Data

Table 1 reports summary statistics for all the depended and independent variables included in the analysis.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variable Units N Mean S.D.

Dependent variables

General public school enrollment % 848 86.83 5.23

Pupil to teacher ratio # 1101 11.01 1.99

SO2 emissions 1,000 ton 995 20.48 34.38

NO2 emissions 1,000 ton 1000 15.31 19.53

Infant mortality per 1,000 1048 11.74 5.00

Population to doctor ratio # 1111 225.41 52.05

# of heat sources per capita # 1108 825.92 633.55

# of sewage systems per capita # 1018 130.61 139.34

Bus volume Passenger-km 1061 189,258.6 184,723

Paved road volume km/area (1000 sq. km) 1035 13,239.59 14,369.37 Water cleaning per capita 1,000 cubic meters 1005 0.07 0.03

Socio-economic characteristics

Real GDP per capita RUB 1027 137,713.10 161,553.80

Real income per capita RUB 929 10,912.82 8,133.40

Urbanization rate % 1119 68.14 14.56

Population density population/area (sq. km) 1118 178.63 1113.13

Ethnic fractionalization % 1131 0.24 0.23

Poverty rate % 1064 22.99 12.53

School-age children (7-16) to

population ratio % 956 0.13 0.03

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The dataset on outcomes of public goods provision, governors’ party affiliation, and control variables covers 91 federal regions of Russia17 _{for the years 2000-2012.}18 _{Data are available}

from the Russian Federation Federal State Statistics Service (FSSS) as well as 2002 and 2010 Russian Census. My dependent variables of interest are an array of public services with and without interregional spillover effects. Public services with spillovers are environmental quality, education outcomes, and healthcare outcomes.19 Environmental quality is measured in terms of sulfur dioxide emissions, which are linked with adverse effects on the respiratory system20_.

According to the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, the biggest sources of its emissions in Russia are fuel (coal) combustion at metallurgical and power plants. Education outcomes are measured as a percentage of school-age children enrolled in elementary and secondary public schools, and pupil-to-teacher ratio. Infant mortality is calculated as the number of deaths of children under the age of 1 per 1000 live births; population-to-doctor ratio also serves as a proxy for the effectiveness of the health care system21 (Robalino et al. 2001). Public services without interregional spillover effects are public utilities, such as heating and sewage sources, and water treatment22, and public transportation23. Public utilities are measured as a number of central sewage systems, excluding rain drainages, located in population districts per

17 _{Chechen Republic is excluded from the analysis due to the Second Chechen War, which started in 1999,}

continued until 2003.

18 _{Data for some dependent variables and covariates is missing for some of the earlier years.}

19 _{A large percentage of infant deaths in Russia are due to infections and parasitic diseases as well as poor}

environmental quality. As a result, infant mortality represents a category of healthcare provision that might exhibit interregional spillover effects (1996 WHO report).

20 _{Pollution data at the regional level are scarce and published infrequently.}

21 _{Changes in immunization would indicate a more immediate effect on the efficiency of the health care system than}

infant mortality. However no pre-2005 immunization information exists at the required geographic level. In addition, infant mortality can only serve as a proxy for public services as it is really an output of a function of the quality of public services provision, and not an input into it.

22 _{Perhaps, a better measure of public utilities provision is percentage of households with access to residential water}

or sewage systems as opposed to counts of water and sewage systems. However, data on household access to public utilities is not available prior to 2007.

23 _{Measures like public street lightning or street paving represent better examples of public services with low}

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capita; thousands of cubic meters of water run though sewage treatment per capita; and number of central heating systems per capita. Public transportation is measured in passenger-kilometers, which is the distance traveled by passengers on buses. In addition, transportation is measured by density of paved roads, which is number of kilometers of roads per 1,000 square kilometers. The array of dependent variables was chosen to maximize the probability that regional political leaders would have a significant impact on the provision of public goods. According to Kraan et al. (2008), regional authorities in Russia oversee 49% of total expenditures on household

utilities, 59% of total expenditures on transportation, 56% of total expenditures on environmental protection, 68% of the expenditures on health care, and 26% of total expenditures on primary education.

The main independent variables of interest include a time dummy for whether a regional governor was elected or appointed, a dummy for whether a regional governor belongs to the treatment or control group, and an indicator for the governor’s pre- and post- law party affiliation24. The time dummy takes a value of 1 for the years 2005-2012, and 0 for the years 2000-2004. There is no uniform data source for the governors’ party affiliation since UR does not specify the accession of high-ranking officials to the party. As a result, I collected data on the governors’ party affiliation directly from online news sources. The treatment dummy takes a value of 1 if a governor changed his party affiliation to UR between 2005 and 2007, and 0 if he has been affiliated with UR prior to 2005. Governors’ affiliation is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a regional governor is an official member of UR, or at least expresses a public support for it, as determined by public news announcements, and 0 if he is a member of an

24 _{Since I employ those dummies to essentially measure recentralization of regional political institutions I avoid}

using the share of sub-national revenues/expenditures in total revenues/expenditures, which often overestimates the degree of fiscal autonomy (Stegarescu 2005).

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opposition party or an independent candidate. The treatment effect of interest is expressed by the interaction of the time dummy and the treatment dummy.