Definiteness

The questions that Lyons is preoccupied with and which his predecessors (cf. Christophersen, 1939; Chesterman, 1991; Hawkins, 1978, a.o) had been preoccupied with are what it means for an entity to be definite or indefinite and how the speaker signals to the hearer that something is definite or indefinite. To answer these questions, Lyons (1999) appeals to the four semantic and discourse- pragmatic notions of familiarity, identifiability, uniqueness and inclusiveness, which he adopts from Hawkins’ (1978) location theory. In the sub-sections below, I discuss each of these notions in turn.

3.10.1.1 The familiarity hypothesis

Lyons (1999) states that the principle of familiarity, which he adapts from Hawkins’ (1978) location theory, is about whether both the speaker and hearer are aware of the reference of the noun phrase. According to this principle, a definite noun phrase is, therefore, the one whose referent is assumed to be aware by both the speaker and hearer whereas an indefinite noun phrase is the one which only the

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speaker is assumed to be aware of the referent. Lyons provides factors which may contribute to shared familiarity, namely physical situations, discourse-anaphora, general knowledge and associations.

3.10.1.1.1 Physical situations

The physical setting can be immediate such that it is visible/tactile, or it can simply be a wider environment which is not necessarily immediately visible/tactile but assumed to exist. Thus, if a referent of an NP is in a physical context that both the speaker and hearer are situated, then that referent is familiar through shared physical context. This is because the referent is or can be accessible to both interlocutors from that immediate environment. The following examples may illustrate the point.

(44) a. Go to the kitchen and give it a mop.

b. Do not forget to switch the lights off before you go to bed.

c. The president has appointed mama Salma Kikwete an MP.

The assumption underlying the use of the definite article in examples (44a-b) is that the speaker and hearer have shared knowledge of the referents of the noun phrases because of the physical context that the two are in. Example (44c) illustrates the case where the shared familiarity encompasses wider contexts such that the president in this example is assumed to be the president of that particular country. The hearer, in this case, is directed to interpret the intended referent of the noun phrase locally- i.e. the president alludes to the president of his country.

3.10.1.1.2 Discourse-anaphora

The second factor contributing to shared familiarity is discourse- anaphora. Levinson (1987), as cited in Lyons (1999: 6) defines anaphora as ‘the phenomenon whereby one linguistic element, lacking clear independent reference, can pick up reference through connection with another linguistic element” Thus, if an indefinite referent is introduced in a linguistic context for the first time and then subsequently fore-grounded by a definite description, then such a referent has been made definite anaphorically. In English, the first mention of an entity is usually signalled by the indefinite article ‘a/an’ or by no article at all. The subsequent mention of the same entity is indicated by the definite article ‘the’. The examples below may illustrate the point:

(45) a. I saw a lion. The lion was big.

b. We went to a party. No soft drinks were saved at the party.

In the examples above, the nouns a lion in (45a) and a party (45b) are indefinite in their first mention but they are definite after they have been mentioned a second time.

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3.10.1.1.3 General knowledge

General or encyclopaedic knowledge is related to situational use. Lyons maintains that both general and situational uses presuppose the existence of ‘situations’. However, general knowledge use is quite different from situational use in that the situation implicated is the whole world and this kind of knowledge is applied to the entities which are assumed to be only one in the whole world.

(46) a. The sun is hot today

b. The Earth is spherical

3.9.1.1.4 Associations

Another factor that Lyons discusses as contributing to shared familiarity is association or bridging cross-reference. According to Lyons, associative use combines discourse- anaphora and general knowledge. The hearer is instructed to activate his general knowledge about the state of affairs and use this knowledge to match with the indefinite descriptions given, as illustrated below.

(47) a. We bought a fridge yesterday. The door was white b. I hired a car. The driver was speaking IsiZulu throughout

One can see the validity of the claim Lyons makes that associative use of simple definites involves anaphoric and general knowledge presuppositions. The use of the definite article in (47) presupposes that fridges and cars have doors and drivers, respectively. This is part of encyclopaedic knowledge that speakers and hearers are expected to have. Thus, by ‘the door’ and ‘the driver’ in (47a) and (47b), respectively, the hearer is instructed to associate them with non-definite noun phrases mentioned previously, i.e. ‘a fridge’ and ‘a car’, respectively.

3.10.1.2 The identifiability hypothesis

The basic idea underlying the familiarity hypothesis discussed above is concerned with ‘knowing which’. To be familiar with something presumes knowing what it is. However, it is very easy to tell that a one to one correspondence between something being definite or indefinite and someone knowing or not knowing it is not tenable. If I tell someone that ‘I had bought a phone but the phone was faulty’, I do not expect the speaker to ‘know’ the phone that I had bought (unless she has seen it) but I assume that she may be able to identify it i.e. she may pick out the referent of the noun phrase that fits the description (i.e. the one that I had bought). In other words, the familiarity hypothesis is not a panacea for explaining the concept of (in)definiteness, which calls for other explanations for the concept. As a remedy to the challenges afforded by the familiarity principle, Lyons proposes the second principle to account for (in)definiteness, which is identifiability principle, the term which is due to Chafe (1976).

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Instead of speakers and hearers to be expected to know the reference of the noun phrase, the identifiability principle requires that the speaker and hearer have the same mental representation of the reference of the noun phrase. Thus, the minimum requirement is to be able to identify the referent of the noun phrase among other possible referents designated by a linguistic expression. Knowing it (familiarity) is just an added advantage, and Lyons (ibid.: 6) supports this by saying that familiarity aids the hearer to identify the referent by matching it with some real-world entity which satisfies the description. The following example slightly adapted from Lyons’ (1999:6) may illustrate this point. (48) Bring me the orange, will you?

Given the appropriate context, Lyons asserts that it may not be easy to use the familiarity principle to account for definiteness associated with the noun ‘orange’ in sentences like (48) above. Suppose Ericah has hailed a taxi and upon Ericah getting into the car, the driver utters (48). Ericah is not aware (familiar) of the presence of an orange in the car. However, what will guide her to pick out what the driver has asked her is simply looking for a referent satisfying the description ‘orange’.

3.10.1.3 The uniqueness hypothesis

Lyons notes that there are yet other contexts which familiarity and identifiability principles are inadequate in explaining (in)definiteness. In such cases, Lyons proposes the uniqueness principle. In terms of this principle, hearers are not necessarily expected to know or identify the referent of the noun phrase, but they are expected to match one entity that satisfies the description designated by the noun phrase (Lyons, 1999: 8). According to Lyons, uniqueness is generally context-dependent (with common nouns) i.e. for the hearer to successfully associate the description provided for a noun phrase with one unique entity, the speaker and hearer are expected to share some general knowledge of a particular context. However, uniqueness can be absolute especially with singleton set of nouns (inherently unique nouns) such as the sun and the moon.

(49) a. I attended Olomi’s wedding. The bride wore black

b. The sun is hot today

A standard wedding ceremony has two principal characters, the bride and bridegroom. Thus, the use of the definite article in with the noun ‘bride’ in (49a) is associated with the uniqueness of the wedding occasion in which case ‘the bride’ should be understood relative to this wedding context. In (49b), the noun ‘sun’ is an inherently unique entity in the sense that there is only one Sun in the universe.

3.10.1.4 The inclusiveness hypothesis

Lyons points out that the notions of uniqueness and inclusiveness are similar. The former is applied to the singular common and uniquely inherent nouns (individual sets) whereas the latter is applied to

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mass and plural nouns (groups). Regarding the inclusiveness hypothesis, Lyons (1999: 11) states that “reference is to the totality of the objects or mass in the context which satisfy [sic] the description”. In terms of this principle, Lyons equates the use of ‘the’ in definite expressions with plural and mass nouns to a universal quantifier synonymous with ‘all’. He supports this claim by illustrating cases where both ‘the’ and ‘all’ can co-occur with almost the same meaning as in the following example. (50) a. Jane has turned down all the offers (cf. Jane has turned down the offers)

b. She is draining the pasta

The DPs in (50) denote all the totality of entities and mass designated by their linguistic expressions.