Defining Local Order

While it was long time believed that order was first and foremost produced by the state, I have highlighted in the previous section that this is not necessarily the case. The limited reach of the state does not leave areas uncontrolled or ungoverned and in disorder but in these regions we rather see alternative rule and order (O´Donnell 1993; Levitski and Helmke 2006; Erdmann and Engel 2007). This has also been shown for the cases of civil war (Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2007; Kalyvas et al. 2008;

Arjona 2014, 2016). Instead of the state, also, local groups might have an important role in local orders.

These can be church groups, sports clubs, schools or cooperatives that give structure to community life or can organize marches and protests, but also criminal groups can fulfill such a role (Arias 2010, 2017: 26-27). Also, the interplay of the state with informal rules or hybrid orders have been highlighted before (Erdmann and Engel 2007; Lund 2006; Boege et al. 2009; Dewey et al. 2017). In this thesis I will build on these results and moreover concentrate on the effect of illicit economies on local order.

I refer to local order as a frame that gives a predictability of clear rules (formal or informal) in a given territory and that offers guarantees to meet economic needs and personal security. I define local order as a combination of institutions and practices that structure social interactions, and organization in a given region, which have formed in historical processes.²⁹ Bearing in mind that order can vary across space and time, I regard the following categories as essential features for local order: the provision of security, the provision of economic means and the presence of clear rules (North et al. 2009).³⁰

29 Ana Arjona (2016) convincingly argues that rebels prefer order over disorder and influence territorial rule, the political and economic sphere as well as social life. This in turn would lead to a reinforcement of territorial control (2016: 11-16). While Arjona addresses the conscious production of a social order by rebels (which she calls Rebelocracy or Aliocracy) the present study highlights how local order is formed unconsciously as result of a formative process.

30 In fact, these factors are typically also related to core functions of state order (e.g. Weber 2010; Mann 1993). Even if Weber did not directly define what he understands by “order”, we can follow from his work that the basic principles “structures”

which are based on the principles of security provision, economic stability and territorial rule (Anter 2014).

42 A core condition for this local order to be sustainable is its acceptance and the belief of its rightfulness.

To control a certain territory, the possession of means of coercion is necessary, but not sufficient and, as it was already argued by Elias (1994), presupposes a certain amount of internal social organization.

We can assume a general belief of what is right or wrong therefore lies beyond the demand for coercion and the sanctioning capacity of the “ordering” entity. People follow rules either because of the ultimately coercive means of the ruling actors or because they believe that the rules are “just” and serve the society. Accepting the rules and the coercive power is therefore connected to the belief of its legitimacy (Tyler 2006). This does not imply that coercion cannot play an important role in local order. On the contrary, imposing rules through coercion can be very effective in the short term and but might be less sustainable in the long term, especially if the means for control are limited. Hence, providing and securing rule does not only come through the fear of coercion but rather stems from the “belief” that the rule is just and “legitimate” (Weber 2010; see also Lukes 1987; Tyler 2004;

Bonacker 2012). This belief in the legitimacy of rules can refer to formal rules given by the state but it can also be referred to local traditional rules, which reflect the belief and acceptance of the local population.

The legitimate form of order is thus based on an affirmative relationship among those that govern, and those being governed; or in other words, trust by those who are governed. For Alagappa (1995: 15), who worked on political legitimacy in South East Asia, key terms described for legitimacy are shared values, conformity with established rules for acquiring power, and the proper and effective use of power and consent.

He adds that legitimacy “is the belief by the governed in the ruler´s moral right to issue commands and the people´s corresponding obligation to obey such commands. Legitimacy is furthermore a dynamic interactive process between actor and those being ruled. Thus it is not a teleological aspect. A relationship between those being governed and those who govern is based on shared norms and values” (Alagappa 1995: 29).

Similarly, Beetham stresses an important specification, when he holds that it is not only the belief in legitimacy, but one act in accordance to such a belief (Beetham 1991). Hence, legitimacy is a commonly accepted condition for stability of a given order, whether formal or informal.

Local order can be guided by formal and/ or informal rules that developed over time and that meet the collective belief of the population. Fundamental aspects for a local order are the provision of security and the control of violence, as well as the access to the economy and clearly defined rules (North et al. 2009). I am building on this premise when analyzing the effect of illicit on local order economies in the margins of the state. Therefore, I will analyze how institutions and practices are expressed in the following core areas: security, economy and rules. Order is formed in a historical process while there is no actor that consciously “construct” this type of order. I assume that it is formed

43 as a result of a process, which is deeply affected by the illicit economy. Therefore, the analysis of this process will be a key part of this analysis.

Another important facet of local order is not only the use but also the distribution of power. I am focusing in particular on the dynamic processes of power, conceptualized by Pierre Bourdieu. Before I will come to the definition of the concept of power used for this thesis I think it is important to highlight some understandings of the widely discussed topic. From Weber’s understanding power as the chance

“to realize the own will, even against the resistance of others” (Weber 2010). Weber does not specify the sources for this “chance”. It can derive from structural, social or historical contexts. Coercive force is therefore not necessarily a precondition to power, but might be used as ultima ratio to achieve a political goal. At the same time, Weber understands power as a process; power is not static or absolute (Weber 2010). In a more definite sense, power can be understood as the absence of violence.

According to Hannah Arendt (1970), the need to use violence in order to get people to follow an order rather reflects on the lack of power than the possession of it. For Arendt, power is not so much about the position of a particular actor or institution as it is about a relation within the political sphere.

Following this understanding, the use of violence disqualifies people from wielding positions of power.

That is an important aspect that leads us to recognize the non-violent aspects as well as the diversity of power. Furthermore, we can hold that power does not derive from a single dominant institution or actor but is more disperse, decentralized and executed in society. In fact, the presence of power is not only ingrained in society, it produces reality of society (Foucault 1991). While I agree with these understandings of power, I want to stress the relational aspect and the basis of power in a cultural and societal setting (Bourdieu 1985). This thesis takes this relational aspect into consideration for the theoretical analysis as well as the empirical assessment of the case study.

The distribution of power and control in a given local order often is diffuse and does not depend exclusively on the relationship with the state (it is sometimes less firmly institutionalized as well). In contexts of low state control, the assessment of different sources of power is therefore helpful to analyze the power relations more closely. For example, the relational aspect of power is important and can give us a deeper understanding on the dynamics between different actors. Instead of focusing on the power of the state, this approach asks how different forms of power develop in areas that have low state control. The concept Pierre Bourdieu elaborates with his “fields of power” takes this relational aspect into consideration and offers both a theoretical contribution as well as an analytical tool for our analysis. According to Pierre Bourdieu (1986), power is based on the inequality and distribution of the social, political, and economic "capital" that defines positions in a field. By adding this aspect to the analysis, the study takes the dynamics of power into account and will be able to describe more accurately the relationship of illicit economies with the state in “brown spot” areas. This

44 conceptualization opens analytical possibilities to capture local processes in relationship to the state.

It also captures social processes and structures as well as the dialogical relationship between the state and local order. This will give us analytical depth and highlights not only the dynamic process between actors but also the setting in which this process takes place. This is why I will apply concepts of local order and power into the analysis. In this sense, by synthesizing the current debates I will analyze how illicit economies affect local order, including security, economy, territorial rule and relational power.