Defining ‘ethics’ in a universal and absolute way is simply not possible. Many scholars have offered a multitude of differing moral and ethical philosophies, from a concept of goodness at the monist level (only one form of good) to a pluralist perspective.
These long-established moral philosophies and relativist perspectives have been broadly categorised into deontological- and teleological-focused theories (Lewis and Speck, 1990).
Deontology and teleology are the most established and contrasted schools of philosophical thought with regard to ethics (see Table 2.1 below). Deontology focuses on both the positive and negative rights and entitlements of individuals, and stems from great philosophical thinkers including Socrates (469-399 BC) and Kant (1724-1804). In contrast, teleological theory focuses on deriving the greatest good overall and is primarily influenced by the work of Bentham (1748-1832) and Mill (1806-1873).
Ferrell et al. (2017, p. 161) described deontology as:
“… moral philosophies that focus on the rights of individuals and on the intentions associated with a particular behavior, rather than on its consequences. Fundamental to deontological theory is the idea that equal respect must be given to all persons.”
19 Teleological theories are contrary to this contention in that they focus on the consequences of behaviour in respect of the greater good, as defined by Hunt and Vitell (1986, p. 6):
“Teleologists propose that people should determine the consequences of various behaviors in a situation and evaluate the goodness or badness of all the consequences. A behavior is then ethical if it produces a greater balance of good over evil than any available alternative.”
Table 2.1: Theories of ethics
Teleological theories Deontological theories Altruism (Kant, Hare, Nagel)
Amoralism (Plato’s Callicles) Asceticism (Greco-Roman religions) Casuistry (Catholic tradition) Conventionalism (Carr)
Critical Theory (Frankfurt School, Geuss, Jay) Cynicism (Greek philosophers)
Determinism (Augustine, Abelard) Dialectical materialism (Hegel, Marx) Disclosure Rule (Media sanctions) Doctrine of the Golden Mean (Aristotle) Egoism (Plato, Aristotle)
Epicureanism (Epicurus) Free Will (Nielsen) Hedonism (Hume) Instrumentalism (Dewey)
Law of Love (Christ, Apostles John and Paul) Means-end Ethic (Machiavelli)
Might-equals-right (Nietzsche, Spengler, Schopenhauer)
Naturalism (Aristotle, Mill, Hume) Nihilism (19th C. Russian movement) Pragmatism (Pierce, James, Dewey) Professional Ethic (Professional Codes) Semantic Analysis (Korzybski, Leys, Kron) Situationalism (Fletcher)
Spirit of Seriousness (Sartre) Subjectivism
Utilitarianism (Bentham, Mill, Sidgwick)
Axiology (Greek philosophers)
Balance Sheet Approach (Janis and Mann) Categorical Imperative (Kant)
Contractarianism (Hume, Buchanan, Gauthier) Critical Questions Approach (Leys, Nash) Dogmatism (Religious sects)
Emotivism (Ayer, Stephenson, Scheler) Existentialism (Kierkegaard)
Golden Rule (Christ)
‘Good Reasons’ Ethics Hypothetical Imperative (Kant)
Intuitionism (Price, Whewell, Moore, Ross, Prichard)
Justice (Rawls, Bowie) Legal/logical Positivism (Comte) Market Ethic (Smith)
Moral Obligation (Bradley, Ross, Hartmann, Scheler)
Naturalistic Fallacy (Moore) Objectivism (Rand)
Organization Ethic (Codes of conduct) Pluralism (Fried, Brandt)
Prima Facie Duties (Ross)
Principle of Generic Consistency (Gewirth) Principle of Proportionality (Garrett) Puritanism (Puritans)
Relativism (Protagoras, Hobbes, Spinoza) Religious Legalism (Fanatics)
Revelation Ethic (‘Godseekers’)
Rights (Hobbes, Locke, Brandt, Sobel, Dworkin, Nozick)
Social Darwinism (Darwin, Spenser) Stoicism (Zeno)
Ten Commandments (God/Moses) Truth/truthfulness (Williams)
Universalism (Confucius, Pincheler and DeGeorge)
Voluntarism
Source: Lewis and Speck (1990, p. 215)
20 The fact that no one definition, theory or philosophy has ever found prevalent acceptance simply demonstrates that ethics, and its definition, is relative to the perspective, purpose and context within which it is applied. The intent here is not to provide an exhaustive conceptual discussion of such applications, but to identify the primary perspective in relation to how this research defines and applies the term.
For example, Wood (1997, p. 42), in the seminal work that forms the basis of this research, defined ethics as:
“… a set of mutually-held moral beliefs, usually outside of, but not always exclusive of, the law that exist between members of a societal group and which enable that group to expect commonly acceptable behaviours from group members in respect to questions involving ‘right’ and ‘wrong’.”
Moving beyond this definition of ethics towards a universal definition of business ethics is even more problematic, based on varying views (most often surrounding preferences for notions of profit versus the concept of good) reflected in various scholars’ definitions (Lewis and Speck, 1990). The previous themes identified above (in Table 2.1), based on teleological and deontological perspectives of individual versus group, are still reflected in these definitions. However, the primary theme of most definitions of business ethics are teleological, in that they focus on consequences and maximisation of the greatest good, and are therefore more consistent with broader concepts of efficiency, capitalism and democracy (Reidenbach and Robin, 1990).
Thus, it is this approach that was taken in this research, as reflected by Wood’s (1997) definition (above).
De George (1987, p. 205) acknowledged the difficulty in defining business ethics given its complexity and broad basis, drawn from disparate practical and academic fields, saying that:
“The field, as I have defined it, is an interdisciplinary one. It is not defined by a simple methodology. The methodologies of ethical and philosophical analysis, reasoning and argumentation are applicable, as are the methodologies of religious and theological thinking, and the methodologies of the various areas of business education. The field, as
21 interdisciplinary, is comparable in this respect to other interdisciplinary fields.”
Similarly, the publication title ‘Defining “Business Ethics”: Like Nailing Jello to a Wall’ aptly described the experience of Lewis (1985) in his attempt to define business ethics. Lewis’s (1985) study of the business ethics literature identified 38 categories of business ethics definitions, and subsequently concluded that it is difficult to achieve a universal classification. Nonetheless, he still articulated his own definition based on his study findings:
“‘business ethics’ is rules, standards, codes or principles which provide guidelines for morally right behavior and truthfulness in specific situations.”
(Lewis, 1985, p. 381)
Yet while Lewis's (1985) work clearly conveys that a unified definition of business ethics is unrealistic, it also identifies common themes that facilitate the use of the term as a descriptor of a broad, interdisciplinary field of business activity, based on ethical and theological philosophies and methods, with the purpose of informing business culture through its application. Lewis’s (1985, p. 381) definition of business ethics is specific in identifying its substance as “rules, standards, codes or principles” with the purpose to “provide guidelines for morally right behavior and truthfulness in specific situations”. Thus, this research is primarily based on this definition, which explicitly classifies the essence of corporate codes of ethics in informing business culture, and as such serving as a basis for ethics education within the organisation.
2.1.1 Codes of ethics and their role in the corporate context
The development and use of codes of ethics within a corporate context essentially lies in the need to provide guidance to employees on the appropriate standards of conduct expected of them. At this point, it is important to note that this dissertation, and the research that underpins it, views corporate codes of ethics as inclusive of codes of conduct and other similar documents intended to provide ethical guidance to employees and other stakeholders of the organisation. The underlying reasons for such guidance may differ; for example, Cressey and Moore (1983) highlighted an