Data Analysis – Part Two

The second part of the deductive discourse analysis will focus on the creation of discourses in four Presidential Addresses concerning President Obama’s perception of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. The analysis will follow the same structure that is employed in subchapter 4.2. Hence, first various discourses will be classified. Subsequently, these mapped discourse will be subject to characterisation. Then, the dynamics of the established discourses will be identified. Further, the effect that the established discourse generates will be examined. Finally, these discourses will be subject to criticism.

4.2.1 Classification

Similar to sub-chapter 4.1.1, this section will demonstrate particular linguistic performances of the Obama administration in four Presidential Speeches. This section will therefore also adhere to a similar structure as in sub-chapter 4.1.1. Initially, the expected ‘self’ and ‘other’- representations will be identified. Following, the dominant framing patterns, marginal patterns and silenced patterns will be determined and discussed.

4.2.1.1 ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ Representations

An thorough analysis of the four texts produces strong ‘self’ and ‘other’ representations by which the Obama administration indicates how it perceives both itself and ISIL within the context of the Syrian conflict.

First, similar to one of the ‘self’ representations that was produced within the four Presidential Addresses concerning the Bashar al-Assad regime, the majority of the four texts often refer to the Obama administration or to the United States in general as ‘militarily

strong’. Utterances such as “I believe that the United States military can achieve any mission” and “that we are, and must remain, the strongest fighting force the world has ever known” highly portray the ‘self’ as militarily undefeatable and strong (“Remarks by the President on the Administration’s Approach to Counterterrorism”, 2016). Additionally, President Obama has addressed the success of previously employed military strikes in Iraq by stating “we’ve conducted more than 150 successful airstrikes in Iraq” and “these strikes have also helped save the lives of thousands of innocent men, women and children” (“Statement by the President on ISIL”, 2014). The effect of referring to former accomplished successes is that it reinforces the intersubjective understanding of the ‘self’ as militarily powerful. The fact that this particular ‘self’ representation is continuously used in the majority of the Presidential Addresses, both concerning the conflict with Bashar al-Assad and ISIL, implies that this representation is not per se context related. The United States as a military power is a

representation that is accepted by the American authorities and public regardless the situation. Second, the primary manner in which the ‘other’ is represented is within a terrorism frame. The Obama administration primarily used direct linguistic references such as “the terrorist group known as ISIL”, “terrorist network” and “ISIL terrorists” to represent the ISIL as a terrorist organisation. All four Presidential Addresses frequently used terms as such, which indicates that it is the predominant frame in which the Obama administration

state”, the understanding of ISIL as a politically illegitimate terrorist organisation is accepted to be valid by the American public (“Statement by the President on ISIL”, 2014).

4.2.1.2 Dominant Patterns

The ‘self’ and ‘other’ representations are preeminent in the four Presidential Addresses. However, the text does position the conceptions of a threat to national security and international cooperation as dominant patterns.

First, similar to the paramount dominant pattern in the texts concerning the Assad regime, the four Presidential Addresses pose that the existence and acts performed by ISIL are a threat to national and international security. Simple and straightforward utterances such as “threat posed by ISIL”, “threaten the United States”, and “ISIL poses a threat to the people and stability of Iraq, Syria, and the broader Middle East, and to U.S. national security” stress the perceived significance of the threat (“Statement by the President on Congressional Authorization to Train Syrian Opposition”, 2014; “Letter from the President – Authorization for the Use of United States Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant”, 2015). These linguistic utterances demonstrate the securitisation moves that the Obama administration performs.

Second, expressions such as “the United States continues to build a broad coalition” and “we’ve built a network of partners” portray the dominant pattern of international cooperation (“Statement by the President on Congressional Authorization to Train Syrian Opposition”, 2014; “Remarks by the President on the Administration’s Approach to Counterterrorism”, 2016). By frequently addressing the frame of international cooperation, the Obama administration positions ISIL as a threat to the security of the broader international system. Framing it not only as an American national security interest, but also as an

international security interest.

Furthermore, President Obama attempts to create the understanding that the United States plays a leading role within an “international coalition” of “more than 40 countries” (“Statement by the President on Congressional Authorization to Train Syrian Opposition”, 2014; “Statement by the President on ISIL”, 2014). The Obama administration may hereby generate the public understanding of the United States as destined to play a key role within the international coalition against ISIL. This not only draws on the concept of American Exceptionalism, it simultaneously functions as a manner through which President Obama legitimises his choice to employ extraordinary measures. This because it establishes the idea

that if the United States – as leader of the international coalition – won’t initiate counter- measures against ISIL, a perceived security threat, then who will?

4.2.1.3 Marginal Patterns

Besides the prevalent ‘self’ and ‘other’ representations and the dominant patterns of security and international cooperation, the Presidential Addresses put forward two marginal patterns. Despite it being marginal patterns, they are of great significance and therefore must not be excluded in the analysis. The marginal patterns concern the matters of condemnation and resilience.

First, similarly to the Presidential Addresses regarding American foreign policy aimed at the Bashar al-Assad regime, the Obama administration employs the frame of

condemnation. The concept of condemnation can be referred to in multiple manners, either directly which was done by President Obama in 2012 (“Statement by the President on Syria”). Or, indirectly by addressing the brutality, violence and barbarism performed by the ‘other’ – hence ISIL. Whereas the texts regarding Assad employed both direct and indirect references, the texts on ISIL however primarily uses indirect references to the concept of condemnation. “The brutality of ISIL terrorists”, “acts of barbarism”, “these terrorists are unique in their brutality” are all worthy examples hereof (“Statement by the President on Congressional Authorization to Train Syrian Opposition”, 2014; “Statement by the President on ISIL”, 2014). Simultaneously, stating that the United States will “degrade and ultimately destroy” ISIL is another manner by which the Obama administration expresses their condemnation of the atrocious acts performed by the ascribed terrorist organisation (“Statement by the

President on Congressional Authorization to Train Syrian Opposition”, 2014; “Statement by the President on ISIL”, 2014).

Second, to continue with the particular linguistic utterance of “degrade and ultimately destroy”, the text simultaneously poses that the United States will be resilient in combat against ISIL (“Statement by the President on Congressional Authorization to Train Syrian Opposition”, 2014; “Statement by the President on ISIL”, 2014). Hence, the four Presidential Addresses put forward the frame of resilience. This marginal frame in particular is of great significance since it is newly established when compared to the discourses created regarding the Bashar al-Assad regime. Initially, the frame of resilience was classified as a silenced pattern. The consequence thereof was that the threat posed by the Assad regime was perceived as not existential enough to trigger American extraordinary measures. Introducing the frame

of resilience when dealing with a threat posed by a particular actor stresses the significance of the threat itself. Hence, within the context of Bashar al-Assad’s atrocious acts and regime, the Obama administration chose to not present a resilience frame. Within the context of ISIL however, President Obama explicitly addressed resilience using the above mentioned linguistic utterances. This indicates that the threat posed by ISIL requires the need for the Obama administration to emphasise the resilient nature of the United States. While resilience is marginally represented within the four Presidential Addresses on American foreign policy towards ISIL, the texts does not explicitly use the concept of resilience, or related linguistic utterances, to symbolise or represent the ‘self’. Explicitly representing the ‘other’ within a threat frame and choosing not to represent the ‘self’ within a framework of resilience while presenting it as a marginal frame seemingly establishes a politics of fear in order to legitimise American foreign policy towards Syria, and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in particular.

4.2.1.4 Silenced Patterns

In contrast to the use of the conception of democracy as predominant ‘self’ and ‘other’ representations in the four Presidential Addresses concerning American foreign policy aimed at the Bashar al-Assad regime, democracy functions as a silenced pattern in the texts

concerning ISIL. The atrocious acts performed by ISIL are not highlighted as threatening to American democratic norms and values, and neither to the Syrian democratic uprising. Furthermore, no direct or indirect references to the democratic nature of the United States are made. Similarly, the texts do not position ISIL as inherently undemocratic. This can be

perceived as logical since President Obama does not recognise ISIL as a state, but rather as an illegitimate entity and terrorist organisation. Importantly, this notion cannot be perceived as self-evident since ISIL itself does not share this vision and has been challenging it from the beginning of their uprising. However, it must be argued – due to the Western belief that ISIL is not a state and therefore cannot claim to be democratic – that the Obama administration did not feel the urgency to depict the conflict with ISIL within a democratic frame. The effect that this linguistic silencing of democracy generates will be examined in chapter 4.3.4.

4.2.2 Characterisation

The above analysed ‘self’ and ‘other’ representations of militarily strong and terrorist organisation, the dominant patterns of security threat and international cooperation, the

marginal patterns of resilience and condemnation will be mapped into more general and broadly defined frames.

First, one of the ‘other’ representations regarding terrorism and one of the dominant patterns of international and national security must be mapped together within the larger frame of violence. This is based on the fact that the ‘other’ representation and the dominant pattern are produced by the characteristic of violence. Representing ISIL within a terrorism frame, and hence in light of national security, is the result of ISIL’s violent nature and their performances of various violent and deadly terrorist attacks. This larger characterisation is of great significance since it completely fits the master ‘threat’ frame in which securitisation resides. Since the War on Terror, the common understanding of terrorism as an existential threat to American security has remained largely unchallenged. Expressions used in the texts that highlight the violent nature of ISIL and its threat level to the United States and the

international community similarly back away from challenging this intersubjective belief. The frequent and explicit references to ISIL within the terrorism and security frame indicate President Obama’s desire to present ISIL as a security threat.

Second, the ‘self’ representation of militarily strong, the dominant pattern of

international cooperation and the marginal pattern of resilience may be characterised into a larger theme of policy response to the previous theme of violence. When addressing the United States’ military might and resilience in combination with referring to America as the leader of an international coalition, the Obama administration communicates that an

international response using extraordinary measures is the best solution to the violence produced by ISIL as the terrorist ‘other’. Herein, in contrast to resorting to diplomatic measures, the United States is depicted as resilient and thereby legitimises the extraordinary measures. Hence, the theme of policy response has two functions. First, it disapproves the terrorist nature of ISIL and simultaneously highlights the severity of the issue that ISIL poses by advocating for resilience. Second, it communicates Obama’s belief that extraordinary measures performed by an international coalition are the correct response to ISIL’s atrocious acts.

Third, the marginal pattern of condemnation cannot be mapped into one of the above- mentioned larger themes. Similar to the discourse regarding the Bashar al-Assad regime, utterances of condemnation towards ISIL must be mapped within the larger theme of morality. ISIL’s atrocious acts and terrorist characteristics are perceived as amoral, just as Assad’s use of chemical weapons against his own civilians. Hence, President Obama condemns both parties and their performances. Obama’s choice to perform utterances of

condemnation must be perceived within the frame of morality since the condemnation of violent and illegitimate acts performed by any actor fits the Western notion of being moral. Importantly, the fact that the Obama administration refers to morality in both selections of speeches indicates that morality – and more specifically condemnation – does not influence the securitisation of either issue. Both Assad’s and ISIL’s violent acts were condemned by the Obama administration, however, only ISIL’s acts were securitised and triggered military response. Therefore, condemnation solely serves as the initial – and hence moral – response of the American government concerning illegitimate acts of violence.

4.2.3 Dynamics

Similar to section 4.1.3, this section will examine the dynamics of the established discourses in the texts via attempting to answer the following questions: What type of othering is performed by the Obama administration?; Who is accepted to speak – and hence securitise – and on whose behalf?; What is accepted as knowledge and truth by the public?

First, after analysing the type of othering that occurs, it must be argued that the four Presidential Addresses concerning American foreign policy towards ISIL performs radical othering. This indicates that the othering performed in this set of texts is stronger than the othering that occurred in the former texts concerning the Assad regime. However, similar to the former texts, the othering does concern identifying ISIL as inferior to the superior ‘self’ of the United States. The radical manner in which the texts represent the ‘other’ is primarily depicted by the highly frequent use of terminology related to terrorism. When President Obama addressed ISIL he customarily referred to them as “terrorists” or “terrorist

organisation” (“Statement by the President on Congressional Authorization to Train Syrian Opposition”, 2014; “Statement by the President on ISIL”, 2014). These references are of great significance as they not only demonstrate the radical type of othering that occurs, it

simultaneously shows that President Obama attempted – seemingly successfully – to represent the ‘other’ as inferior. Frequently using terrorism-related references is effective herein as the concepts of terrorism and terrorists have had a bad connotation within American society, especially since the 9/11-attack. Therefore, by positioning them as terrorists reinforced the American understanding of ISIL as inferior to the United States, which, in turn, may have contributed to public acceptance of extraordinary policies.

Second, it is primarily only President Obama who was politically and publicly

took within this conflict. This is due to two reasons. Firstly, the Presidential Speeches reside in a formal setting. Hereby, President Obama’s perspective are easily marginalised since he is the highest ranking official of the nation and hence, enjoys the highest level of political legitimacy. As argued earlier in the analysis of the four Presidential Speeches concerning American foreign policy aimed at Bashar al-Assad, the highest political official enjoys the highest level of legitimacy when it comes to performing securitising processes (Hansen, 2006). Secondly, the threat that ISIL poses to American national security and international security requires the perspective of the Commander-in-Chief rather than the opinions of lower ranking diplomats. Which similarly makes Obama the expected actor to speak.

Third, the predominant feature of the discourses established in the four texts that is admitted by the public concerns the notion that terrorism is accepted to be countered by extraordinary measures. Or in other words, terrorism is accepted and since the War on Terror expected to be securitised into a national security threat. As Thierry Balzacq (2010) argued, “what appears to make a threat “existential” is not the presence or scale of armed violence [...]. Rather, it is the association of that threat with “the terrorists”, whoever they might be”.

A CNN/ORC poll, conducted between the 28th of April and 1st of May of 2016, questioned: “Do you think there are terrorists associated with ISIS [- a developed acronym for Islamic State of Iraq and Syria -]who are currently in the United States and have the resources to launch a major terrorist attack against the U.S. at any time, or not?” (“ISIS”). Roughly 75%-80% of the respondents believed that there indeed were terrorists associated with ISIL posing a threat to American security due to their capability to launch a terrorist attack against the United States (“ISIS”).

Despite it being a foreign organisation and despite the fact that he atrocious acts performed by ISIL are to an extent similar to the violent acts performed by the Assad regime, the use of the label terrorism generates the notion that military power must be employed to counter the national security threat. The CNN/ORC poll demonstrates that around 60% of the respondents belief that the American response to ISIL is not aggressive enough (“ISIS”). Hence, terrorism equals extraordinary measures as a policy response. This notion is reinforced by the fact that President Obama did not linguistically refer to the use of diplomacy to

establish long term peace, as he did when American foreign policy concerned dealing with the Assad regime. Thus, the Obama administration needed the American public and political field to understand and accept as truth that ISIL – as a terrorist organisation – required military counter-measures rather than diplomatic measures in order to successfully securitise the organisation and to be able to legitimise his own policy approach. The above-mentioned

CNN/ORC poll also asked the American public the following question: “Would you say that the following represent a very serious threat to the United States, a moderately serious threat, just a slight threat, or no threat at all? The Islamic militant group often referred to as ISIS” (“ISIS”). The outcome indicates that roughly 70% of the respondents perceived ISIL a very