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Constructivist and Regionalist Theory

2.2 Defining Security

Defining what security threats mean for EU and New Zealand officials and understanding the theoretical nature of security is essential for a succinct analysis to be undertaken. The word ‘security’ is a term so often heard that it has become desensitised and hard to define. When we talk about security, what do we mean? Entering into the scholarly debate about ‘widening’ or ‘narrowing’ creates a conceptual lens through which a transpicuous concept of security can be formed. Traditional theorists adhere to the narrow view, which encompasses a realist understanding of security. The narrow perspective will often place military conflict or political authority as the epicentre of security conceptualisation. Ole Wæver defines traditionalist theory as the “phenomenon of war and…‘the study of threat, use, and control of military force.’”49 Major scholarly

authorities who adhere to this perspective include Colin Gray, Richard Lebow and John Chipman.50 On the other side of the spectrum, scholars such as Barry Buzan, Richard

47 Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 188. 48 Ibid, 175.

49 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, Colo.:

Lynne Rienner Pub., 1998), 1-5.

50 Colin S. Gray, “New Directions for Strategic Studies: How Can Theory Help Practice?” Security Studies

1, no. 4 (1992): 610-635., John Chipman, “The future of strategic Studies: Beyond Grand Strategy,” Survival 34, no. 1 (1992): 109-131., Richard N. Lebow, “Interdisciplinary Research and Future of Peace and Security Studies,” Political Psychology 9, no. 3 (1988): 507-543. In Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 3.

Ullman, Egbert Jahn, Pierre Lemaitre or Weaver hold that a wider understanding of security should be conceptualized, particularly since the fall of the Soviet Union.51

The idea of ‘widening’ was introduced in the 1970s and 1980s when economic, environmental and identity issues, coupled with an increase in transnational crime, emphasised the need to redefine security.52 A vast number of articles and books were

introduced in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which held that a wider perspective on security was needed. Indeed, Helene Sjursen stated that “security is something other than, or something in addition to, military force.”53 Traditionalists fought back, arguing that the

political and intellectual significance of attaching the word ‘security’ to other policy areas would be damaging by stating that widening “elevates security into a kind of universal good thing”54 by diluting its original importance.

This thesis will define security as wide: it accepts that non-conventional security concerns are active in the international arena, while also maintaining that military force has a role to play. In addition to a wide conception of security, a constructivist approach will also be applied. ‘Widening’ weakens the meaning of security because it accepts all phenomena as security, creating a perplexing construct. In order to remedy this problem a concept entitled ‘interchangeable precedence’ will be adopted. This re-conceptualises how one looks at security by positing that while a wide range of issues may be labelled a ‘security problem’, the security issues are, nevertheless, confined to the perception of the political actors within a decision-making body. In other words, security issues will fall and rise in prominence depending on the political situation in a confined timeframe. This means, for example, military force or environmental security are only as important as the

51 The sudden failure of communism and its repercussions in the international system has been hard for

realists to convincingly explain, exposing room for other theories to become more established. Richard Ullman, “Redefining Security,” International Security 8, no. 1 (1983): 129-153., Jahn Egbert, Pierre Lemaitre, and Ole Weaver, “Concepts of Security: Problem of Research on Non-Military Aspects,” Copenhagen Papers no. 1 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1987). In Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 2.

52 Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 1-5.

53 Frédéric Charillon, “The EU as a Security Regime,” European Foreign Affairs Review 10, no. 4 (2005):

523.

54 Daniel Deudney, “The Case Against Linking Enviromental Degredation and National Security,”

Millennium 19, no. 3 (1990): 441-473. In Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, Security : A New Framework for Analysis, 4.

social or political climate that they exist in. Indeed, this sentiment reflects Jörn Dosch’s conceptualisation of security, which states that “[s]ecurity is not the product of any predictable rules, [but] depends on individual threat perceptions, differs greatly according to an actor's status and position within the international system and, most importantly, is subject to interpretation.” 55 It is vital to maintain an approach to the definition of security

that recognises security issues as dynamic entities.

Security concerns will change in precedence depending on an assortment of variables, which frequently relate to the application of knowledge and technology. It is widely understood by constructivists that, through the application of knowledge and technology, epistemic communities are able to communicate and influence decision makers in regional fora or states; perspectives change through understanding (see Figure 2.2). Perhaps this is why Hopf stated: “choices are rigorously constrained by the webs of understanding of the practice, identities, and interests of other actors that prevail in particular historical contexts.”56 However, the way knowledge is exercised by actors is

determined by the application of wisdom.57 An example of how security concepts have

interchangeable precedence can be observed by analysing the security culture of the Cold War in comparison to contemporary security concerns. The Cold War was characterised by a ‘balance of powers,’ prioritising military force as a major security concern. However, the current security culture is more complex; globalisation, interdependence and changing perspectives from an increase in ‘knowledge’ mean economic security, human security or even environmental security will sometimes take precedence over military-focused threat perceptions. This does not mean other security issues are of no concern, only that the political ‘opportunity cost’ of security issues will determine how actors prioritise and decide on the most pressing security issue in a particular political environment. This line of thought is most closely reflected in Frédéric Charillon’s statement: “[i]n a world characterized by interdependence and exchange, the building of a

55 Jörn Dosch, “Changing Security Cultures in Europe and South East Asia: Implications for Inter-

Regionalism,” Asia Europe Journal 1, no. 4 (2003): 483. This is not dissimilar to Buzan’s security conceptualisation, ‘conditions of existence.’ See Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security”, International Affairs 67, no. 3 (1991): 433.

56 Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 177.

57 See Peter M. Haas, “When Does Power Listen to Truth? A Constructivist Approach to the Policy

secure regional milieu in a safe international system has become more important than the control of new territories and resources.”58 Thus, in contemporary security relations,

more emphasis is put on non-conventional security concerns, while traditional aspects of security have taken a step back.

Interchangeable precedence is also dependent on actual or perceived capabilities. The old saying, “if the only instrument you have is a hammer all your problems start looking like a nail”59 is a relevant analogy for analysing the capability structures of regional or state

security. If a region adopts a wide view of security, a greater number of instruments are needed to fulfil the requirements that non-conventional security issues create. This will give international security cultures greater flexibility in assessing security risks and threats. Conversely, the instruments needed may also create a negative response from actors due to limited financial or institutional resources. In other words, a wide view of security fosters complexity and increases the potential of limited civilian or military capabilities, often referred to as the ‘capabilities-expectations gap.’60 However, in

realising the capabilities-expectations gap and the increasing complexity of non- conventional security, regional groups or states – who share a similar concept of security – will intensify cooperation to manage contemporary security environments. The increasing complexity of transnational security will limit any alternative, other than cooperation, to maintain international stability.

Although a definition of security has been established, identifying the security conceptualisations that regions and nations hold is equally significant. Through establishing a succinct understanding of the nature of security, this study can confidently analyse the various definitions of security other agents have and how their definitions

58 Charillon, “The EU as a Security Regime,” 522.

59 Steven Everts and Gary Schmitt, “Is military power still the key to international security?” NATO Review

(Winter 2002): 17.

60See Bretherton and Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, 206. See also Jolyon Howorth,

“From Security to Defense: The evolution of the CFSP,” in International Relations and the European Union, ed. Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 179- 204.

affect the international process.61 From a constructivist perspective, how states and

regions define security will have implications on the depth of cooperation. For example, the EU and ASEAN held “[c]onflicting views on non-traditional security issues… [which] had been the most serious intervening variable in Europe-East Asia relations throughout the 1990s.”62 This illustrates the potency of ideas and how they can enhance

or inhibit relations within and between regions and nations.

61 A personal definition of security means one can analyse other definitions with greater accuracy, while at

the same time being aware one’s own bias.

62 Dosch, “Changing Security Cultures in Europe and South East Asia: Implications for Inter-Regionalism,”