Klein, Moon and Hoffman’s (2006a) data-frame model treats frames in a similar manner to schemas1, i.e. that they take the form of a retrospective narrative account, based on expertise and
experience; these frames are used to organise data and anticipate future events (Pirolli and Card, 2005). For Klein et al. (2006a) the process of sensemaking involves the recognition and fitting of data into an appropriate frame, which then guides further data collection and influences the filtering of
1 Klein et al. (2007) describe the frame as the synthesis of concepts proposed by earlier researchers,
data viewed as relevant to the situation. These processes of frame construction/modification and frame-defined data collection are thought to occur in parallel (Klein et al., 2005). For Minsky (1975, cited in Klein et al., 2006a) frames primarily serve to aid recognition, by guiding attention to fill in the missing elements of the frame and to search for information that allows the frame to be tested. Klein et al. (2006a) expand on this view by noting both that frames themselves change with the acquisition of data and also that frames shape (transform) the data they encapsulate.
Figure 2.3: Notional model of the sensemaking loop for intelligence analysis derived from CTA (Pirolli and Card, 2005)
From this perspective, problem detection is seen as part of sensemaking and is characterised as a rising suspicion that “the way events are being interpreted is incomplete and perhaps incorrect” (Klein et al., 2005). The suspicion that forms the basis of questioning a frame is based on the available data and may result from direct contradictions to the frame, the accumulation of discrepancies or the detection of subtle anomalies (Klein et al., 2005). Klein et al. (2004; cited in Klein et al. 2005) describe how the questioning of a frame may lead to elaboration (discovery of new data or relationships), frame preservation (explaining away anomalies), the comparison of alternate frames, or reframing (recovering discarded data and reinterpreting data). These activities are summarised in Figure 2.4; which represents each activity as an oval, each of which contains actions
relating to frame-driven data collection (on the left) and ways in which the data can affect the frame (on the right). The top oval represents the basic sensemaking cycle of frame-defined data collection and data based frame modification (Klein et al., 2007). Any of the activities in Figure 2.4 can be a starting point for sensemaking, depending on the nature of the ‘surprise’ or perception of inadequacy of the existing frame that triggered it (Klein et al., 2007). According to Klein et al. (2005; 2007) difficulties in describing sensemaking stem from this wide range of associated activities and the fact that they operate in different ways, with different strategies and obstacles that must be overcome. Klein at al. (2007) also state nine assertions related to the data-frame theory of sensemaking:
1. Sensemaking is the simultaneous process of fitting data into a frame and fitting a frame around the data.
2. Data elements are inferred, using the frame; different people may derive different data elements from a situation.
3. The frame is inferred from a few key anchors and that frame is used to search for more data elements.
4. The inferences used in sensemaking rely on abductive reasoning (i.e. the most plausible explanation) as well as logical deduction.
5. Sensemaking usually ceases when the data and frame are brought into congruence. 6. Experts reason the same way as novices, but have a richer repertoire of frames.
7. Sensemaking is used to achieve a functional understanding – what to do in a situation – as well as an abstract understanding.
8. People primarily rely on just-in-time mental models. “...constructed from fragments...In
complex and open systems, a comprehensive mental model is unrealistic.” (Klein et al., 2007,
page 151).
9. Sensemaking takes different forms, each with its own dynamics.
(Klein et al., 2007, page 120) Looking at these assertions, it is clear that there are some similarities with the representation construction approach to sensemaking: the various cyclical processes associated with the data-frame theory (i.e. elaboration, questioning, seeking, reframing, etc.) could be seen as expanding on Pirolli and Card’s (2005) foraging and sensemaking loops, thereby providing the ‘how’ of sensemaking that is absent from their description. Additionally, Klein et al.’s (2007) assertion that sensemaking involves abductive, as well as deductive reasoning could be seen as similar to the top-down and
bottom-up approaches in Pirolli and Card’s (2005) account. However, Klein et al. (2007) view sensemaking as a process that takes place in dynamic situations, in order to guide not only understanding, but also action:
“The active exploration of an environment, conducted for a purpose, reminds us that sensemaking is an active process and not the passive receipt and combination of messages.”
(Klein et al., 2007 page 118) Thus, the process of sensemaking can be viewed as being partly defined by the situation.
Figure 2.4: The seven types of sensemaking in the data-frame model (redrawn from Klein, Phillips, Rall and Peluso, 2007, page 133)
Klein (2006, page 227) acknowledges that “it is rare to find an important task being performed by an
individual without any sort of team and organizational coordination” and Klein et al. (2006b)
ground. Nevertheless, the view adopted by Klein et al. (2006b) is that sensemaking in teams is only performed by certain expert individuals to whom information is passed, i.e. it is socially mediated, rather than an inherently social process. As a result, Klein (2006) views the distribution of tasks and data across team members as more of a barrier to effective sensemaking than an enabler:
“Experts must be able to explore data, and their analysis can suffer when data are hidden from them in layers of someone else’s interpretations.” (Klein, Moon and Hoffman, 2006b page 71)
A consequence of this individualistic view is that Klein and associates only see technology as being involved in sensemaking through the use of intelligent systems – something which they are highly sceptical of (Klein, Moon and Hoffman, 2006a). Klein et al. (2007) seem to suggest that artefacts may function as frames:
“A frame can take the form of a story, explaining the chronology of events and the causal relationships between them; a map, explaining where we are by showing distances and directions to various landmarks and showing routes to destinations; a script, explaining our role
or job as complementary to the roles or jobs of others; or a plan for describing a sequence of intended actions. Thus, a frame is a structure for accounting for the data and guiding the
search for more data.” (Klein et al., 2007 page 118)
However, they quickly retreat from this interpretation, by clarifying that “...a frame is that portion of
the perceptual cycle that is internal to the perceiver, modifiable by experience, and specific to what is being perceived” (Klein et al., 2007, page 119).