On decision models and categories outside the pragmatic wheel

Let us begin by considering the decision models for the ENSs in [2]. It should be noted that their total number in [2] does not correspond to the actual number of participants (24 in all). This is mainly due to the fact that some respondents produced requests containing more than one decision model, or, to use Durst-Andersen’s words, ‘made a tour in the pragmatic wheel several times’. Hence, the methodological decision was to count the imperative frames for each communicative event rather than for each respondent (see the analysis of the BED in the attached Excel-document I.3):

[2]

As can be seen from [2], despite our expectations, the ENSs appeared to make a large use of the ‘solving-a-problem’ decision model, which functions as an entrance to the imperative frame. This implies that when dealing with the BED results, we will meet the category of imperative in its three functions, i.e. imperative as Symptom, imperative as Signal, and imperative as Model. However, the ENSs also used the interrogative frame (i.e. ‘stating-a- problem’), which is in accordance with our initial hy-pothesis I, according to which indirect requesting strategies are the ones that are favoured among the ENSs (Brown & Levinson, 1987). Finally, the analysis revealed the least number of the ‘best-bid-for-a-solution-to-a-problem’ decision model among the ENSs, which I did not predict would be found in the results on Permission, involving a prescriptive and – most importantly – polite scenario descrip-tion. This is so because declaratives are claimed to be another preferable indirect requesting strategy among the ENSs (ibid.). Consider examples of the three decision models for the Trolley scenario:

[3]

As already mentioned above, speaking about the categories outside the pragmatic wheel, verbal-ised thought stands out as the most frequent category applied by the ENSs for the scenario description at hand (see the attached Excel-file 1.3):

[4]

The statistics in [4] present more or less predicted results for the ENSs in that they have been claimed to largely employ indirect requesting strategies. However, what I did not expect is the finding concerning the category of motivation:

[5]

Interestingly, I observed a particular tendency among the ENSs to combine motivation with ver-balised thought, which did not seem to be the case with the RESs and the DENs (see below). Consider also an example from the DED in [6]:

[6]

*P101: John.

*P101: I’ve got a trolley here with space on.

*P101: Would you like to just put your suitcase on my trolley here?

*P101: And then we’ll push it.

*P101: It’ll be easier for you.

We have already seen in section 3.5.6.3 that motivation is a pretty straightforward category used when the speaker wants to motivate the hearer to accept her offer by describing the so-called

‘key’ to the solution of the problem. Hence, the paraphrase of I’ve got a trolley here with space on:

‘I can solve your problem because I have got enough space.’

Finally, we shall have to supplement [4] by an in-depth analysis of the category of verbalised thought, which may exhibit findings that are not obvious from the functional analysis. Ironically, I found that most occurrences of verbalised thought in the BED constituted instances of the imperative frame involving Possibility. Thus, most of the ENSs perceived the otherwise prescriptive scenario based on Permission in terms of Possibility. To illustrate the difference between the two types of speech acts, consider [7] and [8] below, which instantiate Possibility and Permission, respectively.

[7] *P114: D’you wanna put that on the trolley?

In [7] a British respondent might have got the following Thought:

‘He desires to produce an activity with the intention that it be sufficient for him to have his suitcase on the trolley.’

which makes sense only in a situation where the speaker does not see any possible reason for why the hearer would not use the trolley. One of the plausible explanations of that could be that the trolley is not the speaker’s property, but belongs to the airport, which, in turn, must make her think that Permission is not appropriate in this situation. Whatever the case may be, if we transform this

Thought into English, we get He wants to put his suitcase on the trolley, which, according to Durst-An-dersen (1995), functions as a ‘key’ to the imperative frame involving Possibility.

[8] *P120: Why don’t you put your case on my trolley?

In [8], on the other hand, another British respondent’s Thought might read as following:

‘He does not intend to produce an activity with the intention that it be suffi-cient for him to have his case on my trolley.’

The speaker in [8] knows that her boss wants his case to be on her trolley. What she is experi-encing at the moment of speech, though, is that her boss does not want to perform a particular action so that the final state can be on the world location. If we translate it into English, we get He does not intend to put his case on my trolley, which functions as a ‘key’ to the imperative frame involving Permis-sion. P120 sincerely desires her boss’s case to be on her trolley. Hence, she expresses her surprise by ask-ing whether her assumption corresponds to his actual state of mind, Why don’t you put your case on my trolley? In this situation, the boss will know that he should put his case on the trolley according to the speaker’s expectation, since why should P120 be surprised if she wanted her boss’s case on her trolley.

In conclusion, only one out of ten ENSs used the category verbalised thought for the imperative frame involving Permission. This is presumably because of the formal format of the Trolley scenario, which imposes certain limitations on the participants’ perception of the trolley as something not be-longing to them. However, this explanation does not hold for the NSPTs, where most of the Russian and Danish respondents issued Permission with the given scenario description, using the imperfective aspect in the case of the former and a negated interrogative in the case of the latter. I shall consider these important differences in the three groups’ perceptions of the Trolley situation in section 5.1.4.3.