Cultural programming

A major obstacle is the alteration of the negative aspects of culture and attitudes across general aviation in New Zealand. The integration of the cultural concepts of adventure aviation will be a novel influence. A key component for maintaining safety and quality standards is in the fostering of good cultural values within and across organisations (Hall & Hall, 2000; Helmreich & Merrit, 1998). Cultural programming includes the inculcation of values and attitudes to risk. In this sense Part 115 may indeed fit well within New Zealand aviation from a cultural point of view as it is a rule that is specific to adventure activities and, as such, has the opportunity to introduce relevant concepts of risk management. Gill and Shergill (2004) noted that although highly individualistic cultural conditioning maybe problematic in a establishing unifying and universal safety culture, the individual tended to become the prime mover of safety initiatives and the general aviation sector relies on a high level of personal judgment and decision making. The extension of skills and knowledge beyond the level of the individual to establish a broader community has been is an obstacle due to a lack of impetus and a culture of mistrust towards

149 authorities (ibid). The implementation of Part 115 should extend the aviation culture towards the

adventure sector rather than attempt to contain it within its previous limits.

The successful development of cultural norms that embrace best practice in safety will be an indication of buy-in by operators. Membership of an adventure aviation community that both supports the needs of each operation by the input of requisite expertise, and that recognises the safety management output of the operators themselves will assist this development A recognition of the validity of safety management processes that are currently in place would extend best practice processes further into the ecology of the system. It would need to consider the interaction of the operator to the environmental conditions they face on a day to day and individual basis. The entry and on-going audit would evaluate the level of input of the hazard mitigation processes that are due to the experience and ability of individual operators and to reiterate this in other operations. This consideration emphasises the need for a practical strategy for the active monitoring of performance indicators at the operator level – in order to show how improvements and mitigation steps are achieved - as part of the implementation of the Rule. The proposal is to set performance standards subjective to each operator at initial entry which is modified as safety data from reporting and exchange is contributed to a pool of measurement tools. These tools are then used to update the indicators in a progressive fashion.

A focus on the continuous improvement aspect of quality assurance that is embedded within SMS, and the requirement for on-going collaboration, entails establishing a range information sharing processes. This includes the concept of a “just culture” – seeking to make improvements, as opposed to attributing blame (Flight Safety Foundation, 2005). The development of integrated communication channels has the benefit of increasing safety awareness, encouraging information and occurrence reporting, and enabling accurate quality assessment. Open and non-judgmental communication channels for incident reporting, along with non-punitive surveillance and investigation are particularly applicable to fostering a common safety culture. A culture that does not regard these values will act counter to safety by stifling the reporting of critical issues or basic safety concerns and encourage further insularity.

150 Recent consultation undertaken for the CAA's Safety Target Outcome Reports (CAA, 2004b)

indicates a further element of resistance amongst operators in reporting incidents due to the perceived negativity and repercussive effects. An Industry Issues Group convened by the CAA questions the impartiality and just culture of the CAA in regard to reporting (CAA 2009a). This highlights a need to develop a better culture of reporting risk information within the CAA’s own safety support structures – including incidents and accidents. Fortunately, the high degree of camaraderie that exists along with the current level of stated concern for safety should facilitate an open reporting system that may be in place alongside from CAA sponsored structures. Such a system should be consciously developed with both formal and informal components. A convenient system of open reporting would further support the availability and dissemination of knowledge and skill for the purpose of improving processes and upgrading practices. A number of communication channels exist at present by way of a range of media that is disseminated privately or individually, and also by the various support organisations – including those using Part 149. An integrative measure to combine and centralise the flow of information could be managed by a whole-of-industry agency. Such a role may be taken up by an existing agency that acts at a national level, or be newly formed.

The establishment of an adequate knowledge base is a critical success factor for systems development and application. This would include a level of informational output defining the requirement and rationale for SMS as a common and universally accepted set of safety standards, on an industry-wide scale. The source of this output would have to be the regulatory authority (the CAA) or a national representative agency to provide for the scale and diversity of operations.

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Chapter 7. Conclusions & Recommendations