5.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
5.1.1 Cryptographic support (FCS)
60 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
61 FCS_CKM.1/SM Cryptographic key generation – Secure Messaging Keys Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.1.1/
SM
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm card-to-card authentication with secure messaging9 and specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bit10 that meet the following: [6], Sections 3.6, 3.7 11.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
62 Application note 11: The Key Generation is done during a mutual authentication with trusted channel establishment according to section 3.6 or 3.7 of the eHC specification, part 2 ([6]). The Authentication Protocol produces agreed parameters to generate the Triple-DES encryption key and the Retail-MAC message authentication keys for secure messaging. The algorithm uses random numbers generated by the TSF as required by FCS_RND.1.
63 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
64 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [assignment: cryptographic key destruction method] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].
9 [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
10 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
11 [assignment: list of standards]
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
65 Application note 12: The TOE shall destroy the Triple-DES encryption session key and the Retail-MAC message authentication session keys for secure messaging after reset or termination of secure messaging session or reaching fail secure state according to FPT_FLS.1.
66 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic algorithms to be implemented by the TOE.
67 FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation – Hash Algorithm Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
SHA
The TSF shall perform hashing12 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 13 and cryptographic key sizes none 14 that meet the following: FIPS 180-2 15.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
Application note 13: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the hash function SHA-1.
Application note 14: Depending on the publication of the RegTP on algorithms suitable for electronic signatures [14], additional hash functions may be specified by the author of a Security Target.
68 FCS_COP.1/CCA_SIGN Cryptographic operation – Digital Signature-Creation for Card-to-Card Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
12 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
13 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
14 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
15 [assignment: list of standards]
FCS_COP.1.1/
CCA_SIGN
The TSF shall perform digital signature-creation 16 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA 17 and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: ISO/IEC9796-2 (DS scheme 1) 18.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
Application note 15: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the RSA for the cryptographic primitive of the digital signature-creation for the card-to-card authentication mechanism according the eHC specification, part 2 ([6]).
69 FCS_COP.1/CCA_VERIF Cryptographic operation – Digital Signature-Verification for Card-to-Card Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
CCA_VERIF
The TSF shall perform digital signature-verification 19 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA 20 and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: ISO/IEC9796-2 (DS scheme 1) 21.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
70 Application note 16: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the RSA for the cryptographic primitive of the digital signature-verification for the card-to-card authentication mechanism according to eHC specification, part 2 ([6]).
16 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
17 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
18 [assignment: list of standards]
19 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
20 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
21 [assignment: list of standards]
71 FCS_COP.1/CSA Cryptographic operation – Digital Signature-Creation for Client-Server Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
CSA
The TSF shall perform digital signature-creation 22 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA 23 and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: PKCS#1 [19] 24.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
72 Application note 17: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the RSA for the cryptographic primitive of the digital signature-creation for the client-server authentication mechanism according to eHC specification, Part 2 [6].
73 FCS_COP.1/RSA_DEC Cryptographic operation – RSA Decryption Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
RSA_DEC
The TSF shall perform decryption 25 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA 26 and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following:
PKCS#1, [19] 27.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
74 Application note 18: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the RSA for the cryptographic primitive of the RSA decryption.
22 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
23 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
24 [assignment: list of standards]
25 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
26 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
27 [assignment: list of standards]
75 FCS_COP.1/TDES Cryptographic operation – TDES Encryption / Decryption Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
TDES
The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption 28 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES in CBC mode 29 and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit 30 that meet the following: FIPS 46-3 [16] 31.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
76 Application note 19: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure messaging and for possible other uses of TDES.
77 FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
MAC
The TSF shall perform generation and verification of message authentication code 32 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail MAC 33 and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit 34 that meet the following: ANSI X9.19 with DES35.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
78 Application note 20: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure messaging.
28 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
29 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
30 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
31 [assignment: list of standards]
32 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
33 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
34 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
35 [assignment: list of standards]
79 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS_RND.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
80 FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet [assignment: a defined quality metric].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
81 Application note 21: This SFR requires the TOE to generate random numbers used for (i) the authentication protocols as required by FIA_UAU.4, and (ii) the key agreement FCS_CKM.1/SM for secure messaging. The quality metric shall be chosen to ensure the strength of function high.