Curricular Approaches to Developing CT

The major approaches for developing CT in the American CT movement are direct, infusion, immersion, or a mixed-mode approach, depending upon one's view on whether CT is a general or subject-specific skill (see table 2.4 for a summary comparing approaches). Briefly, the four approaches described by Ennis (1989) are:

Table 2.4 Comparison of curricular approaches to CT

Approach Entails Pedagogy

Direct (described in Ennis 1989)

Teaching CT in separate courses Instruction in formal and informal logic, fallacies, skills of analyzing arguments

Infusion (described in Ennis 1989)

Teaching CT within existing subjects

Explicit teaching of CT skills within existing courses

Immersion (described in Ennis 1989)

Students learn CT indirectly via immersion in disciplines

No explicit teaching of CT Mixed-mode

(described in Ennis 1989)

Combination of above approaches Combination of above approaches

Critical Inquiry (Bailin 1998)

Teaching CT in context Taking account of disciplinary and knowledge context

Questioning epistemologies (Burwood 1999, Barnett 1997)

Encourage students to question disciplinary epistemologies; critical interdisciplinarity can help expose students to diverse perspectives

Goes beyond infusion and

immersion: makes epistemologies explicit, then encourages

questioning them

First, the direct approach: separate courses that explicitly teach CT skills. This approach emphasis building the skills of argument and detecting logical fallacies, which is criticized for decontextualizing the skills of argument and teaching them in a didactic way, although proponents believe that to develop critical thinking, “students should be given reasons for doing things a certain way, rather than being dogmatically told how to do them” (Facione, 1990, p. 17).

Second, the infusion approach: explicitly teaching CT within existing subject areas. This approach promotes transfer by explicitly teaching CT and helping students find possibilities for transfer

(Bransford, Brown, & Cocking, 1999). Infusion also addresses the criticisms of "decontextualization" of the direct approach above. Some liberal arts colleges require a course on a topic such as moral

reasoning and teach CT in that context (Nussbaum, 1997). Others recommend doing so by teaching CT in writing courses (Paul, 1990, Elbow, 1994).

Third, Immersion: that students will learn CT by virtue of being “immersed” in the subject matters they are studying (and according to McPeck, within a good liberal arts education), without being directly taught any skills or rules. Proponents of this approach (led by McPeck but including others like Moore 2011) find the skills and rules taught in the direct approach to be either ones not worth teaching, or to be similar in name but not in application across different domains. They claim that once a student has learned to think critically within their own domain, they will transfer some of these skills to other domains, especially if they have had exposure to different domains via a good liberal arts education. However, cognitive science suggests that for transfer to occur for more students, one needs to make explicit to students the possible alternatives for transfer (Bransford et al, 1999). Also, depending on how strong the “liberal arts education”, one does not often delve deeply enough into various disciplines to understand their epistemologies deeply simply via immersion; immersion would occur more readily in one's own discipline, but not in random courses outside one's discipline. Barnett (1997) suggests that although interdisciplinarity can promote CT as one learns to see different perspectives, superficial encounters with different disciplines can backfire. Nussbaum (1997) points out that critical (Socratic) reasoning can conceivably be taught in any humanities or social science discipline. However, doing so in scientific and professional disciplines is more complex (Barnett, 1997; McPeck, 1990). This implies support for the discipline-specific view, since the kind of CT traditionally taught in the latter disciplines does not prepare students for social criticism.

Fourth, Mixed-mode: would be to combine the above approaches. Ennis (1989) supports direct with infusion approaches, while McPeck (1990) supports immersion with infusion. Although the “mixed- mode” approach sounds reconciliatory, there are several issues with it. If McPeck’s claim that there are no “general” CT skills is true, then it is futile to teach direct CT; infusion would only be helpful when making explicit the discipline's own epistemology. But if you subscribe to the “generalizability” approach, then it is more “efficient” (cost-wise and time-wise, in my view) to have philosophers teaching CT courses – it is their domain – than to make sure you “train” all other instructors on how to teach CT whether via infusion or immersion. But if an institution decided to use the infusion approach, why would it need to spend time and money on a separate “direct” CT course? Harotounian-Gordon (1998) suggests that this debate should be resolved by researching what actually works to develop CT

in practice for each context. But as previously mentioned, supporters of a general notion use standardized CT tests as evidence, which is problematic.

One approach that claims to go beyond the generalizability/subject-specificity debate is Bailin's (1998) conceptualization of CT as inseparable from context (also Brookfield 1987), and as such, can be taught neither directly nor by immersion. Instead, Battersby and Bailin (2011) suggest teaching CT as "critical inquiry" which they consider contextual by including the following elements (p. 243):

(1) knowledge of the dialectical context (the debate around an issue, both current and historical); (2) an understanding of the current state of practice and belief surrounding an issue; (3) an understanding of the intellectual, political, historical and social contexts in which an issue is embedded; (4) knowledge of the relevant disciplinary context; (5) information about the sources of an argument; (6) awareness of one’s own beliefs and biases.

Finding that both the general and subject-specific views had merit on the philosophical front, I tested these views on myself by taking a graduate course entitled "Women & the Quran" (cross-listed as Islamic Studies and Gender Studies12). I found that while it took me a while to get acquainted with the traditions of the discipline, my background knowledge (albeit not from the critical standpoint of academia) on the "Quran" as a Muslim who reads it regularly, and popular knowledge of gender issues, both helped me exercise CT in the course. My background in social science prepared me to begin thinking critically in this new area, but with minimal support and modelling from teacher and colleagues regarding disciplinary traditions, none of which was done explicitly.

Other scholars support the explicit teaching of disciplinary epistemologies (e.g. Burwood, 1999; Moon, 2005), which sounds similar to "infusion", but go beyond that into empowering students by

encouraging them to question the ways knowledge is constructed in their discipline, rather than accepting it as given (Burwood, 1999; Barnett, 1997) - otherwise, CT would be used a means to "control" students (Barnett, 1997, p. 21).

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These were two disciplines I had never studied before. My undergraduate degree was in computer science, and within my liberal arts courses, I never studied either gender or Islam. Since then, I have only been studying education. So neither gender nor Islamic studies were familiar to me

The latter suggestions to question epistemology may be influenced by Foucault (as interpreted by Marshall, 1989; Usher & Edwards, 1994) in showing the dual-meaning of the word “discipline” as both subject-matter and means of social control. Foucault would suggest that simply teaching students disciplinary discourses is a means of normalizing individuals into these existing discourses, and that simply fitting students into existing epistemologies is to exert a certain power-knowledge. However, Foucault would probably then question the kind of power-knowledge that takes place in questioning discourses, and would question any pedagogy’s benevolent claim to be “liberalizing”, since “liberation” is a grand narrative, and any new formation would create a new form of power-knowledge. One must also recognize the limitations to the instructor’s own agency and resistance resulting from his/her normalization into the discipline previously in order to gain a degree, publish and remain employed within an institution’s structure. Even where the instructor encourages questioning of epistemology, s/he retains some power over student assessment, and the institution retains power over granting degrees to students and retaining instructors.

Having discussed the subject-specificity debate, I now turn to the question of bias in CT.

2.3.2 Is CT Biased?

CT has been accused by some scholars (most prominently Atkinson 1997; Norris 1995; Fox 1994) of being culturally biased, with responses by other scholars (e.g. Benesch, 1999; Zamel, 1997; Ennis, 1989). Others take a feminist view and consider CT biased against feminine ways of thinking (Clinchy, 1994, 1996; Gallo, 1994; Phelan & Garrison, 1994, Belenkey, et al., 1986 cited in Love & Guthrie, 1999). I will tackle the cultural critique separately from the feminist critique.

2.3.2.1 Cultural Bias

There are those of the view that considering critical reasoning distant from non-Anglo cultures displays misunderstandings (Ennis, 1998) or even ignorance and condescension of non-Western people and their capacities for logical thinking (Nussbaum, 1997). Portraying CT as a Western ideal not available in other cultures can be seen as reductionist and deficit oriented rather than culturally-sensitive (Zamel, 1997). As I mentioned earlier, there are often ideals in different cultures that are stated differently, but are in essence very similar to CT (e.g. Ijtihad in Islamic scholarship). Empirical evidence, however, points to difficulties of teaching CT to international students studying in Anglo universities, especially those of Asian origin (e.g. Vandermensbrugghe, 2004; Egege & Kutieleh, 2004), although this can be attributed

to linguistic rather than cultural differences (Floyd, 2011) or pedagogical biases rather than biases with CT itself (Ennis, 1998). Even when CT is valued across cultures, it is manifested in different ways and valued differently in various cultures (Egege & Kutieleh, 2004). It is important, for example, to recognize that in certain oppressive cultures, taking any kind of critical stance against authority or power is a risk most people are unwilling to take (Asgharzadeh, 2008). However, lack of CT in some cultural contexts does not mean it does not exist at all (Davidson, 1998) - for example, it may be rare in academia but common in everyday discussions of politics (Fox, 1994). And so the question of whether CT is culturally biased needs to be examined more closely.

Atkinson's critique of CT as culturally biased rests on four premises (Atkinson, 1997, p. 71):

(a) Critical thinking may be more on the order of a non-overt social practice than a well- defined and teachable pedagogical set of behaviours; (b) critical thinking can be and has been criticized for its exclusive and reductive character; (c) teaching thinking to nonnative speakers may be fraught with cultural problems; and, (d) once having been taught, thinking skills do not appear to transfer effectively beyond their narrow contexts of instruction.

Atkinson cites Fox's (1994) book, which exposes cultural issues in academic writing, but incorrectly generalizes problems with writing automatically to problems with CT (Gieve, 1999). One can consider the issue of cultural bias of CT a pedagogical one: the ways in which CT is expressed or taught might be culturally biased, especially when teaching linear modes of writing (Ennis, 1998).

While I can relate to Atkinson's first point about CT being a social practice, at least to some extent, his reason for stating this, that experts disagree on a definition, has been criticized by Gieve (1998) and Benesch (1999). They both believe Atkinson was discussing monologic CT, whereas they prefer to advance what they call "dialogic" CT which is influenced by the Frankfurt school and Marxism: a CT which examines taken-for-granted assumptions (Gieve, 1998) and encourages questioning the status quo, dissenting, and prioritizing social justice as a goal, and is thus beneficial to people from all cultural backgrounds (Benesch, 1999). Interestingly, this point further widens the difference in understandings of CT, as this is a very different conception than that held by the traditional American CT movement. Moreover, the difficulty of creating behavioural outcomes does not in itself render a concept

articulate in clear and measurable ways - breaking such goals down to measurable components can lose their essence (Kelly, 2009).

Atkinson's final argument which suggests difficulties in transfer of CT implies cultural bias is strange. I cannot see how it would necessarily be attributed to cultural bias, as a multitude of other viable explanations exist: For example, the lack of clear definition and measurement of CT make researching transfer difficult altogether (Reece, 2002). Moreover, if CT were proven to be discipline-specific (see section above), then teaching it in a direct way is unlikely to encourage transfer (McPeck, 1990). A discipline-specific view of CT may even explain the different definitions, as empirical evidence shows that academics from different disciplines tend to focus on different aspects of CT specifically (Moore, 2011) and thinking generally (Donaldson, 2002). On the other hand, CT may be taught in implicit ways, whereas students may need to be taught in a more explicit way in order to transfer (e.g. Bransford et al., 1999). Transfer issues for international students might be stronger than for L1 students because of any combination of reasons, other than CT being culturally specific, such as linguistic issues (Floyd, 2011).

A common argument amongst those responding to CT's cultural bias, is that whatever its origin, the use of CT has the potential to empower individuals (Benesch, 1999) - even if they are non-dominant people in the dominant culture (Ennis, 1998).

However, the main aspect of Atkinson's argument which I find most acceptable and important is the first one, regarding CT as a social practice. I do not think CT is "only" a social practice, but it does have aspects of "social practice", in that in some cultures, it is promoted and valued implicitly not only in educational practice, but also beyond it in media and politics and every day interactions. As Ennis (1998) points out, even Americans will not use CT in every single context for every single situation. However, individual students who are brought up immersed in a culture that values CT in the way it is taught in American universities, are likely to have accumulated cultural capital of familiarity with CT which students from minority or international backgrounds do not have. This advantages some

students over others in the teaching of CT. However, it does not devalue the importance of teaching CT to all (Benesch 1999); it merely makes educators aware of these differences so that they may be cognizant of them when teaching classes of mixed abilities.

Regarding Atkinsons' second point about the reductive and exclusive nature of CT, I dedicate the next section specifically to discussing gender bias of CT.

2.3.2.2 Gender Bias

Rational argument has operated in ways that set up as its opposite an irrational Other, which has been understood historically as the province of women and other exotic Others. In schools, rational deliberation, reflection, and consideration of all viewpoints has

become a vehicle for regulating conflict and the power to speak, for transforming "conflict into rational argument by means of universalized capacities for language and reason" (Ellsworth 1989 p. 301, section in quotes citing Walkerdine 1985 p. 205).

In discussing gender bias in CT, I include non-dominant, non-masculine approaches to knowledge, other than rationality. These include emotion, intuition, imagination and creativity. The field of philosophy in the US is dominated by White males (Burbules, 1998), and the traditional North American scholarship on CT is dominated by males (e.g. the majority of authors in Facione's 1990 Expert Consensus). One of the criticisms of CT is that it promotes a certain kind of thinking that is male-oriented to the exclusion of the way most females are disposed to think, as though CT is the universal ideal while other forms of thinking are of less value (Wheary & Ennis, 1995, cited in Thayer-Bacon, 1998, admit to such gender bias in CT). This is particularly when CT is conceived of as "rule-oriented inferential procedures" as is often done when CT is equated with informal logic (Walters, 1994a, p. 66); however this "vulcanized thinking is not rational thinking" (Walters, 1994a, p. 69). Criticality can be furthered by integrating imagination and intuition (Walters, 1994a; Gallo, 1994) which does not necessarily entail "follow[ing] a consistent and premeditated chain of reasoning" (Walters, 1994a, p. 73).

However, two responses can be given to this: First, there is scholarship by proponents of CT that values the integration of creative thinking. Paul and Elder write about the “inseparability” of critical and creative thinking (2006, p.35). They claim that “CT without creative thinking reduces to mere scepticism and negativity” (p.35), whereas “creative thinking without critical thinking reduces to mere novelty” (p. 35). They also attest that reasoning is itself a “creative act” (Elder & Paul, 2007, p.36) because it involves the creation of ideas. Moreover, Elbow (1994) emphasizes the necessity of utilizing both creative and critical thinking when one writes, intertwining both processes repeatedly in order to complete a piece of writing. He criticizes those who defend one form of thinking while attacking another, whereas their relationship is more of a “mutual reinforcement” (p. 31). Also, conceiving of CT in broader ways, particularly as "dialogic thinking" (Gieve, 1998; Benesch, 1999 see previous section)

resolves this problem as CT is not conceived at all as the technical following of rules or steps, but as a critique of the status quo, similar to critical pedagogy.

Ellsworth's (1989) feminist poststructural critique goes beyond critical pedagogy, and posits that marginalized people's words should not be "subjected... to rationalist debates about their validity" (p. 302). She argues that in a truly critical classroom, both instructor and student narratives should be accepted as "partial", both in the sense of being incomplete, and in the sense of being biased for one view over others, rather than following the dominant rationalist ways of thinking. She argues that "empowerment" should not be "dependent on rationalism" (p. 306).One well-known critique of CT as conflicting with "Women's Ways of Knowing" is found in the book by that title based on research by Belenkey, Clinchy, Goldberger and Tarule (1986, cited in Love & Guthrie 1999f). Two studies conducted on women in the eighties have produced results implying this conclusion, although Clinchy (1994) suggests the results may apply to other categories of minorities, not only women. Clinchy (1994) states that most women are not as comfortable with CT as they are with “connected knowing”. Clinchy compares “separate knowing” which is based on detachment and scepticism, with “connected

knowing” which she says women seem to prefer. In “connected knowing”, the listener/reader first tries to imagine herself in the position of the speaker/writer, trying to understand where they are coming from, biasing herself towards the speaker/writer and empathizing with both emotion and reason.

The connected knower believes that in order to understand what a person is saying she must adopt the person’s own terms and refrain from judgment (p. 39)

She considers that this is “in a sense, uncritical”, but that it is not “unthinking”, that it is merely a different form of thinking that also involves feeling and a personal approach.13

Thayer-Bacon's (1998) "constructive thinking" builds upon Women's Ways of Knowing, and suggests a "dialectical relationship between social beings and ideas that is dynamic, flexible, and reciprocal", while also "addressing cultural influences and political power in theories about thinking" (p. 143). Thayer- Bacon's concept stresses the contextuality of CT, something which contradicts the CT movement's more abstract notions of CT.

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In chapter six, I suggest this understanding of criticality intersects with Edward Said's philological humanism, and with