Definition of Terms

The Muslim regions in Mindanao are frequently defined as a “no war, no peace”

environment (see, e.g., MacGinty 2006: 111; MacGinty, Muldoon, and Ferguson 2007).¹⁰⁹ According to Dennis Dijkzeul, societies which are defined as “no war, no peace” can be described as being involved in a situation “where neither positive peace nor full-out war occur

109 In relation to Mindanao, it seems to be more appropriate to use the term in relation to the environment rather than the society since not only is the local society involved, but there are local as well as national players involved in the creation and maintenance of the local situation.

but where violent conflict may recur anytime” (2008: 15). He further argues that these societies can be characterized by their reproduction of conflict-generating institutions:¹¹⁰

As stated, our main research assumption is that a “no war, no peace” society continuously reproduces institutions, such as structures, formal organizations, informal groupings, and norms and values that generate conflict potential within a society, as well as within and among neighboring states. This reproduction of conflict potential undermines democratic transitions, economic development, and peacebuilding. Moreover, such reproduction usually implies strong normative disagreements within society, among or within groups, and the social exclusion of certain groups. Therefore, the taken-for-granted nature of institutions may erode and sometimes informal or weak institutions may become more prevalent. Other institutions, for example, ethnic or religious ones may reify. (ibid. 24)

The “no war, no peace” situation related to the Mindanao conflict reproduces institutions that undermine peace-building. It implies that normative disagreements among or within groups lead to a weakening of formal institutions. However, this is only one characteristic trait of the situation. Additionally, there are counteracting agents creating structures of peace, democracy, and economic development. Several international, national, and local NGOs and People’s Organizations (POs), peace agents, women’s organizations, etc. (see Abubakar 2007) attempt to strengthen if not peace then at least the peace process and the ceasefire situation. Demands have been made to institutionalize the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) as the “Department of Peace,” and to maintain the ceasefire in the form of peace zones and development projects. So far, the MILF itself has signed several peace zone agreements in order not to involve certain communities in violent conflicts. It established the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), which is responsible for local development, and signed a document promising to help the government capture criminals, such as kidnappers, in the area of the MILF.

In a recent (2009) agreement, the MILF and the AFP committed themselves to providing civilian protection and avoiding collateral damages.

Government officials are likely to be entangled in war- as well as peace-strengthening measures. In 1996, the Ramos government and the MNLF signed the Final Peace Agreement (FPA), which called for post-war and development projects in the Muslim areas. On the one hand, government officials build peace and development based on the 1996 agreement and take part in peace negotiations with the MILF. On the other hand, some politicians, mainly those from

110 Institutions, according to Dijkzeul (2008), “constrain and enable human action,” for example by providing moral or cognitive frameworks for interpretation or action (pp. 21ff.). This can be realized by formal (e.g., state bureaucracies, NGOs) as well as informal institutions (e.g., warlords, patronage). Institutions can be reproduced consciously as well as unconsciously.

Mindanao who would lose land area by a final comprehensive agreement or those forming the opposition using the Mindanao issue to mobilize against the president, are frequently involved in verbal abuse or tactical resistance against peace agreements between the government and the MILF. The military and, in some cases, paramilitary groups are ensnared in violent conflicts with rebels and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Sulu Archipelago.

It is thus a specific characteristic of the present Mindanao “no war, no peace” situation, besides the permanent threat of a new outbreak of violent conflict being initiated by the government, the army, the MILF, the MNLF, the Abu Sayyaf, local clans, warlords, or criminals, to have conflict-, as well as peace-generating institutions. But even though periods of ceasefire have lasted for years, for example from 2003 to 2008, thus providing time to strengthen peace-building mechanisms, an overall environment remains that can be found in situations of war. This is described by MacGinty (2006) for similar cases as being characterized by

inter-group tensions and systematic discrimination against out-groups, widespread insecurity arising from the presence of armed groups, grinding poverty with few prospects for economic advancement, militarism, poor provision of public goods and a profound disconnection between government and people. (p. 2)

Although, direct violence might be absent for some time, the characteristics of a war environment remain (see also Richards 2005: 6). The outbreak of violent conflicts is then only the manifestation of the above-mentioned characteristics. MacGinty explains that such “no war, no peace” situations might be found following a formal end of conflict in which no positive peace has been achieved and also “in cases of stalled peace processes, wherein the antagonists have failed to reach a comprehensive peace accord but the peace process and its ceasefire assume semi-permanence” (2006: 4). Such a situation brings about one major problem. It might become chronic in case the peace process is “more comfortable than war, but this comfort brings with it little urgency to push for a far-reaching peace settlement.” MacGinty concludes that, in this case, the peace process might become a “comfort zone” (ibid.).

In the following section, I discuss how far conflict- as well as peace-building efforts in a

“no war, no peace” situation are consciously and unconsciously institutionalized and sometimes even instrumentalized among concerned groups, and for what reasons. Additionally, I consider when the institutionalization of conflicts means that they are automatically reproduced or imply a potential for the limitation of violent conflicts, as in the case of the Joint Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH). MacGinty warns that such institutionalization might

merely lead to an absence of violence but not to a positive peace.¹¹¹ This is so because an agreement might be to the liking of international groups but not much appreciated locally. This appeared to be the case after the creation of the ARMM at the beginning of the 1990s and the FPA of 1996, which did not include the MILF in a possible solution. The task is thus not only to stop violence but also to create positive peace by solving the root causes of the problem and to provide prospects for the future. This in the Mindanao case is mainly a question of “ancestral domain,” governance, and economic development.