Data

This study uses mixed methods of data analysis to generate robust results (Small 2011). It combines data from: a) surveys; b) interviews; c) ethnographic fieldwork; and d) socio-economic and policy indicators. Most of my public opinion data comes from the European Social Survey (ESS); a biannual survey containing public opinion data for over thirty European countries, including Belgium and Spain, with samples of approximately two thousand respondents for every country and year. All five waves: 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010 include the two survey questions I have used to present the variability of anti-immigrant sentiment.

I also include public opinion data from the Eurobarometer (2011), the European Values Study (2008), and the Immigrant Citizen Survey (2012). The Eurobarometer and the European Values Study are large cross-national surveys comparable to the European Social Survey. A recent Eurobarometer (2011) provides public opinion data on cross-cultural relations, and how citizens expect them to evolve in the near future, and the European Values Study (2008) contains a survey question on citizens’ attitudes toward immigrants’ cultural integration. The Immigrant Citizen Survey (2012) is a novel pilot study with data on immigrants’ integration in fifteen European cities,

including five capitals of my six research sites; Antwerp (Flanders), Barcelona (Catalonia), Brussels (Brussels), Liege (Wallonia), and Madrid (Madrid). The most innovative element of this study is that it approaches integration from the immigrants’ perspective. I have used these four surveys to compare and contrast anti-immigrant sentiment across regions.

National-level datasets provide complementary evidence to better capture cross-regional differences. In the analysis of Belgian regions, I have used data from: a) the General Election Study (1991, 1999, and 2003); and b) Discrimination Survey, Enquête discrimination (2004). For the study of Spanish regions, I have used: a) Survey on public attitudes toward immigration, Actitudes de los españoles frente a la inmigración (1995, 1996, 2008, and 2009); b) Opinions and Attitudes of the Andalusian Population toward Immigration, Opiniones y actitudes de la población andaluza ante la inmigración (2005, 2008, 2010); and c) Catalans’ perceptions of immigration, Percepció dels catalans sobre la immigració (2010).

I interpret survey data with evidence from forty-five semi-structured interviews with immigration experts. These experts include university professors conducting immigration research across the social sciences; Sociology, Political Science, Economics, and Law; politicians, and representatives of immigrant associations (see Appendix B: Descriptive statistics of interviewees).

I have conducted interviews in three different languages: Catalan, English, and Spanish, and their length ranged from forty five minutes to one hour. I quote segments of interviews and, when they were not conducted in English, I include the original quote in a footnote.

In both countries, I select immigration experts using a snow-ball sample strategy. In Spain, the selection of experts was based on an independent research foundation for international affairs in Barcelona, CIDOB (Centre d’Estudis i Documentació Internationals de Barcelona [Center for International Studies and Documentation of Barcelona]). As CIDOB works with experts who have

external appointments in research universities and public administrations, I think that they represent unbiased intellectual and professional elite⁴. This list has been the point of departure of my selection of experts in Spain. In Belgium, I have selected experts based on the research foundation King Baudouin, in Brussels, as well as peer-reviewed publications in the most important journals on international migration. In both countries, I have encouraged my interviewees to propose additional experts in the field, in order to expand the size of my experts’

sample. My interview protocol begins by presenting cross-regional attitudinal differences in the expert’s country, and proceeds with the discussion of demographic, economic, political and cultural processes that could be potentially underlying these attitudes (see Table 3.5: Interview protocol).

< Table 3.5 about here >

In order to evaluate the role of state policies regulating immigrants’ enfranchisement, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork during the two months preceding Spain’s 2011 local elections in two localities: Alcalá de Henares (Madrid) and Badalona (Barcelona). I selected these two localities because of their similar size; about 200,000 inhabitants, above-average percentages of immigration; 21.6% in Alcalá and 14.8% in Badalona, and their proximity to the two largest cities in the country. Most immigrants in Alcalá de Henares come from other member states of the European Union or Latin America, and about 87% of them are eligible to vote in local elections.

By contrast, most immigrants in Badalona come from Africa or Asia, and only 42% are likely to be enfranchised (Table 3.6: Immigrant population in Alcalá de Henares and Badalona, 2010). The three largest nationalities in Alcalá de Henares are Romanians, Poles, and Bulgarians, while in Badalona, they are: Pakistanis, Moroccans, and Chinese (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2012).

4 List of immigration experts: http://www.cidob.org/ca/temes_regions/migracions/equip_de_treball

Ethnographic fieldwork in these two communities has facilitated the sociological understanding of how political parties respond to immigrants’ access to political power.

< Table 3.6 about here >

To optimize the comparison, I focus on the performance of a single political party: Partido Popular. In Spain’s bi-party system, Partido Popular represents the most important conservative party in the country. It has been in office between 1996 and 2004, under the presidency of José María Aznar, and from November 2011 onwards, under Mariano Rajoy. Immigration became a top priority during Aznar’s government (Arango and Martin 2005), but in the current legislature the salience of immigration has decreased vis-à-vis the reforms to address an unprecedented economic crisis. In May 2011, Partido Popular won local elections in both Alcalá de Henares and Badalona. The examination of this party’s immigration discourse and its mutability according to immigrants’ access to political power helps explain cross-regional differences in anti-immigrant sentiment.

Finally, I use socio-economic and policy indicators to contextualize within-country attitudinal differences. Most of my socio-demographic estimates come from Eurostat, OECD – International Migration Outlook, Belgium’s Directorate-General Statistics and Economic Information, and Spain’s Instituto Nacional de Estadística [National Statistics Institute].

Additionally, I rely upon the Migrant Integration Policy Index to illustrate national institutional frameworks for immigrants’ integration in the labor market and access to political rights. I use data from the European Union Democracy Observatory to present citizenship statistics across regions and the largest nationalities naturalized.

In sum, this study combines data from existing public opinion surveys, semi-structured interviews, ethnographic fieldwork, and socio-economic and policy indicators to explain the

uneven distribution of anti-immigrant sentiment, and its manifestation as a material and as a cultural threat.