The landscape of the Hungarian far-right is quite broad. It can essentially be divided into three main groups of organisations: the political movements (the far-right), the social movements (radical right), and the fringe movements (extreme right). The political movements have been previously described here; they are political parties that can be situated in the far-right, namely Jobbik, Fidesz, and the new Our Homeland movement. The second groups are those larger radical right organisations that may have a political affiliation, but do not take part in politics. The last group includes more extreme fringe movements and organisations with smaller membership numbers, including chapters of international skinhead organisations. Several of the prominent radical right social movement organisations will be introduced here.7 This should not be seen as an exhaustive
7 Four of these organisations – The New Hungarian Guard, the Hungarian Defence Movement, the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement, and the Outlaw Army – were covered in a 2017 policy publication, written by the author for this project and utilised for the policy report. Those descriptions will bear resemblance to what is found here. See Holdsworth and Kondor (2017) for the publication.
62 list, as it must be remembered that the landscape of the far-right is ever-changing and fluctuating. Quite small fringe groups, like the Hungarian chapters of Combat 18 and Blood and Honour, will not be covered in this overview. Additionally, smaller organisations with little relation to the Hungarian Defence Movement, such as Pax Hungarica, the Guardians of the Carpathian Homeland Movement, and the Hungarian National Front will not be covered herein.
This subsection will first look at the Hungarian Defence Movement, the organisation at the centre of this study. Then other organisations will be introduced, beginning with the New Hungarian Guard as they are the organisation which the Hungarian Defence Movement essentially grew out of. The Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement and the Outlaw Army will also be discussed as both have ties to the Hungarian Defence Movement, and they will be mentioned again later in this study.
Contrary to the situation in the UK, most of the larger groups in Hungary exist in a tight network with each group filling a different role. The New Hungarian Guard is somewhat of an ‘old boys’ club; the Hungarian Defence Movement is an anti-Roma organisation which values community and volunteer activities; the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement has the youngest membership profile, organises demonstrations, and has a strongly irredentist identity; and the Outlaw Army is an organisation of violent muscular men who often serve as security at events. Several of these organisations are also tied to political parties. Gábor Vona, ex-leader and founder of Jobbik, was a member of the Hungarian Guard. Several members of the Hungarian Defence Movement are also members of Jobbik, and the two groups often organised charity events together. László Toroczkai, founder of the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement, was a mayor for Jobbik in the town Ásotthalom and has now formed a new party, the Our Homeland Movement.
63 The Hungarian Defence Movement
The Hungarian Defence Movement (Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom) was formed in October of 2014 out of the organisation For a Better Future Hungarian Self-Defense (Szebb Jövőért Magyar Önvédelem; henceforth Better Future), originally For a Better Future Civil Guard Organisation (Szebb Jövőért Polgárőr Egyesület). The Better Future movement was founded in 2010 after the fragmentation of the Hungarian Guard following its proscription.
Founded and led by Attila Tibor László, the Better Future Movement was disbanded in 2014 for activities in Gyöngyöspata, Kunhegyes, Cegléd, and Devecser. The Better Future Movement became nationally famous in 2011 for incidents in the village of Gyöngyöspata, where the group patrolled the village for several weeks terrorizing Roma residents. The movement was accused of threatening the rights and safety of people in Cegléd, and at events in Kunhegyes and Devecser they likened Roma to criminals, using terms like
“vermin, spawn of Satan, and rats” (Janecskó, 2014).
Currently, the Hungarian Defence Movement is quite active online, with a regularly-updated website, a Facebook presence, and an Instagram account. Their Facebook page, where they identify themselves as an NGO, has nearly 5,400 supporters;
having gained about 3,000 supporters in the last year alone. They seem to be present at most radical right demonstrations and the group’s leader is regularly photographed with other major figures in the Hungarian radical right movement, especially Zsolt Tyirityán (Outlaw Army, Strength and Dedication) and László Toroczkai (Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement, Our Homeland Movement).
The group regularly organises events and music festivals supporting Hungarian far-right bands. The group presents an image of a community organisation, organising food and clothing drives and depicting families along with children on their Facebook page.
They organise an annual summer camp for children who are taught about Hungarian history
64 and presumably radical right values, and which serves as a community-building event.
There is also a paramilitary section of the organisation, which offers combat training to members. The Hungarian Defence Movement still regularly patrol streets of areas with high Roma populations, who they refer to as ‘pigs’ on their website. They strongly feel that nothing is being done to protect the ‘Hungarian’ population around Hungary, and that it is their duty to do so.
The New Hungarian Guard
The Hungarian Guard Movement was formed in 2007 with 56 members, a number chosen to commemorate the 1956 revolution (LeBoer, 2008). The Hungarian Guard was dissolved by the government in 2009 for civil soldier marches in Tatárszentgyörgy, a village with a high population of Roma. The group was re-formed as the New Hungarian Guard Movement (Új Magyar Gárda Mozgalom) only three weeks later and is now strategically split into local chapters. They now have chapters in most of Hungary’s nineteen counties but are seemingly less active than in the past.
The Hungarian Guard are a radical right organisation whose members pledge to defend Hungarian values and culture and consider themselves “a self-defence alliance that transcends parties and borders” (Új Magyar Garda Mozgalom, 2013). Their seven tenets are: honour, ‘Hungarianness,’ trust in God, fellowship, helpfulness, bravery, and loyalty to the organisation. According the Hungarian Guard’s website, their goals can only be those which abide by the official Hungarian constitution (Új Magyar Gárda Mozgalom, n.d.1).
At the same time they profess that their goals must abide by the ancient rights of freedom and ancient traditions. They say they only have one rule: to protect the Hungarian state and the interests of the Hungarian nation.
According to their website (Új Magyar Gárda Mozgalom, n.d.2) membership in the
65 Hungarian Guard is open to anyone who is at least eighteen years old, believes in God, identifies as a member of the Hungarian nation, speaks Hungarian, is familiar with and respects Hungarian tradition and history, promises to protect Hungarian national identity, and will not allow anyone to differentiate between true Hungarians. It should be mentioned that the latter point is an irredentist nod to those ethnic Hungarians living across national borders (in areas of pre-Trianon Hungary) and emphasises the idea that Roma are not part of the Hungarian nation. Ironically, according to their initial introduction letter, anyone can join the Hungarian Guard, regardless of nationality, religion, political affiliation, or ethnic minority, as long as they love Hungary and sympathise with the goals of the movement.
The organisation has also revitalised fascist symbols of the 1944-1945 Arrow Cross, by using the red-and-white striped Árpád flag in their emblem and wearing a uniform of black boots, black pants, black military waistcoats, white shirts, and a black cap emblazoned with the Árpád stripes. The symbolism is quite prominent, and, according to one author, could be “a homage to Mussolini, if not Hitler, and to the fusion between race, state, and national unity” (LeBoer, 2008: 34).
The Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement
The Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement (Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom; henceforth: HVIM), self-identify as a radical youth nationalist movement.
Founded on April 21st, 2001 by László Toroczkai, the movement’s name is an homage to the sixty-four counties of Hungary, excluding Croatia, before the signing of the Treaty of Trianon. Their slogan is “Faith, loyalty, bravery,” their symbol is the royal orb, and their ideology is strongly irredentist.
They believe that the centre of Hungary is not Budapest, but indeed lies in Csongrád county. This area in southern Hungary is believed to be where the original Blood Oath was
66 made, which according to legend was the official pact between the original seven tribes of Hungary. The area is also one of the areas where ancient burial mounds can be found.
Additionally, it is the birthplace of Sándor Rózsa, the Hungarian Robin Hood, who in reality was a highwayman who led his own company into battle in the 1848 Hungarian Revolution. Lastly, the River Tisza flows through the county, which is said to be ‘the most Hungarian river’ as it used to lie entirely in Hungary – now crossing several national borders. As Szeged is Csongrád county’s County Town, it is held as the main seat for both HVIM and the related, yet more violent, paramilitary Outlaw Army (Betyársereg).
The founders of HVIM came from Hungary, Germany, and the Hungarian region of Serbia: Szeged, Hódmezővásárhely (the only Székely town outside of Transylvania), Budapest, Stuttgart, and Subotica. Their original meeting place was a farm with old ruins, owned by Toroczkai, in the very town where Sándor Rózsa went into hiding. One of the strongest ideologies of HVIM is irredentism and the desire for autonomy for Hungarian lands outside of Hungary’s borders. Indeed, after only one year of existence, in 2002 they entered Székelyföld, or the Szeklerlands, where they show their support for Szekler autonomy and clash with police. In 2018, two members of their Szekler chapter were sentenced to five years in jail for terrorism, for allegedly planning to set off homemade bombs in 2015 at a Romanian national celebration (Horváth, 2018).
The origin of the Székely, or Szekler, people is constantly under debate, but one theory is that they were a separate tribe who originally came to the Carpathian Basin with the ancient Magyars. Another theory states that they went the area of today’s Szeklerland in the twelfth or thirteenth centuries. Regardless, they are considered by most Hungarians to be somewhat ‘ultra-Hungarian,’ and to have retained the ancient culture of the Hungarians before the series of invasions. The area is found in eastern Transylvania, originally belonging to Hungary until the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, and today belonging
67 to Romania. Many Szekler people now actively seek autonomy from the Romanian state, a fight which HVIM has very quickly joined. The leaders of HVIM are regularly banned from entering Romania. They also have several chapters in Slovakia, where László Toroczkai was declared a persona non grata for five years in 2006.
Since their foundation in 2001, HVIM has been incredibly active in organising various conferences, organising meetings and protests in Hungarian regions of surrounding countries, organising anti-Trianon and other demonstrations, and even holding an annual music festival and annual youth camp. Their Facebook page had nearly 13,000 supporters in 2015. After Facebook deleted their page as part of their sweep of radical right movements, a new Facebook page had over 3,600 supporters before being banned under Facebook’s new crackdown on radical right organisations. The most recent deletion of their Facebook page and of their old website has prompted the banner “They can erase us from the internet, but we’ll meet on the streets!” on the latest incarnation of their website.
The Outlaw Army
Formed in 2008, the motto of the Outlaw Army (Betyársereg) is “Ne bánstd a magyart, mert pórul jársz!” which loosely translates to “Don’t hurt Hungarians, or else!”
Their online self-description states that they do not believe in the laws of the state, rather in the ancient laws of the puszta, or Hungarian plains. Like the outlaws of days past, they say they have been forced by the powers that be to act outside of the law. In other words, they say they are not outlaws by choice, but by necessity. The Outlaw Army is closely tied to other radical right organisations, and often provide ‘security’ for different protests and radical right events. They are very popular among the Hungarian radical right, even selling their own merchandise.
68 The Outlaw army is led by Zsolt Tyirityán, who is one of the most well-known figures in the Hungary radical right scene. They assert that they are a loose alliance or society of self-organised clans that work under the traditions of Eurasian civilisations – thus avoiding the ascription of ‘army’ or ’organised group’ so they cannot be dissolved.
According to an interview with Tyirityán conducted in February of 2016, the group has approximately 300 members spread out across the country, divided into 10-15 clans (Kittensinurface, 2016). He claims that the Outlaw Army is merely a defence organisation that tries to draw criminal, dangerous, and anti-social elements of society to the attention of law enforcement. Tyirityán stated that one must have right-wing values to become a member of the Outlaw Army, which to him mean patriotism (patriotizmus) and communal spirit (közösségi szellem). Potential members of the organisation must also have a strong history in either martial arts or strength training. The group has repeatedly claimed to not be a threat and to only exist to aid Hungarians and protect the country in ways the government cannot.
Other Organisations
The Identitarian movement has also appeared in Hungary with two separate and unrelated organisations. The short-lived Identitesz was formed in September 2015 at a university in Budapest, originally under the name of the Conservative Student Society. The organisation was led by Balázs László and claimed to build a ‘new right’. Identitesz has since dissolved, after announcing an intent to become a political party and, ultimately, joining forces with the Outlaw Army. On 8 July 2017, the two organisations formed a coalition movement called Strength and Devotion (Erő és Elszántság), at which time Balázs László resigned as the leader of Identitesz. Strength and Devotion has since essentially disappeared.
69 The other organisation is the Hungarian branch of the Generation Identity movement (Identitás Generáció). The Hungarian Generation Identity was formed in 2014 and seemingly in 2017 had about 100 members (Kulcsár and Halász 2017). Along a different line from the more traditional radical right organisations in Hungary, Generation Identity see an importance in protecting both a European and Hungarian identity, namely against migration and the ‘threat’ of Islam. They claim to not have any issues with any one particular group of people, Muslims included, but are against the ‘Islamisation’ of Europe.
They are concerned with a supposed replacement of European people by migrants and refugees, and subscribe to ethnopluralist views. Their actions around Budapest have included displaying large banners in public areas that read things like, for example,
“Islamisation kills!” (Dezse 2017) and organising a demonstration commemorating the Siege of Buda on 2 September 1686. This is particularly important as it commemorates a defeat of Ottoman forces and is now reinterpreted as freeing the Hungarians from Islam.
toward the future and the goal of “making Hungary more European” (Sellner 2017).
Lastly is the newer Hungarian Legion (Légió Hungária) formed in the summer of 2018. As they are a fairly new organisation not much is known; it can be assumed by the black Celtic Cross flags displayed at their events that they are part of the white power network, and their logo is essentially the Celtic Cross formed out of a laurel wreath and two crossed swords. Their organisation is based on three fundamentals: tradition, consciousness, and community. They see traditional family as crucially important and have a close relationship with the Outlaw Army.
70 1.4 CONCLUSION
This chapter has overviewed the modern histories of both Great Britain and Hungary to set a context for comparison in this study. Then, the landscape of the far-right in Hungary and the Great Britain was provided, again to help set context for this study.
Lastly, a discussion of terminology was provided to clarify choices of terminology for this study
The two groups which will be examined in this study will be the English Defence League and the Hungarian Defence Movement (MÖM). These groups were chosen, aside from the accidental synchronisation of their name, for several reasons. The EDL was chosen as it is one of the only radical right organisations in Great Britain which is still relatively moderate; other groups are considered to be more extreme. In Hungary, MÖM was chosen as they are a larger radical right organisation who are regularly active and are not as extreme as some of their counterparts (such as the Outlaw Army, for example).
Additionally, both of these groups have relatively large membership numbers, and perhaps most importantly, were both very active online.
This project has three major phases, which will be used in an attempt to shed light on the research questions. These questions are: why individuals adopt nationalist attitudes, why they join radical right movements, and why they maintain membership in these movements. The first phase of this research will be secondary survey analysis of European Social Survey data in order to help set the context of causation of right-wing and far-right attitudes in the UK and Hungary. Next, an online analysis will provide insight into how these organisations attempt to recruit and how they wish to display the image of their organisation. Lastly, qualitative interviews will be presented with organisation members to look further into why individuals join radical right movements and maintain membership.
First, however, an overview of the literature will be presented.
71 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
As mentioned, this study will examine three overarching research questions: why individuals adopt radical right attitudes, why individuals join social movements, and why they maintain membership in these movements. These questions will be approached from the framework of radical right social movement organisations in Hungary and Great Britain. All of these questions are extremely involved and must be approached from several different angles; an attempt to provide a comprehensive review of these approaches from different disciplines will herein be provided. Due to the interdisciplinary nature of this project, there is a huge body of literature to draw from and it is accepted that there will be omissions. There has been no directly analogous research previously conducted; the most cognate pieces of work were chosen to frame the current study.
The first section will look at why people adopt extremist views. Why someone adopts extreme views does not explain why they join a group, and this question must be considered separately. The second section will then look at what drives people to political action, namely why people join social movements and organisations.
There have also been several studies examining questions of the adoption of extremist attitudes and the motivation to join groups, both of which will be discussed further below. However, most of these studies have focused heavily on Western Europe (especially Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands), while Eastern Europe has been largely ignored. There has also not yet been a study exploring these questions of
There have also been several studies examining questions of the adoption of extremist attitudes and the motivation to join groups, both of which will be discussed further below. However, most of these studies have focused heavily on Western Europe (especially Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands), while Eastern Europe has been largely ignored. There has also not yet been a study exploring these questions of