THE DEBATE OUTSIDE THE WEST: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE RMA

It is not only Western or those actors aspiring to big power status that need to or are contemplating matters of future warfare and the RMA as a dominant strand of a future military posture. Developing countries are also increasingly entering this debate as is portrayed in contemporary RMA literature. This shift becomes visible in the emergent views concerning the RMA, as it is increasingly debated by Asian countries, Middle Eastern states and to a lesser extent, even in Africa. The debate is quite recent, underdeveloped and in need of further scrutiny. In the following section, certain features are outlined that tend to characterise the debate before introducing a number of views concerning the RMA and the developing community of states.

4.4.1 The RMA in the Developing World: A quest for theory and understanding

In Chapter Three it was concluded that it is wrong to presume that military innovations automatically diffuse to other actors. It was furthermore argued that certain preconditions determine whether innovations that do diffuse are liable to be integrated into systems of the host.

For developing countries to pursue the RMA hold risks and in particular if its sophisticated format is viewed as a quick fix for their military difficulties. These risks and difficulties require from developing actors a balanced outlook upon the RMA debate, as there is no single RMA-solution or silver bullet as a cure all. Different threats to and requirements by developing countries are to stimulate a need for elements of the technological, organisational and conceptual triad that underpins RMA-thinking (Sherman, 1999: 18).

Developed countries are inclined to view the developing world as the future theatre of war where admixtures of military forces will clash or developed actors might become drawn into some future conflict they might prefer to avoid. Such outlooks by developed countries tend to border on military colonialism towards the less developed world for it assumes them to merely subject to it.

However, these very actors upon whose territories future conflicts are judged to manifest should not be viewed as mere bystanders or victims. Their views on important military matters such as the RMA are admittedly vague and not unlike the West, even somewhat skewed. Certain developing actors nonetheless pursue the debate in some manner whilst others prefer some elements or islands of future military sophistication.

4.4.2 What developing countries should know about the RMA debate

In spite of the technological emphasis by certain RMA-proponents, decision-makers in developing countries should note that it is not only about gaining access to modern technologies. Failing to absorb and integrate emerging technologies or becoming overwhelmed by its glamour holds the potential for devastating consequences and strategic failure. Both Iraq and Libya are prominent examples of developing countries that gained access to new technologies, but were unable to exploit it properly. The same is perhaps to be said of North Korea with their pursuit of military sophistication probably ties into the famine and poor socio-economic conditions of that country (Buzan, 1991:242, 286). Technology fallacies are not only about the inability to absorb and integrate, but also of not understanding or an incapacity to uphold the full spectrum of military changes necessary to gain the desired outcomes. Biddle and Zirkle (1996) present compelling arguments on this matter as to why certain developing countries master new technologies and systems integration and others fail. It is, however, necessary to first address some theoretical perspectives on RMA-thinking and developing countries before returning to the research findings of Biddle and Zirkle.

According to Hasim (1998:5) the outcome of the 1991 Gulf War impressed upon many countries the challenges and their inability to shift towards high-tech militaries to exploit some sectors of the RMA. Hasim (1998:1) also points out some fundamental and challenging policy questions that developing countries have to consider.

ƒ Do they have the technology infrastructure and financial resources to dedicate to developing high-tech military forces?

ƒ Do their military forces have the flexibility to revamp their organisations, military culture, and doctrines to allow exploitation of RMA-thinking?

ƒ What alternatives to the RMA do developing countries have?

In addition to the above that rather reflects matters of defence policy, Metz (2000) infuses some detail by outlining the deeper implications of concepts used to master future warfare along RMA-type developments. These are particular challenges to be considered by decision-makers of developing countries when contemplating the utility of RMA-type changes to move their military forces into the future.

Metz posits that in spite of the progress supposed by the RMA, war is to remain subject to dangerous relationships between passion, hatred, reason chance, and probability. This is so much the more applicable to the types of conflicts expected in the developing world whilst RMA-ways and means are not sweep this from the future strategic landscape (Metz, 2000:80-81).

These are difficulties, according to Gray, (2000) that are unlikely to change in the near future. It furthermore augments uncertainty for entering the RMA domain is to also enter that of second order and mostly unforeseen effects concerning one's own military establishments (Metz, 2000:100). Difficulties of this kind apply to developing countries in particular where military balances and threat perceptions are more fragile or vulnerable to changes in military ways and means and thus hold potentially deep effects for this tier of states.

4.4.3 Particular RMA complexities facing developing countries

Speed of decision-making and reaction is a defining element of the RMA and crucial for gaining an advantage over opponents. Speed is to emanate from information technologies and its use for maximising own advantages and minimising those of opponents by reacting first to opportunities (Metz, 2000:81-82). Following in its wake is faster decision-making about future military conflict situations; a matter not all that simple in many developing countries with their complex security challenges and misuse of military coercion as found in Africa for example (Metz, 2000a:6). At the meta-level speed is even more fundamental. It is about rapid organisational and conceptual adaptation to new threats that defy existing paradigms. Countries need to develop strategic entrepreneurship to adjust to new threat/conflict environments and this calls for a true military futures outlook (Metz, 2000:84).

Although precision is prone to be understood in terms of weapons technology and perhaps tactics, Metz adds a further important dimension for developing countries. Precision has multiple facets and needs a broader understanding. In addition to physical precision, psychological precision is equally important (Metz, 2000:86). War is a psychological struggle as well and to be successful, psychological precision should complement physical precision for developing countries do not always have recourse to the latter. As the use of the military option becomes increasingly questioned, psychological precision is to increasingly feature alongside decisions

about military operations. It remains to be seen if developing countries are exempted of this imposition.

Strategic precision is a third dimension. This entails to structure or compose and prepare military institutions to accurately reflect a country's strategic situation: strategic culture, level of technological development, threats etc. Determining strategic thresholds - what types of military responses are possible and ethically acceptable - form part of strategic precision (Metz, 2000:88-89). Strategic precision is a crucial contemporary issue as military forces and their functional relevance and moral justification are under growing pressure. This is prominent in present day South Africa and the ongoing transformation of its military forces to defend South Africa and simultaneously contribute to the African continent's security in its widest sense. Strategic precision is encapsulated in the South African view expressed as "Our security forces have to contribute to democracy, peace and stability on our continent as a whole." (Department of Defence, 2001:2-12).

Reorganising operational concepts and organisations are judged to underpin successful future militaries. This applies to developing countries as well. Human capital, private-military blending, hierarchy-network competition, arms of service versus conflict specialisation and new services for new futures all enter the organisational and operational concept scene (Metz, 2000:91 - 93). In essence the question is posed whether existing paradigms are compatible with new threat environments and changes in the strategic environment. Failing to master this transformation towards a future military need is to risk defeat through irrelevance. For developing countries it implies difficult decisions as to whether they should enter this debate, only partially or ignore it.

To effect deep changes as implied by the RMA entails operating within a supporting pattern of civil-military relations. According to Metz (2000:94) countries contemplating the RMA will be forced to examine and adjust its relationship with civil society. For the future it implies balancing the drive for military sophistication and efficiency with civil outlooks upon the military. Adjusting the relationship is furthermore to be challenged by the types of future conflicts or roles military forces will have to assume and their sanctioning by civil society. This is important at both the civil decision-making level about the military as well as the psychological level concerning the image of the military held by society. Patterns of civil-military relations, according to Biddle and Zirkle (1996) also determine the mobility of military forces to adjust and reorganise according to new concepts, new roles and skills and thus the dynamics or stasis reflected in its thinking and operations.

4.4.4 RMA-thinking and its pursuit in developing countries¹⁸

The above theoretical perspectives represent an outlook upon certain challenges that decision-makers wishing to contemplate RMA-capabilities need to keep in mind. In the following section an overview of matters that developing countries need to face are set out to indicate challenges and even the inappropriateness for some to follow the RMA alternative.

Being wired or information conscious is one aspect facilitating a pursuit of the RMA. According to Demchak (2000:1) the increased diffusion of information technologies to developing countries is a cause for optimism as their share of using the internet rose from 11 per cent to 33 per cent over the period 1995-1998. This rise implies a growing capacity to understand and use information and networked systems. Inter alia such networking also promotes its eventual diffusion to the military realm. Access to information technologies is also becoming cheaper and more readily accessible by military institutions and accordingly their determination to modernise along electronic lines as well (Demchak, 2000:2).

In a survey by Demchak (2000:5) of countries planning modernisation, 68 countries were identified as being developing countries aspiring towards having smaller more sophisticated and information intensive future militaries. Such modernisation became the presumed key to both effectiveness as well as prestige amongst some developing countries. This is portrayed and argued by Cordesman concerning the flow of modern arms to the Middle East and Persian Gulf States in particular (Cordesman, 1999:1). This outlook and its pursuit take place amidst no real sophisticated threats as well as pressing economic problems for some (Demchak, 2000:6).

Competition in keeping up with neighbouring actors plays a role as well. However, the institutional challenges of such shifts for developing countries display critical parameters. Modern weapons systems and the information domain are not exclusively military and not dependent upon military support only. The civil-military intermix implies access and durability, but raises further needs in order to remain effective or competitive (Demchak, 2000:8) as such new capabilities are only valid as long as the new owners are able to sustain and use them in a proper manner.

Partial entry into the RMA-realm is to render benefits as well as difficulties. Benefits can be disproportionate to the actual investment or entry level achieved. Long reach and disruptive potential contained in a moderately effective implementation and mastering of RMA, capabilities need to be noted. It remains marginal for developing countries to achieve these capabilities over the general spectrum of its military forces, but the potentially disproportionate benefit to deter

18 See Vreÿ, 2001, Military futures of developing countries: Images of alternative futures for the South African Military,

attracts developing countries towards obtaining a selective RMA capacity (Demchak, 2000:8). It is, however, bound to promote undue threat perceptions within neighbouring countries.

According to an assessment by Cordesman (1999) threat perceptions do play a role. In countries of the Persian Gulf this factor operates in two ways. First, the perception of countries like Iran and Iraq of the USA and its RMA-capabilities drove their military procurement to some extent.

Subsequent to this smaller Gulf States purchase major weapons systems in order not to be left out in the cold. According to Cordesman (1999:50) this cycle is not so much about harnessing the RMA, but rather offsetting an opponent that has entered its domain. Acquiring modern systems does not automatically imply the ability to use them in an integrated and collective manner or in dramatic new ways as demonstrated by the 1991 Second Gulf War. Gulf States are not effecting revolutionary shifts in their military organisations and doctrines in spite of the high glitter factor in their arms purchases. At the most it will imply tactical improvements or a tactical RMA (Cordesman, 1999:50-51).

The extent to which a developing country manages to master military modernisation along RMA lines (if only partially) also raises certain difficulties. Electronic and information type modernisation increases capabilities disproportionately as to larger and stronger adversaries.

Raising its information capacity can also be less costly to the new entrants making it a lucrative option to such actors. It furthermore extends strategic reach and creates vulnerabilities in opponents that were previously inconceivable. Such reach holds the attraction of coercing your opponent whilst remaining out of his reach and not becoming involved in an attritional style military conflict. This threat is multiplied for those not able to make the transition towards exploiting some elements of the RMA (Vreÿ, 2001:42, 46 ; Demchak, 2000:5).

4.4.5 Some hard realities for RMA pursuits by developing countries

Counter to the above optimistic view of developing countries and the diffusion of RMA-type capabilities, some theorists present a more pessimistic outlook. These difficulties point to the dictates of realities - what is theoretically desirable, but ultimately affordable and therefore probable.

Hasim puts forward a very pessimistic opinion on the presumed ability of developing countries to master the RMA or elements thereof as they lack certain competencies. Developing countries, for example, do not have the scientific and technological base to produce major weapons systems - high-technology systems in particular. Neither do they have the high-technology information industries to produce RMA-type information technologies (Hasim, 1998:5).

Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol XXIII, No 2, November.

Countries outside the developed sphere are also judged not to have the financial resources and human capital to construct the desired infrastructures. They are furthermore not accomplished in waging war in a joint and integrated manner. Their systemic inability to use air and naval forces effectively and in conjunction with land forces results from a poor culture of inter-service co-operation and co-ordination. Operating in a joint manner demands the very organisational flexibility and decentralisation presumed for RMA-type militaries, but found wanting in the military forces of most developing countries (Hasim, 1998:6).

It is possible as well that some countries will remain ignorant about the RMA for they do not rate it as important to their future security. If not exploited by its neighbours or potential foes it also remains optional to pursue this new line of thinking. Furthermore, the asymmetric option, as a burgeoning parallel debate to the RMA, becomes a viable option to oppose those actors and potential foes immersed in the pursuit of RMA capabilities (Hasim, 1998:6). Potential victims of the RMA are therefore prone to turn to the asymmetric option to counterbalance their inability to compete with or offset RMA opponents. Another option - like in the case of South Africa, is to redirect policies and military posture away from any future conflict where it is to face such war fighting type challenges as the latter is deemed an unaffordable luxury.

Biddle and Zirkle (1996) argue a strong case for the disruptive impact of improper civil-military relations upon mastering military complexities. Disturbing patterns of civil-military relations in developing countries are prone to erode the military's ability to acquire the skills and expertise to integrate and operate advanced systems (Biddle and Zirkle, 1996:199). This includes integrating supporting systems and creating an officer's corps that can operate expert-like in an advanced and complex military environment. Denying foreign contact for political expediency is a further impediment for the expertise to operate acquired military systems, nowadays lies with the foreign party. Modernising militaries also need to optimise their combat power. Technology and organisational readiness are crucial to this in terms of being able to operate and maintain it, as well as organisational adjustment to its needs. If this symbiotic relationship is disrupted by political interference, the coherence between organisational readiness and modern technology becomes unravelled (Biddle and Zirkle, 1996:173-174).

Case studies by Biddle and Zirkle on Iraq and the former North Vietnam substantiates the above views. The more harmonious interaction between Vietnamese civil-military parties as opposed to that of contemporary Iraq led to different outcomes in spite of neither having general access to technologically skilled human capital. These differences can be reconfigured and illustrated from the comparison done by Biddle and Zirkle as illustrated in Table 4.2.

As both Iraq as well as North Vietnam had access to quite similar human capital it is tenable to argue that disrupting or facilitating balanced civil-military relations played some discernible role.

From the comparison done in Table 4.2 it appears that of the five factors used by Biddle and Zirkle, Iraqi civil-military relations score an unqualified high negative on all seven factors.

Opposed to this the North Vietnamese score of a low negative on two and positive on the remaining five. Judging that the Vietnamese achieved most success in mastering complex technologies it is possible to argue for civil military relations being an important variable concerning the complexities of future warfare. For those aspiring towards mastering complex, integrative and technology driven militaries of the future, civil-military relations are to become an important facilitating condition. As in the case illustrated above this applies equally to developing countries.

Table 4.2: Differential Patterns of Civil-Military Relations followed by Iraq and North Vietnam

Civil-military factor Iraq North Vietnam

Purges and executions. Yes, frequent purges. Yes, but infrequently.

Politicisation of promotion. Yes, heavily. No, only marginally.

Political surveillance. Yes, heavily. Yes, but less of a military focus.

Absence of military influence at highest levels of political decision-making.

Yes, exclusive for Ba'th party members.

No, close political-military integration.

Inhibition of military initiative. Yes No, lateral communications and exchanges possible.

Multiple lines of command. Yes No, a single chain of command.

Politicisation of training. Yes No, professionalism and foreign exposure promoted.

(Source: Own Compilation from Biddle and Zirkle, 1996)

4.4.6 India: Integrating the RMA into a second tier military

4.4.6 India: Integrating the RMA into a second tier military