Debates in Social Construction Theory

SCT has been subjected to criticism and debate. The main discussion point rests on the extremes of two sub theories, strict or strong constructivism, also known as relativism, and realism. Although Crotty (1998, p. 64) dismisses this debate stating that “social construction should not contrast with ‘realism’; social construction does not confine reality in the same way idealism does. Idealism is the philosophical view that what is real is somehow confined to what is in the mind, that is, it consists only of ‘ideas’”. Idealism, therefore, according to Crotty, is the debatable contrast to realism, but for the purposes of illuminating the discussions that exist around social construction, namely the realism versus relativism debate, which is recognized by many other claims-makers, as the relevant contrast, this will be discussed below. I will also address the appealing middle ground – moderate constructivism.

3.4.1

Realism versus relativism

Realism, according to Crotty (1998, p. 10), is “an ontological (nature of existence) notion asserting that realities exist outside the mind.” In apparent contrast to realism is relativism, which is the concept that there exists no absolute truth or validity, that some central aspect of experience, thought, evaluation, or even reality is relative to something else, such as culture, language, or experience (Swoyer, 2010). Relativism even claims that science and scientific research methods are subjective, as there are no objective truths. Acknowledging these two extremes helps to navigate a way to which both sides can be used productively. This debate is a common one when considering social construction, as it tends to lead to a compromise that is a social construction itself. As stated by Crotty (1998, p.63) social constructivism is “at once realist and relativist”.

This concept was metaphorically explained by Stanley Fish (New York Times, 21, May 1996) in Crotty, (1998, p. 63) stating that “It is no contradiction to say that something is socially constructed and also real”. He described a situation in baseball whereby the concepts of “balls” and “strikes” are themselves a social construction, but they are also most certainly real. They are essentially constructions and could potentially change, but nonetheless they are real. Additionally, as argued by Irwin (2001, p. 16)

[e]xpressed very crudely, ‘realists’ have been critical of what they sometimes represent as the empty and misplaced theorizing of constructivists. Equally, the realist charge has been that by undermining the reality of

environmental problems, constructivists fail to develop an adequate analytical framework, and ultimately deny the separate existence of the natural from the social. Constructivists have suggested in response that realist approaches miss out on one of the most important aspects of environmental debate: the manner in which particular issues rise to prominence and are seen to be ‘real’. Constructivists also argue that their accounts bring more rather than less ‘reality’ to environmental problems – and especially in terms of the social and institutional processes that lead to their emergence.

Therefore, there are aspects of reality that are objectively “real”, such as the deforestation in Cambodian rainforest, but intertwined with those objects, concepts and topics are socially-malleable relative constructions; which are imposed by humanity and culture. These could include the conceptions and the interpretation of the environmental changes, and meaning attributed to the forests and how such meaning contributes to how people interact with the forest.

3.4.2

Critical realism

Established in the 1970s by Roy Bhaskar (1975), critical realism has been suggested to be a successor to social constructivism (Losch, 2009). Originally Bhaskar developed a general philosophy of science described as “transcendental realism” and a philosophy of human sciences that he called “critical naturalism”. Gradually Bhaskar hybridized the terms into “critical realism” (Losch, 2009). Critical realism, as it is understood today, aims to be a more theoretical substitute for positivism and social

constructivism. Critical realists claim that social constructivism is too superficial and too imprecise to be useful in examining society and science (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2009). Similar to social construction, critical realism was born out of a reaction against positivism and empirical science and is part of so-called “postmodern” critiques. Critical realism argues that science should be understood as an on-going process rather than an identification of a coincidence between a postulated independent and dependent variable. But critical realism still maintains that examinations into the social reality can be approached with positivist, scientific methods and makes strong assumptions of underlying structures in society (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2009).

The divisions highlighted between critical realism and social constructivism appear to be more representative of extreme constructivism expressions. Moderate constructivism, which will be discussed below, allows for a more interactive role between ‘objective’ reality and social interpretations. Since social construction is a broad framework which allows for many different varieties to be utilized, it is therefore at this point more frequently used. For the purposes of exploring a social relationship to a nature-based concept (nature and nature conservation) this study employed a moderate constructivist framework that utilized qualitative research methods, including semi-structured and key-informant interviews.

3.4.3

Moderate constructivism

There is an objective reality to social problems (Eitzen, 1984 cited in Holstein, 1993, p. 8).

Strong constructivism is more closely aligned to relativism and has therefore been met with more criticism, but for the purposes of this research a more moderate constructivism is utilized. This moderate constructivism accepts that external realities exist in nature, but that individuals influence that reality with their constructions of it. The following sets out some key characteristics of SCT:

1) Importance of social processes in shaping the world and the people in it (Cromby & Nightingale, 1999).

2) Belief that these social processes are specific to particular time and culture (Braun & Wainwright, 2001).

3) Belief that knowledge and activity are intertwined (Cromby and Nightingale, 1999). The first characteristic revolves around ‘social processes’. These frequently involve language and discourse. Therefore, typically, it is these interactions that focus on using qualitative interviews and discourse analysis (Berngartt, 2004). Second, the idea that social processes are specific to time and culture is particularly relevant to consider when attempting to examine another culture from one’s own. In doing research in Asia, it is vital to understand that there are diverse ways of knowing, or as Crotty (1998) puts it, “distinguishable sets of meanings”, as well as separate realities. Lastly, and perhaps most

important to this thesis and for the relationship of social science and nature conservation, is the belief that knowledge and activity are intertwined, meaning that how people express what they know directly relates to what action could be taken on that subject. This perspective does not deny the existence of the material world or undermine the role of the natural sciences in understanding it. Rather, it draws attention to the social contexts and meanings attributed to the material world (which can be influenced by the natural sciences, NGOs and government as well), which, in this case, can influence people’s responses to questions regarding nature and nature conservation.