 27 1Vxc4 'ii'xc4 28 j_xc4 and 24 .. ."ii'b6 25 j_e5 White retains a slight advantage.

24 h4 25 l:!.g5

h5 j_f6

Here too White is well prepared for 25 . . . c5.

After this there follows simply 26 .l:txc5 .l:ixc5 27 dxc5 'ii'b4 28 'ii'c4, when both 28 .. . j_xb2 29 'ii'xb4 axb4 30 :c4 and 28 .. . 'ii'xc4 29

l:!xc4 j_xb2 30 c6 bxc6 31 .:.Xc6 are in his favour.

26 .l:!.c5 j_e7?

My opponent falls into the trap. Carried away by the struggle for . . . c6-c5, for an instant he drops his guard and forgets about the weakening of his king's position. 26 .. . .l::td7 was more cautious, with a minimal advan­

tage for White.

27 l:.xh5! !

An unexpected tactical blow on the kingside.

I n this game, which would also be fully appropriate for the theme of manoeuvring, I was successful with play by my advanced rook.

27 . . . gxh5?

The sharp change in the situation affects my opponent and he chooses a poor move, which leads by force to his defeat. 27 . . . c5!?

was much more tenacious, after which White would have had to play accurately: 28 j_e5!

(unconvincing is 28 dxc5 'i!fc6 or 28 l:.xc5 j_xc5 29 dxc5 'i!fb4) 28 .. .f6 29 l:!.g 1 cxd4 (29 . . . fxe5 30 l:.xg6+ cJilf7 3 1 'ii'f5+ �e8 32 j_xe6 ltJxe6 33 l:.xe6 is hopeless for Black) 30 l:txg6+! cJi;f7 31 .U.xf6+ j_xf6 (31 . . . �e8 32 l1xf8+) 32 lih 7 + cJile8 (32 .. . cJilg8 33 j_xf6!

l:1xc2 34 .llg7+ �h8 35 .U.Xb7+ �g8 36 .l::txb6 .l:tc1 + 37 'it>g2) 33 j_xffi! (threatening 34 .U.e7 mate) 33 .. . 'il¥d6 34 'i!fe4 ltJxh7, and now not

35 'ii'xh7? 'ii'f8! , but 35 .i.xe6! �f8 (35 .. . tt:Jxf6 36 'ii'g6+) 36 'ii'f5! - the 'ambush' threats created by the queen are deadly.

28 l:tg1

Threatening to move the bishop to c7 with a discovered check.

28 . . . lt:Jg6

28 . . . �h8 29 .i.e5+ f6 would also have lost to 30 �xe6 tt:Jxe6 31 'fig6.

29 .i.xe6!

All the white pieces swiftly join the attack.

29 . . . �h7

After 29 .. . fxe5 30 'ii'xg6+ �f8 any move by the bishop from g3 is decisive. After 29 .. . 'iti>g7 White wins by 30 .i.e5+, while if 29 .. . �f8 -30 'ii'f5.

30 'it'f5 l:tg8

Or 30 .. . fxe6 31 'fif7+ �h6 32 .i.f4+.

31 .i.e5 �h6

32 �f4+ �h7

It was no better to play 32 .. . �g7 33 'ii'xf7+

�h8 34 .i.e5+ tt:Jxe5 35 'ii'xh5 mate, or 32 . . . tt:Jxf4 33 'ifxf4+ .i.g5 34 hxg5+ �h7 35 'ii'xf7+ �h8 36 'ifxh5+.

33 'ifxh5+

34 �h6+

Black resigned .

�g7

Yusupov-Lautier Amsterdam 1 994

Queen 's Gambit

1 d4 d5

2 c4 3 tt:Jc3

e6

�b4

Joel Lautier plays the opening in an original way, employing an unusual hybrid of the Queen's Gambit Declined and the Nimzo­

lndian Defence. But if White does not object to a Nimzo-lndian with 4 e3, this does not bring Black any benefits.

4 e3 tt:Je7

Here the knight is more passively placed than at f6, and White gains the advantage of the two bishops without any particular compensation for Black. 4 . . . c5 is another original continuation , which after 5 cxd5 exd5 6 dxc5 (in the game Psakhis-Korzubov, USSR Championship First League 1 983, Black equalised after 6 .i.b5+ tt:Jc6 7 tt:le2 tt:Je 7 8 0-0 0-0 9 dxc5 .i.xc5 1 0 b3 .i.g4! 1 1 h3 .i.h5 1 2 �b2 l:tc8) 6 . . . tt:Jf6 7 .i.b5+ i.d7 8

�xd7+ tt:Jbxd7 9 tt:Je2 1ed to a more pleasant position for White in the game Bandza­

Aieksandrov (Frunze , 989).

5 .i.d2! ? 0-0

5 . . . c5 6 a3 .i.xc3 7 �xc3 cxd4 8 'ifxd4 f6 came into consideration, as in the game Psakhis-Kupreichik (USSR 1 984 ). However, after 9 l:ld 1 White's position is preferable.

6 a3 .i.xc3

7 .i.xc3 b6

8 tt:Jf3 .i.a6

9 b3 c5

The first serious problem for White: he has to decide what pawn structure it would be desirable to obtain. Despite his advantage of the two bishops, he has to take serious account of the opponent's cou nterplay, as shown by the following variations:

A) 1 0 .i.d3 cxd4 11 exd4 lt:Jd7 1 2 0-0 l:tc8 1 3 'ii'e2 lt:Jg6! 1 4 g 3 "i/c7 1 5 lt:Jd2 e5 (or

Crux of the Position

ltJ

1 91

1 5 .. . dxc4 1 6 bxc4 e5);

B) 1 0 l:tc1 dxc4 11 bxc4 cxd4 1 2 exd4 tiJd7 13 ..td3 l::tc8 14 ..tb2 tiJg6! 1 5 'ii'd2 ..tb7 1 6 'ife3 'ili'f6.

Usually with the two bishops you should not avoid hanging pawns, but in the given instance the black knight obtains good prospects on g6. In view of this feature of the position, I preferred a sound continuation , which secures a slight but enduring advan­

tage. reply 1 2 ..td3. It remains to consider the most critical reply 1 1 .. . dxc4. After 1 2 'ii'xd8 .l:r.xd8 1 3 ..ta5 White's idea becomes clear: he takes play into an endgame, where the weakness of the opponent's pawns begins to tell. There can follow:

A) 1 3 .. . .l:!.d5 14 bxc4 ( 1 4 ..txc4 is also not thought. After 1 1 cxb6!? the opponent would

probably not have replied 1 1 .. . cxb3 in view of bxc4!? also deserved serious consideration . After 1 1 .. . 'ii'xd 1 + ( 1 1 . . . bxc5 is weaker be­

cause of 1 2 ..td3) 1 2 l::.xd 1 bxc5 1 3 ..te2 tiJbc6! 1 4 tiJd2 .l:.ab8 1 5 l:tc1 ( 1 5 0-0 is of equal merit) 1 5 .. . tiJd8! ( 1 5 . . .f5 is weaker in view of 16 f4! followed by g2-g4) 16 ttJe4 tiJb7 White has a slight advantage.

1 1 . . . ..txc4

Therefore here the placing of the knights is of great importance. My opponent did not sense the importance of the moment, and without much thought he made an outwardly natural and 'pretty' move .. .

1 5 . . . ttJc6?

The c6-square is only apparently a good one for the knight - in fact here it is restricted by the opponent's bishop, it is not attacking anything, it is not preventing anything and it lacks any clear prospects. When I discussed and analysed the game with Mark Dvoretsky, we came to the conclusion that this super­

ficial and aimless move was the main cause of Black's defeat.

The knights should have been deployed more actively, aiming for pressure on the c4-pawn. 1 5 .. . ttJc8!? was correct, in order to play one knight to d6, and the other to b6. As the variations given below demonstrate, at best White would have retained only a slight advantage:

A) 1 6 a4 ltJd6 1 7 a5 f6 1 8 g4 .Uab8 1 9 h4 e5 (with the idea of . . . e�4. but 1 9 .. .<lt>f7 20 f4 h5!? is also not bad) 20 f3 �f7 and by playing his knight via f8 to e6, Black equalises;

B) 1 6 g4 ltJd6 1 7 .:tac1 f6 (if 1 7 .. . ltJb6 1 8 i.e5 f6, then 1 9 i.xd6 .l:.xd6 20 ltJe4 with the better chances for White) 1 8 h4 ltJb6 1 9 i.a 1 e5 20 g5 � 2 1 lihg 1 h5 22 gxh6 gxh6 23 h5 l::tg8 24 f4 exf4 25 exf4 l:tae8+ 26 �d3 (if 26 �f3 there follows 26 . . . ttJbxc4! 27 ltJxc4 ltJxc4 28 Itxg8 liJd2+) 26 .. . l:Id8 27 .l:.xg8 .l:.xg8 28 ltJe4 ttJxe4 29 �xe4 .l:.e8+

(29 .. . <ii?e6!? 30 f5+ �f7) 30 �f5 ltJc8 3 1 l:id 1 ltJe7+ 32 �g4 lig8+ 33 �f3 �e6 with an equal position;

C) 16 l:.hb1 ltJd6 17 i.a5 .l:.dc8 1 8 l:.b3 <ii?f8 1 9 f4 (less is promised by 1 9 .l:.d3 �e7 20 lld 1 in view of 20 .. . ltJb6 21 .l:.c1 ltJa4) 1 9 .. . �e7 20 e4 f6! 2 1 .U.ab 1 l:.ab8 with a minimal advantage for White.

1 6 .l:thb1

White would have secured a slight

advan-tage with 1 6 g4 ltJb6 1 7 .l:.ab 1 f6 18 h4 ( 1 8 .l:tb5 ltJa4) 1 8 .. . �f7 1 9 h5 lid7 20 lihc1 liad8 2 1 llc2 .

1 6 . . . l:!.ab8

Now if 1 6 .. . ltJb6 there would naturally have followed 1 7 a4.

1 7 lib5!

In principle it is advantageous for White

to exchange one pair of rooks, since he holds the initiative and it will be easier for him to invade the opponent's rear, while at the same time it will more difficult for Black to gain counterplay. However, every trifle is important, and before exchanging rooks it is not bad to provoke a weakening of the b6-square.

17 . . . 1 8 lixb8

a6 .l:.xb8

What to do now? The direct 1 9 .l:tb1 does not promise anything, since the exchange of all the rooks merely eases Black's defence: he will not have to worry about the invasion of the enemy rook. I need another target to attack. I n this position the superiority of bishop over knight is somewhat camou­

flaged , but it only requires White to begin exploiting his qualitative advantage on the kingside (the fact that he can advance his pawns there, whereas Black is forced to remain passive), when the long-range power of the bishop will tell .

Crux of the Position

ctJ

1 93

Disconcerted by the advance of the enemy pawns on the kingside, Lautier looks for counterplay on the queenside, but he choos­

es an unfortunate moment for this. He should have opposed rooks by playing 22 .. J::td8!?,

es an unfortunate moment for this. He should have opposed rooks by playing 22 .. J::td8!?,

In document 4 Secrets of Positional Play (Page 184-195)