Data collection procedure

constitutes an impediment to the achievement of universal service objectives and further limits the participation of Nigeria in the global information society.

designed to damage competitor operators”.⁴⁵⁶ Also, in some cases cables may be deliberately vandalized to generate employment for workers within the vicinity of the cut.⁴⁵⁷ However, one of the most common forms of fiber cable vandalization involve criminals digging up the fiber cables with the expectation that they will uncover valuable copper cable that can be sold in the black market.⁴⁵⁸

A very worrisome dimension is the destruction of telecommunications towers and base stations by terrorist actors. For over half a decade now Nigeria has been challenged by the terrorist activities of the Boko Haram Islamist sect in the North-Eastern part of the country.⁴⁵⁹ In order to effectively degrade the activities of the sect, in July 2011, the Federal Government through the Office of the National Security Adviser sought the assistance the GSM operators to intercept and track the communications of the sect‟s members including requiring the operators to dedicate emergency toll-free lines to the public with a view to fast tracking intelligence gathering on the sect.⁴⁶⁰ On 14 February 2012, the sect threatened that it will attack the facilities of GSM operators and the offices of the NCC for providing assistance to security agencies in bugging the lines of their members and thereby enabling security agents to track and arrest of their members.⁴⁶¹ Later in September 2012, the sect launched coordinated attacks on telecommunications

456R Southwood, Strategies for the Promotion of Broadband Services in Nigeria, (Geneva: Broadband Commission/ITU, 2012) p.7.

457 Ibid.

458 Ibid.

459 F Chothia, „Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists?‟, BBC News, 4 May, 2015, available at

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13809501>. last accessed on 30 March, 2016.

460 S Iroegbu, „FG to Provide Toll-Free Lines to Tackle Boko Haram‟, ThisDay, 27 July 2011, available at

<http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/fg-to-provide-toll-free-lines-to-tackle-boko-haram/ 957841> last accessed on 30 March, 2016.

461F S Iqtidaruddin, „Nigeria‟s Boko Haram Threatens to Attack Telecom Firms‟, Business Recorder, 14 February, 2012, available at <htttp://www.brecorder.com/world/africa/45736-nigerias-boko-haram-threatens-to-attack-telecoms-firms.html> last accessed on 30 March, 2016. See also, F Onuoha,

„Understanding Boko Haram‟s Attacks on Telecommunication Infrastructure‟, in l Mantzikos (ed) Boko Haram: Anatomy of a Crisis (Bristol, United Kingdom: e-International Relations, 2013) p.23.

base stations across five major cities in Northern Nigeria (Bauchi, Gombe, Maiduguri, Kano and Potiskum). By the end of 2012, the sect had destroyed over 150 base stations in Northern Nigeria and thus exacerbating quality of service issues in the region and further straining the operational costs of telecommunications operators.⁴⁶² Aside from the sect‟s destruction of base stations there is also the issue of the safety of the maintenance personnel that are deployed to repair the damaged stations.⁴⁶³

More worrisome is the resulting loss of investor confidence due to concerns that similar coordinated terrorist attacks could also be executed against telecommunications facilities located across the country. Loss of investor confidence due to the vandalization of base stations is not only caused by the terrorist activities of the Boko Haram sect, but also by the widespread acts of vandalism targeting telecommunications infrastructure across the country.⁴⁶⁴ For example, due to incidents of vandalism, it is estimated that about 2 to 3 percent of Nigeria‟s base stations are usually shut down at any point in time, resulting in very significant losses for operators.⁴⁶⁵ In order to effectively address the vandalization of telecommunications infrastructure, stakeholders including the Ministry of Communications Technology, the NCC and ALTON have proposed the enactment of a law that will designate telecommunications facilities as „critical national

462 F Onuoha, „Understanding Boko Haram‟s Attacks on Telecommunication Infrastructure‟, Ibid, p.24. See also, E Okonji, „Replacement of Damaged Base Stations to Cost Telecoms N16 Billion‟, ThisDay, 7 January, 2013, p.1.

463 B Olaleye, „Bombing: Over N3.9 Trillion Telecommunications Infrastructure under Threat‟, The Sun (11 September, 2012) available at<http://www.osundefender.org/2012/09/11/bombing-over-n3-9trillion-telecoms-infrastructure-under-threat/> last accessed on 30 March, 2016.

464A B Ola and Y YAdewale, „Infrastructural Vandalism in Nigerian Cities: The Case of Osogbo, Osun State‟, (2014) 4 (3) Research on Humanities and Social Sciences, 49-59.

465 P Osuagwu, „Why Telecom Operators May Not Invest More in Nigeria‟, The Vanguard (6 August, 2014).

infrastructure‟⁴⁶⁶ and also criminalize acts of vandalism targeting such facilities with severe penalties as seen in many countries.⁴⁶⁷

To some extent, it may seem that the enactment of the Nigerian Cybercrimes Act (2015) have partly addressed the need for a law that will designate telecommunications facilities as critical national information infrastructure.⁴⁶⁸ One of the objectives of the Act is to ensure the protection of „critical national information infrastructure‟.⁴⁶⁹ The Act does not define „critical national information infrastructure‟, however, it defines „critical infrastructure‟ as “systems and assets which are so vital to the country that the destruction of such systems and assets would have an impact on the security, national economic security, national public health and safety of the country”.⁴⁷⁰ Section 3(1) of the Act provides that:

the President may on the recommendation of the National Security Adviser by [an] Order published in the Federal Gazette designate certain computer systems and/or networks whether physical or virtual…vital to [the] country that the incapacity or destruction of, or interference with such system and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national or economic security, national public health and safety, or any

466A Ogbadu, „Telecommunications Infrastructure as Critical National Infrastructure‟, (August, 2015) 4 The Communicator, available at <http://www.ncc.gov.ng/thecommunicator/index.php?option=

com_content&view=article&id=538&Itemid=5>. See also, NCC Industry Working Group on Multiple Taxation, Brief on the Designation of Telecommunications Infrastructure as Critical National infrastructure, pp.8-9, available at <http://.http://www.ncc.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_

content&view=article&id=839&Itemid=195> last accessed on 30 March, 2016.

467U J Orji, Cybersecurity Law and Regulation (Nijmegen, The Netherlands: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2012) pp.24-30, 224 - 225, 230, 248-250, 296,317& 412.

468 Nigerian Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention Etc) Act 2015.

469 Nigerian Cybercrimes Act 2015, s. 1(b).

470 S. 58 Ibid.

combination of these matters as constituting critical national information infrastructure.⁴⁷¹

The Act does not explicitly provide for the protection of telecommunications facilities, however, it is apparent within the above context that „computer systems and/or networks whether physical or virtual‟ would also include physical elements of telecommunications network such as network infrastructure that facilitates the exchange of information between computer systems. This is due to the effect of the convergence of computer and telecommunications technologies which makes it impossible to explicitly distinguish between computer networks and telecommunications networks in modern telecommunications⁴⁷²since most modern telecommunications networks simultaneously carry information/communications to both telecommunications devices and computer systems.⁴⁷³ Also, section 58 of the Act broadly defines a „computer system‟ to include

“…any type of device with data processing capabilities including but not limited to, computers and mobile phones”.⁴⁷⁴ The Act also defines a „network‟ as “a collection of hardware components and computers interconnected by communications channels that allow the sharing of resources and information”.⁴⁷⁵ Hence, within the context of section 3(1) of the Cybercrime Act a „computer network‟ would include a telecommunications network.

A Presidential Order that is made under section 3(1) of the Cybercrime Act may prescribe minimum standards, guidelines, or rules for the protection or general

471 S. 3 (1) Ibid.

472 U J Orji, Cybersecurity Law and Regulation (Nijmegen, The Netherlands: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2012) p.21.

473 Ibid.

474Cybercrime Act 2015, s.58.

475 S. 58 Ibid.

management of critical information infrastructure.⁴⁷⁶ The Act also criminalizes malicious acts against critical national information infrastructure.⁴⁷⁷ However, the Act does not explicitly criminalize the physical destruction or vandalization of critical national information infrastructure. Rather, it criminalizes core cybercrimes such as unauthorized access to a computer system (hacking), the dissemination of computer viruses and other electronic crimes that target critical national information infrastructure. Hence, in the present circumstance, the Act can only be made to protect telecommunications network facilities where a Presidential Order is made under section 3(1) of the Act to designate such facilities as critical national information infrastructure and also provide for their protection. This also implies that still need for the enactment of a law that will explicitly criminalize the physical destruction or vandalization of telecommunications network facilities. Also, the establishment of a Presidential Order on the protection of telecommunications network facilities as critical national information infrastructure will not be enough in the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms.