D D OUBLE OUBLE J J EOPARDY EOPARDY The guarantee aga

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U. D D OUBLE OUBLE J J EOPARDY EOPARDY The guarantee aga

The guarantee againinst double jeopardy is another assurance of faist double jeopardy is another assurance of fairness – that a person be not rness – that a person be not exposedexposed more than once to

more than once to the danger of being punithe danger of being punished for the commished for the commission of the samession of the sameoffenseoffense. In this regard,. In this regard, it must be remembered that the guarantee is in relation to the

it must be remembered that the guarantee is in relation to the same offense same offense. Thus, it may be that a. Thus, it may be that a single single act

act co could givuld give rise to te rise to two or wo or more offenmore offenses,ses,⁷⁵⁷⁵ prosecution for which will not give rise to a violation of prosecution for which will not give rise to a violation of the constitutional proscripti

the constitutional proscription. Hoon. However, if thewever, if theact act gives rise to violation of a gives rise to violation of a national lawnational law and a and a local local ordinance

ordinance, co, convinviction or acquittal under either shalction or acquittal under either shall be a bar to l be a bar to prosecution for tprosecution for the same act. he same act. It has alsoIt has also been

been noted that double noted that double jeopardy jeopardy attaches iattaches if f one ione is tris tried by ed by both a miboth a mililitary court and a citary court and a civivililian court over an court over the same act.

the same act.⁷⁶⁷⁶ The rule is al

The rule is also that aso that an acquittal putn acquittal puts an end to the crs an end to the crimiiminal case and the prosecutnal case and the prosecution could not eion could not elevatelevate it to a higher tribunal except in case of a

it to a higher tribunal except in case of a mistrial mistrial ⁷⁷⁷⁷ or or when there is grave abuse of diswhen there is grave abuse of discretion on the cretion on the partpart of the judge a

of the judge amounting to lack omounting to lack o r excess of jurir excess of jurisdiction which then sdiction which then renders the resulting judgment void.renders the resulting judgment void.⁷⁸⁷⁸ Thus, a

Thus, a violviolation of the basiation of the basic rules of statutc rules of statut ory construction which amounts to ory construction which amounts to grave abuse of discretiongrave abuse of discretion would render any judgment of acquitt

would render any judgment of acquittal useless.al useless.⁷⁹⁷⁹ Further, where a Further, where a Motion to Motion to DismissDismiss/Quash/Quash is based on is based on the ground that

the ground that the “facts charged do not the “facts charged do not constitute an oconstitute an offffense,” the Sandiganbayense,” the Sandiganbayan cannot proan cannot proceed toceed to dismiss the case based on

dismiss the case based on insufficiency of evidenceinsufficiency of evidence. As a consequence, jeopardy would not at. As a consequence, jeopardy would not attach.tach.⁸⁰⁸⁰ The prosecution may not also appeal to increase the penalty, though if the accused himself does The prosecution may not also appeal to increase the penalty, though if the accused himself does appea

appeal, he stands the risk of having the penaltyl, he stands the risk of having the penaltyrectified rectified – and increased! – and increased!⁸¹⁸¹ And, the employer, too, cannot And, the employer, too, cannot appeal on behalf of an employee who has jumped bail.

appeal on behalf of an employee who has jumped bail.⁸²⁸²

1. People v. Atienza People v. Atienza, 673 SCRA 470 (2012), 673 SCRA 470 (2012)

Here the Court reiterated the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an Here the Court reiterated the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable otherwise it would place the accused in double jeopardy – acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable otherwise it would place the accused in double jeopardy – the verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there. Nevertheless, the Court added: “Although the the verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there. Nevertheless, the Court added: “Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through

dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through certioraricertiorari under Rule 65 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. For

of the Rules of Court. For the writ to the writ to ississue, the tue, the trial rial court must be court must be shown to shown to have acted with grave abusehave acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was denied the of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham, thus, rendering the assailed judgment void.

opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham, thus, rendering the assailed judgment void.

The burden is on t

The burden is on t he petitioner to he petitioner to cleclearly demarly demonstrate tonstrate that the hat the trial court blatantly abused its authoritytrial court blatantly abused its authority to

to a point so grave as ta point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense juso deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.”tice.”

75 E.q. E.q.,, Nierras v. Dacuycuy Nierras v. Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 1 (19, 181 SCRA 1 (19 90) [bouncing checks], and,90) [bouncing checks], and, People People v. Ortiz-Miyakev. Ortiz-Miyake, 279 SCRA 180 (1997) [ill, 279 SCRA 180 (1997) [ill egalegal recruitment]; and,

recruitment]; and, Ramiscal, Jr. v. Ramiscal, Jr. v. SandiganbaSandiganba yanyan, 499 SCRA 375 (2006) [R.A. 3019 and Revised Penal Code], 499 SCRA 375 (2006) [R.A. 3019 and Revised Penal Code]

76 See separate opinion of Justice Tinga in See separate opinion of Justice Tinga in Gonzales v. AbayaGonzales v. Abaya, 498 SCRA 445 (2006)., 498 SCRA 445 (2006).

77Galman v. SandiganbayanGalman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986), 144 SCRA 43 (1986)

78 People People v. Laguio, Jr.v. Laguio, Jr., 518 SCRA 393 (2007). See also, 518 SCRA 393 (2007). See also Heirs of Heirs of Jane Honrales v. Jane Honrales v. HonralesHonrales, 629 SCRA 423 (2010), and,, 629 SCRA 423 (2010), and, CerezoCerezo v. People

v. People, 650 SCRA 222 (2011)., 650 SCRA 222 (2011).

79 People v. Sandiganbayan People v. Sandiganbayan, 559 SCRA 449 (2008), 559 SCRA 449 (2008)

80 People v. Dumlao, 580 SCRA 409 (2009) People v. Dumlao, 580 SCRA 409 (2009)

81 People v. Rondero, 320 SCRA 383 (1999) People v. Rondero, 320 SCRA 383 (1999)

82 In In Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. P Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Peopleeople, 427 SCRA 456 (2004), the Court held that, in accordance with the rul, 427 SCRA 456 (2004), the Court held that, in accordance with the rul e that onlye that only the accused may appeal, the employer cannot, independently of the convicted employ

the accused may appeal, the employer cannot, independently of the convicted employee, appeal that aspect relatee, appeal that aspect relat ing to its subsiing to its subsi diary civildiary civil liability. Where the latter jumps bail, the former cannot, by itself alone, undertake to appeal the civil aspect of the judgment. If it were liability. Where the latter jumps bail, the former cannot, by itself alone, undertake to appeal the civil aspect of the judgment. If it were otherwise allowed, such employer’s appeal would violate the employee’s right against double jeopardy since the judgment against the otherwise allowed, such employer’s appeal would violate the employee’s right against double jeopardy since the judgment against the latter could become subject to modification without his consent, appeal opening up the whole case for review.

latter could become subject to modification without his consent, appeal opening up the whole case for review.

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2. Ivler v. Mod Ivler v. Modesto-Saesto-San Pedron Pedro, 635 SCRA 191 (2010), 635 SCRA 191 (2010)

If irresponsible driving leads to a vehicular collision resulting in damage to property, injuries to a If irresponsible driving leads to a vehicular collision resulting in damage to property, injuries to a passenger

passenger and and death death to anto another pasother passenger, senger, how how many many offenoffensessesare coare commmmitted? Teitted? Technicallchnically, only one eveny, only one even as there

as there would be twould be two resulting charges – one for recwo resulting charges – one for reckless ikless imprudence remprudence resulting isulting in physin physical incal injuries, and,juries, and, another one for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. What if the accused another one for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. What if the accused pleads

pleads guilguilty ty to the lto the lesser esser charge icharge involvnvolvining phyg physical sical ininjurijuries, could es, could he plhe plead thiead this as s as a way a way to preclude to preclude thethe second char

second charge involvige involving homicide? The Court said yng homicide? The Court said yes because doues because double jble jeopaeopardy would have set in – thererdy would have set in – there is actually only

is actually onlyone offense of reckless imprudenceone offense of reckless imprudence! In other words,! In other words, reckless imprudencereckless imprudence is a is a singlesingle crime

crime, and its consequences on persons and property are material only to determine the penalty., and its consequences on persons and property are material only to determine the penalty.

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The constitutional proscription againsconstitutional proscription againstt ex post factoex post facto laws and bills of attainder ensures fundamental laws and bills of attainder ensures fundamental fairness. No man should be punished for acts which when done were perfectly lawful. Due process fairness. No man should be punished for acts which when done were perfectly lawful. Due process requires at the very least that before a person could be held to account for what alleged wrong he requires at the very least that before a person could be held to account for what alleged wrong he comm

committed, he was forewarned oitted, he was forewarned of the consequences of his act.f the consequences of his act.

Both

Both ex post factoex post facto laws and bills of attainder are retroactive in their application. They impose a laws and bills of attainder are retroactive in their application. They impose a penal

penalty ty or or disabdisabilility after ity after the the act act has has been cobeen commmmitted itted when no when no such disadvantageous such disadvantageous effeffect ect was was yetyet present when

present when the act was done. Wthe act was done. Worse, in orse, in the case of the case of bilbills ls of attainder, the sanof attainder, the sanction is iction is imposed wimposed withoutthout judi

judicial cial proceedings. Thus, there iproceedings. Thus, there is alss also a violation of the o a violation of the principrinciple of ple of separation of separation of powers – Congresspowers – Congress legislates but it is the judiciary that adjudicates.

legislates but it is the judiciary that adjudicates.

Where an amendatory law imposes a new penalty, such as a fine, could that penalty be imposed on Where an amendatory law imposes a new penalty, such as a fine, could that penalty be imposed on someone who commi

someone who committed tted the offense befthe offense before tore the amendmhe amendment, and whose case was tent, and whose case was t hen on appeal at thehen on appeal at the time of effectivity of the amendatory law? In

time of effectivity of the amendatory law? In Gonzales v. Court of AppealsGonzales v. Court of Appeals, 277 SCRA 518 (1997), as, 277 SCRA 518 (1997), as well as in

well as in Cadua v. Court of AppealsCadua v. Court of Appeals,, 312 SCRA 703 (1999), the Court said the new penalty may be 312 SCRA 703 (1999), the Court said the new penalty may be im

imposed since an appeal tposed since an appeal throws the hrows the entire case open entire case open for review. One may for review. One may wonder, however, how wonder, however, how suchsuch reaso

reasoning ning could procould provide a satisvide a satisfactorfactory answer to the quy answer to the question as to why the imposition of estion as to why the imposition of thethenew penaltynew penalty (fine) is not a violation of the proscription against

(fine) is not a violation of the proscription against ex post factoex post facto laws. Would it not be a case of a law laws. Would it not be a case of a law

“which changes the punishment and in

“which changes the punishment and inflflicts a greicts a greater pater punishment than the law annexed tunishment than the law annexed to the crime wheno the crime when it was committed”?

it was committed”? Valeroso v. PeopleValeroso v. People, 546 SCRA 450 (2008), provided a better answer. There is no, 546 SCRA 450 (2008), provided a better answer. There is no violation where overa

violation where overall ll the resulting penalty is still the resulting penalty is still more beneficial more beneficial to to the accuthe accused, such as when tsed, such as when the tothe totalal period im

period imprisonmprisonment is reduced.ent is reduced.

With regard to the rule against

With regard to the rule against ex post factoex post facto laws, it has al laws, it has also been observed that, so been observed that, “[a]s the text o“[a]s the text o f thef the Clause makes clear, it ‘is a limitation upon the powers of the Legislature, and does not of its own force Clause makes clear, it ‘is a limitation upon the powers of the Legislature, and does not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch of government.’” Nevertheless, “limitations on

apply to the Judicial Branch of government.’” Nevertheless, “limitations on ex post factoex post facto judicial judicial decisionmaking are inherent in the notion of due process.” Indeed, “[d]eprivation of the right to fair decisionmaking are inherent in the notion of due process.” Indeed, “[d]eprivation of the right to fair warni

warning, . ng, . . . . can result bot. can result both from vague statutory language and from an unforeseeablh from vague statutory language and from an unforeseeable and rete and retroactiveroactive judi

judicial cial expansiexpansion of statutory language that appears narrow and precise on ion of statutory language that appears narrow and precise on its face.”ts face.”⁸³⁸³

83 Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001) Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001)

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1. Republic v. Coju Republic v. Cojuangco, Jr.angco, Jr., 674 SCRA 492 (2012), 674 SCRA 492 (2012)

If the prescriptive period is extended by law such that it makes it longer, does it affect those crimes If the prescriptive period is extended by law such that it makes it longer, does it affect those crimes which were committed prior to the amendment of the law?

which were committed prior to the amendment of the law? InIn Rom Romualdez v. ualdez v. MarceloMarcelo, 497 SCRA 89, 497 SCRA 89 (2006), the

(2006), the Court said no. It there observed: “NotablyCourt said no. It there observed: “Notably, Section 11 , Section 11 of R.A. 3019 now of R.A. 3019 now provides that theprovides that the offenses committed under that law prescribes in 15 years. Prior to its amendment by Batas Pambansa offenses committed under that law prescribes in 15 years. Prior to its amendment by Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195

(B.P.) Blg. 195 on March 16, on March 16, 1982, however, 1982, however, the prescriptivthe prescriptive period e period for offenfor offenses punisses punishablhable under R.A.e under R.A.

3019 wa

3019 was only s only 10 years. Since the acts co10 years. Since the acts complaimplained of were commined of were committetted before the enactd before the enactment of B.P. 19ment of B.P. 195,5, the prescriptive period for such acts is 10 years as provided in Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally the prescriptive period for such acts is 10 years as provided in Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally enacted.” The

enacted.” The Court Court made referenmade reference to ce to its earliits earlier proer pronouncemennouncement t inin People v. Pacificador People v. Pacificador , 354 SCRA, 354 SCRA 310 (2001)

310 (2001) that tthat the longer prescriptihe longer prescriptive period of fifve period of fifteen (15) teen (15) years would not apply for the reason tyears would not apply for the reason thathat the amendm

the amendment, not ent, not beibeing favorablng favorable to e to the accused cannot the accused cannot be given retroactive effbe given retroactive effect.ect.

Cojuangco

Cojuangco applied and reiterated the foregoing principle. And, the Court reminded us also of theapplied and reiterated the foregoing principle. And, the Court reminded us also of the rationale for the rule on prescription: “Prescription of actions is a valued rule in all civilized states from rationale for the rule on prescription: “Prescription of actions is a valued rule in all civilized states from the beginning of organized society. It is a rule of fairness since, without it, the plaintiff can postpone the the beginning of organized society. It is a rule of fairness since, without it, the plaintiff can postpone the filing of his action to the point of depriving the defendant, through the passage of time, of access to filing of his action to the point of depriving the defendant, through the passage of time, of access to defense witnesses who would have died or left to live elsewhere, or to documents that would have been defense witnesses who would have died or left to live elsewhere, or to documents that would have been discarded or could no longer be located. Mo

discarded or could no longer be located. Moreover, the memories of wireover, the memories of witnesses are eroded tnesses are eroded by timby time. Theree. There is an absolute need in the interest of fairness to bar actions that have taken the plaintiffs too long to file is an absolute need in the interest of fairness to bar actions that have taken the plaintiffs too long to file in court.”

in court.”⁸⁴⁸⁴ 2.

2. Bureau of Cu Bureau of Customs Employees stoms Employees AssociaAssociation (BOCEA) v. Tevestion (BOCEA) v. Teves, 661 SCRA 589 (2011), 661 SCRA 589 (2011) Here, the argument was advanced that t

Here, the argument was advanced that thehe Attrition Law Attrition Law (R.A. No. 9335) is a bill of attainder. The (R.A. No. 9335) is a bill of attainder. The Court

Court said no, said no, it is not. it is not. It eIt explained that “[a] bill of attainder is a legislxplained that “[a] bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflative act which inflicts punishmenticts punishment on indivi

on individuals or members of a paduals or members of a particular grorticular group withouup without a judicial trial. Essential t a judicial trial. Essential to a bill to a bill of attaof attainder areinder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or

In document 2017 Bar Updates in Constitutional Law by Atty. Rene B. Gorospe.pdf (Page 96-99)