To begin with, how do universities interpret youshui and its practices in the higher education sector? A simple and common definition of youshui by my interviewees is ‘a bottom-up attempt or action to influence government officials and shape governmental decisions on certain issues of interest’. The word ‘bottom-up’ highlights the hierarchical nature in universitygovernment relationships. In some interviewees’ view, youshui also refers to influencing a broader range of actors, including media, the general public and local communities. As a university president suggested, universities may, and should, youshui society, because it is important to ‘raise people’s understanding about universities’ roles and contributions to the nation and seek their support’. In practice, however, youshui mostly targets the government. The engagement with media and the public often serves as a strategy for universities to attract attention and support from government leaders and officials.
A large number of university leaders I spoke to view youshui positively and label it as ‘natural and logical behaviour’ and a ‘global practice’, which ensures ‘a balanced two-way flow of information (xinxi duichen 信息对称) between universities and the government’, and ‘delivers the views of universities to the state officials directly’. Especially, it provides both sides with, as one associate president described, ‘a capacity to raise concerns, seek solutions and resolve conflicts long before they become serious or go public’. A university president said, ‘Youshui is well established and well developed in China. Through the practices of youshui, our voice, feedback and ideas are able to reach the government officials regularly.’ My interviewees also hold a unanimous and firm opinion that ‘every university lobbies’, especially the leading
research universities that require continuous policy and funding support and need to monitor and explore opportunities on a broad variety of policies.101
As I illustrated in Chapter 1, formal channels of policy communications are typically top-down and led by the government; and there is a lack of legitimate spaces and formal institutions for bottom-up initiatives where universities can be policy advocates and lobbyists. Attempts at policy influencing and seeking competitive advantages have been driven to various informal tactics and behind-the-scenes, covert interactions due to the political constraints. A university president said:
Lobbying is extremely important and common … Taking my university as an example, we lobby the government almost on a daily basis for various matters and at various levels of personnel … Personally, I have meetings with senior government officials two or three times per week for funding policies. This is what we call ‘visiting the ministries
to cash in’ (paobu qianjin 跑部钱进).102
Within the government, competitive allocations of funding resources are often controlled by different government bureaux and divisions as well as individual personnel within those bureaux. This allows space for manipulation and game playing. To influence government decisions and seek financial interests, universities have to actively lobby the bureaucracies and officials. For example, in 2012, the government developed a special elite program. The aim was to select the best five national institutions in science and fund their training of young talents in basic science. Due to the considerable investment attached to the program, numerous
national universities mobilised their special connections within the government and lobbied individual officials for ‘a special consideration’. A few months later, 17 universities of various ranking managed to secure a funding place in this previously ‘exclusive’ program. Several interviewees told me that ‘this happens nearly every time when there is a funding opportunity’.
101 A few interviewees also suggested that besides leading research universities, the second and third-tier
institutions are also active lobbyists for government funding. They are unable to compete with top players on performance and quality, so they often rely on informal lobbying and expedient means, such as personal
connections and nepotism, to seek policy favours and compensate their disadvantages in national competition for funding. As explained in the Introduction, comparing the lobbying practices by different types of universities is not a focus of this thesis, however, it may be an interesting area for future research.
102 This is a word play on the original expression of ‘fast steps to move forward!’ with the character for ‘step’ (bu 步)
Nevertheless, despite its prevalence, university lobbying is typically couched in non-political and non-confrontational terms, and many people in fact avoid using the word youshui in formal conversations or in writing.103 More neutral terms are frequently applied to describe a lobbying process, such as ‘policy interactions’ (zhengce hudong 政策互动), ‘participation in policy discussions’, ‘exchanging views’, ‘providing policy feedback’, ‘bottom-up reporting’ (xiang shangji huibao gongzuo 向上级汇报工作), ‘universitygovernment communications’, and even ‘providing services to the government’. This is similar to what Shu He has observed: many tertiary institutions set up offices in Beijing to facilitate their lobbying of the
government, but these offices are ambiguously labelled as ‘managing relations with government’ (zhengfu gongguan 政府公关) (S. He, 2009, p. 8). Why?
One explanation provided by some interviewees is that youshui is not an idiomatic word in China thus is not widely understood or used. They have argued that it is a newly introduced, foreign term translated from the English word ‘lobbying’.104 A university president also suggested that youshui is an informal, colloquial expression which is never used in the official language.
Another more plausible explanation offered by my interviewees is that youshui is a sensitive topic in the Chinese political context: this is neither ‘a legitimate form of policy
communication’ nor ‘something that people bring up to the table for open discussions’, despite its common existence. The popular understanding amongst interviewees is that the state does have ‘an aversion to bottom-up initiatives’ (Zheng, 2010, p. 143), which may ‘undermine its paramount authority’ and ‘permit greater social activism’. In particular, the government does not wish to be subject to influence or appear vulnerable, hence it is vigilant and hostile towards explicit, open lobbying attempts. One interviewee commented:
Youshui plays an important role in universitygovernment relations, and the government knows that it can be influenced through youshui. But it will never admit to it, or use the expression youshui. The state maintains that its authority is not subject to influence. It dislikes to show any signs of vulnerability and susceptibility. It likes to suggest that all great new policy ideas originate from the government, even though it is universities that often come up with innovative proposals.
103 A few interviewees were hesitant to discuss it in the beginning of my interviews.
104 In fact, the concept of youshui has long existed in China, and can be traced back to the diplomatic and military
policy strategy of interest alliance ‘hezong lianheng’ (合纵连横) practised 2,500 years ago during the Warring States period.
However, according to my interviewees, the government informally accommodates universities’ behind-the-scenes lobbying behaviour, and appears comfortable labelling and treating it as part of ‘bottom-up reporting’, which is ‘familiar and acceptable to both government officials and universities’. Consequently, universities desensitise and legitimise their lobbying interactions and mitigate political risks by adopting expressions that relate to acceptable bureaucratic practices.
A third explanation by my interviewees is that youshui carries negative connotations in Chinese society because of its mercantile origin, which is often associated with profit-driven, selfish interest groups, and shady, unethical conduct. Earlier studies on interest groups in China have shown that lobbying practices often involve clientelism, rent-seeking, nepotism or even corruption (Cheng, 2006, pp. 45-46, 48; Cheng et al., 2003, pp. 66-70; H. Liu, 2006, pp. 53-54; Z. Tian & Gao, 2006, pp. 563-564, 566; W. Yan, 2009, pp. 77-78; Jing Yang, 2010, pp. 152-153; Q. Zhu, 2011, pp. 34-35). Universities want to distance themselves from this bad reputation, although their closed-door youshui practices may sometimes involve ‘shady business’ and unethical behaviour. A university’s vice president confessed to me that universities are
sensitive and reluctant to relate their practices to youshui or discuss their acts, especially when they did something ‘below the belt’ and ‘cannot discuss it on the table’.
I find that the second and third explanations are more convincing for the restrained expression about youshui. Universities conceal their lobbying behaviour or intention. They avoid
describing their activities as ‘lobbying’ or tagging themselves as part of ‘interest groups’ in order to avoid political sensitivity and negative connotations.