The previous chapter argued that traditional accounts of the naval reinforcement debate in the autumn of 1941 are misleading. This chapter examines the separate but related
question of whether the decision taken on 20 October, whatever its merits, to deploy a small deterrent force centred on Prince of Wales, led inexorably to the subsequent
destruction of the force. A majority of historians has argued explicitly or implicitly that it did.1 This chapter does not describe the operational deployment of Force Z following the Japanese attack on 8 December, which is well documented elsewhere.2 It concentrates
rather on questions relating to the movement and role of the force prior to its arrival in Singapore, and the decision to deploy north on 8 December, that have either not been raised at all or not satisfactorily answered. How did the intelligence picture regarding Japanese intentions evolve during the passage of Prince of Wales to Singapore? Did it provide a convincing case for holding Force Z in the Indian Ocean? Did Phillips and his staff make sufficient use of intelligence on Japanese capability available in Singapore? How far did the Admiralty’s recent offensive planning influence Phillips’ thinking? What conclusions can be drawn from Phillips’ discussions with Hart on 6 December? What
1 Christopher Bell is a notable exception here. In both his article ‘The “Singapore Strategy” and the Deterrence of Japan: Winston Churchill, the Admiralty and the Dispatch of Force Z’, and chapter 8 of his recent book, Churchill and Sea Power, he argues that a clear distinction should be drawn between “Churchill’s decision to place two capital ships at Singapore on the eve of war”, and “the subsequent decision, taken thousands of miles away”, that resulted in the ships being caught off the coast of Malaya. He states that Churchill undeniably made their destruction possible, even probable, but not necessarily
inevitable. This chapter certainly agrees with Bell that the decision to deploy Force Z did not make its destruction inevitable. However, it disagrees with much of his reasoning and the motives he ascribes to Churchill, Pound, and Phillips.
2 The best accounts here are still those in Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies Vol 1, and Martin
Middlebrook and Patrick Mahoney, Battleship: The Loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. The latest research which demonstrates in detail why the first IJN torpedo hit proved fatal to Prince of Wales is by William H Garzke, Robert O Dulin, and Kevin V Denlay, in Death of a Battleship: The Loss of HMS Prince
of Wales, December 10 1941, A Marine Forensics Analysis of the Sinking. Paper originally presented at the
Royal Institute of Naval Architects in September 2009, updated in 2010 and 2012, and placed on
www.pacificwrecks.com website.
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were the practical consequences for RN strategy in the East from the loss of Force Z? Did it matter as much as most historians claim?3
Admiralty choices during the passage east
Despite the new Admiralty enthusiasm for placing a battle-fleet at Singapore, only two R-
class, would potentially reach there by the end of the year to join Prince of Wales and Repulse.45 It followed that, if war came before then, any initial capital units based there
would not, as Pound had argued on 20 October, be strong enough to meet the scale of force the IJN could allocate to an attack southward.6 The force would also be exposed to
air attack in harbour and air or submarine attack in any area north of the Malay Barrier. This called for plans to hold them in the Indian Ocean or withdraw them from Singapore in good time if the situation deteriorated, in line with the view adopted by Pound in his exchanges with the PM in August.7 Arguably, operational caution was in conflict here with the political need for a visible deterrent. But deterrence rested on Japanese awareness that high profile reinforcements were in the Far East theatre not on their specific location in Singapore as Eden had recognised on 20 October and Churchill confirmed at the War Cabinet on 5 November.8 The 20 October meeting had also agreed only to deploy Prince of Wales to Cape Town.9 The reason for this was primarily the
3 See for example the views of Haggie, Marder and Barnett recorded at p 388.
4 Revenge was already in the Indian Ocean. A brief for the FSL dated 29 October anticipated that Royal
Sovereign would sail for the Far East with convoy WS 12 on 10 November and Ramillies with WS 14 on 30
November. Resolution was expected to be available to deploy on 21 December. All vessels would have completed refits and a short work-up. The refits included improvements to AA armament and protection. It is likely that Resolution and Royal Sovereign (though certainly not Ramillies and probably not Revenge) also had their main armament equipped for supercharge firing which increased their maximum gun range to about 26,000 yards with pre-1938 4crh ammunition and 28,732 yards with the latest 6crh shells. ADM 205/11, TNA. Royal Sovereign could therefore potentially reach Singapore by end December together with
Revenge. In the event, Royal Sovereign did not reach Durban until 17 December while Ramillies and Resolution did not leave UK for the Indian Ocean until early January 1942. Burt, British Battleships, p 413.
5 On 22 November, the Admiralty announced that the four R-class would form the Third Battle Squadron, under Rear Admiral Bonham-Carter, AT to SO Force G of 22 November, CAB 122/9, TNA.
6 Record of 20 October meeting, CAB 69/8, ibid.
7 Pound minute of 28 August, Churchill, The Grand Alliance, Appendix K. 8 CAB 65/24/2, ibid.
9 Given this decision, it is surprising that the Admiralty sent a signal to relevant overseas commanders the following day stating that Prince of Wales was bound for Singapore via Cape Town. There was no qualification placed on the Singapore destination and key addressees such as CinC China would have taken it as settled. The signal was released by Harwood as ACNS (F). There is a copy in ROSK 4/79, CCA. The Naval Staff History, perhaps not entirely convincingly, explains this signal as follows: “This went beyond
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possibility she might be required to meet a Home Fleet emergency while her new sister
Duke of York was still working up but it was clearly also an opportunity to review the Far
East threat. On 20 October, Pound thought the Japanese were more likely to attack northwards against the Soviet Union. Key questions are therefore whether there was intelligence available during the passage of Force Z to justify a reassessment of the deployment and, if so, why no action was taken.
The first point to address is the planned review at Cape Town where Prince of Wales arrived with her two escorting destroyers10 early on 16 November and sailed the afternoon
of 18 November. Pound confirmed to the PM on 2 November during the passage south that he intended to review the situation just before arrival at the Cape.11 However, no
historian who has examined the Force Z story has found any evidence that this promised review took place either prior to arrival at the Cape or during the visit itself. Roskill investigated the issue thoroughly, expecting Pound to take every opportunity to stall the
Force Z deployment as an unwise initiative executed against Admiralty advice.12 There is
no evidence of such stalling and nor is there any sign of pressure from the PM to pre-empt a review or rush the force onward to Singapore.1314 What is clear from Admiralty signals is that, by 9 November, Pound wanted Phillips to get to Singapore urgently and this meant foreshortening Prince of Wales’ stay in Cape Town to 48 hours.15 It is unlikely this surprised Phillips who had already told Vice Admiral Sir Algernon Willis, CinC South Atlantic, during a brief stop in Freetown on 5 November that he was definitely headed for
the decision reached at the Defence Committee Meeting but was probably intended mainly to ensure that adequate administrative preparations were made for a not improbable move”. Battle Summary 14 (revised), Loss of HM Ships Prince of Wales and Repulse, p 2, ADM 234/330, TNA.
10 Electra and Express.
11 FSL minute of 2 November, ADM 205/10, TNA.
12 ROSK 4/79, CCA, Cambridge. Roskill indeed became almost obsessed with this issue. In a letter to Cunningham, dated 30 March 1953, he wrote: “I have tried very hard to get WSC to come clean about ordering Prince of Wales and Repulse to Singapore against DP’s repeated opposition. I am sure he approved the order but the Admiralty gave it.” Cunningham Papers, Add MS 52563, British Library.
13 In the PM correspondence that does exist regarding the deployment, mainly in ADM 205/10, the PM asks reasonable questions but at all times falls in with Pound’s advice and decisions.
14 The PM clearly felt the decision to proceed beyond Cape Town had still to be made as late as 5 November – see record of the War Cabinet meeting that day in CAB 65/24/2, TNA.
15 AT FSL to NOIC Simonstown, ADM 234/330, TNA. In his minute to the PM of 2 November, Pound indicated the Prince of Wales would stay in Cape Town about a week.
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Singapore and was anxious to make early contact with US commanders in the Far East.16 Two days later, on 11 November, the Admiralty issued orders for the onward movement of Prince of Wales to Ceylon, where she was to rendezvous with Repulse, and for both ships then to proceed to Singapore.17 The obvious development between Pound’s
confirmation of the Cape Town review on 2 November and the executive order to proceed to Singapore, apparently without the review, on 11 November was Pound’s important exchange with Stark on the forward deployment of an RN battle-fleet able to operate north from Singapore under ABC-1 rather than ABD principles.18 The urgency in pushing Prince of Wales on to Singapore was to facilitate the early meeting between Phillips and
Hart. This is confirmed by the PM’s questioning of the suggestion in Pound’s 11 November executive signal that Phillips dispense with his destroyer escort to speed his passage east.19 The obvious conclusion therefore is that the famous missing review was a
victim not of relentless pressure from the PM to move the force east but rather of the momentum generated by the Admiralty’s new offensive strategy. Since Pound was now more firmly committed to forward deployment than the PM, the only reason to halt the deployment was a new operational requirement in the Atlantic. Without this, it is likely Pound saw no cause to persist with a review, the PM would defer to Pound’s judgement, and its absence, so remarked by successive historians, is actually unsurprising.20 Reality was again the reverse of that implied by Roskill. Far from the PM urging the Force Z elements east without regard for the military risks, it was actually the Admiralty making the running.21 This is a crucial point. It meant that, through November, as intelligence
16 Willis letter to Roskill dated 16 May 1953, ROSK 4/79, CCA. The Naval Staff History states: “It seems to have been accepted by Admiral Phillips from the moment he left England that Singapore was his destination”. BS 14, ADM 234/330, TNA.
17 AT Admiralty to SO Force G of 11 November, ADM 234/330, TNA. 18 See Chapter Six.
19 The PM said – “I should like to talk over with you again the idea of PoW being entirely separated from her two destroyers. I do not quite see what all this haste is to arrive at Singapore for a pow wow. This is one of those cases where I am for ‘Safety First’”. Minute to Pound of 11 November, ADM 205/10, TNA. 20 A further factor may be that, by now, it was clear to Pound that Rodney could not be available in the Far East until February at the earliest and Nelson much later. There was thus now no alternative to Prince of
Wales to bolster the R-class. See brief for FSL dated 29 October, ibid.
21 The dangers of relying on the memory of even the most authoritative witness over controversial issues such as the Cape Town review is evident in the recollection of Phillips’ Operations officer, Commander M Goodenough, as passed to Roskill in 1951. Goodenough said Phillips thought it “useless to stay in South Africa and desirable to move to Ceylon” but he thought he might have also received “private instructions” which he suggested emanated at the instigation of the PM urging him on. Phillips certainly did want to press on but he had received a direct Admiralty order to do so a week earlier as Goodenough must have known.
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increasingly pointed to the risk of early hostile action by Japan, nobody in the British war leadership in London was counselling caution over the potential exposure of Force Z, if deterrence were to fail, until too late. Two people did, however, warn Phillips at this time of the dangers in placing an inferior force in a potentially vulnerable location like
Singapore. These were Willis at Freetown22 and Field Marshal J C Smuts who Phillips
met in South Africa23.
If a review had been conducted immediately prior to Prince of Wales’ arrival in Cape Town, what issues might it have raised? A review around 15 November would have found no pressing reason to hold Prince of Wales in the Atlantic matched by a distinct rise in the risk of conflict with Japan. During the first half of November, a steady stream of diplomatic and intelligence reports reached London and Washington describing a rapid build-up of Japanese forces in Indo-China.24 At the same time negotiations between Japan
and the US in Washington were reaching a climax. The impact of sanctions meant Japan must cut a deal, which implied concessions, or take action to break the stranglehold which meant risking war with one or more of the Associated Powers. The JIC drew these strands together in an assessment on 18 November.25 Its conclusions reflected a growing
consensus that invasion of Thailand, including the strategically important Kra Isthmus, would be Japan’s most likely move but that no final decision had yet been taken.26 Given this background, the case for deterrence stood and there was good reason to convince the Japanese Prince of Wales was a key element in early Far East naval reinforcement. It also made sense to have Prince of Wales in the Indian Ocean with Repulse and Revenge as an immediate Phase 1 package to protect vital communications should the situation continue Goodenough also ignored the implications of Pound’s message to Stark which he must surely have seen when it was received as well. Goodenough letter to Roskill dated 8 May 1951, ROSK 4/79, CCA.
22 Willis letter to Roskill of 16 May 1953, ibid. Willis counselled Phillips to keep his force on the move and avoid being tied to a single base – “the fleet in being concept”. He believed Phillips agreed.
23 Smuts’ warning message to Churchill after Phillips’ visit is well known and can be seen at p 68 of Middlebrook and Mahoney, Battleship. Less known are comments he made to Vice Admiral Sir Philip Vian and his Flag Captain Guy Grantham the following year. Smuts said he had told Phillips that once Force Z reached the East Indies it should hide, ever shifting its location, and making sudden attacks on Japanese targets of opportunity. Once located in a base, e.g. Singapore the force was as good as sunk. Letter, Grantham to Roskill of 3 February 1953, ROSK 4/79, CCA.
24 This is well summarised by Ong Chit Chung, Operation Matador, ibid, p 224 – 228. 25 JIC (41) 439 of 18 November 1941, Japanese Intentions, CAB 81/105, TNA.
26 In fact Japan had decided on war at the Imperial Conference held on 5 November. Ian Kershaw, Fateful
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to deteriorate. Neither of these arguments, however, required the force to be in Singapore. The logical outcome of a Cape Town review would surely have been agreement to
concentrate the deterrent force in Ceylon and then review options. If Phillips had to meet Hart urgently, he could fly from Ceylon, as indeed he did. He did not need a fleet to transport him beyond that point.
The Admiralty did take measures to bring the arrival of Prince of Wales at Cape Town and her likely destination to Japanese attention.27 Tokyo was indeed alerted and DNI knew
this on 22 November.28 Potential deterrence had therefore begun to take effect in Cape
Town, as Eden and Churchill anticipated, and Tokyo was also alerted by their London Embassy to the link with Churchill’s Guildhall speech on 10 November.29 There were
options further to enhance this deterrence potential by publicising the complete Force Z at Ceylon where Prince of Wales met Repulse on 29 November.30 Pound also discussed with
Churchill exposing the old battleship Centurion which was in the area, disguised as a KGV battleship.31 However, during the passage to Ceylon, confirmation that the Japanese were fully aware of Prince of Wales and her destination was matched by continuing evidence of the build-up of Japanese military forces in the South.32 The JIC produced a further
assessment on 28 November concluding that the risks of early Japanese action were increasing.33 This drew on excellent sigint coverage of Japanese force levels in Indo-
27 FSL minute to PM of 18 November 1941, ADM 205/10, TNA.
28 The Japanese Consul General Cape Town reported the visit of Prince of Wales between 16 – 18 November to MFA Tokyo on 19 November. He specifically stated she was bound for Malaya. This was decrypted by GC&CS and issued as report 098017 on 22 November. A second intercept was circulated as 098052 the following day. See: HW 12/270, TNA. See also NID report 00421 of 23 November, ADM 223/321, TNA.
29 The Japanese Charge in London confirmed naval reinforcements, including Prince of Wales were being sent East in a message to MFA Tokyo on 21 November which drew attention to Churchill’s Guildhall speech. This was circulated by GC&CS as report 998240 on 27 November, also in HW 12/270. 30 Marder, Vol 1., p 391-392.
31 FSL minute to PM of 2 November, ADM 205/10, TNA.
32 Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo, Naval Commander of the IJN Southern Task Force, claimed he learnt of the arrival of Force Z in Singapore “towards the end of November”. After consulting HQ Combined Fleet, he then moved his covering force from Formosa to Camranh Bay in southern Indo-China. See: “Some Opinions Concerning the War”, a summary of the interviews he gave to American historian Gordon Prange in 1948, included in Donald M Goldstein and Katherine V Dillon, The Pacific War Papers: Japanese
Documents of World War II, (Washington: Potomac Books, 2004). Force Z did not reach Singapore until 2
December so either Kondo only learnt of their arrival then or he was alerted before their arrival.
33 JIC (41) 439 of 18 November, ‘Japan’s Intentions’, and JIC (41) 449 of 28 November, ‘Possible Japanese Action’, CAB 81/105, TNA.
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China but also some important humint reports on their intentions, including targeting of the Kra Isthmus, from SIS.3435 The JIC still expected a step by step approach beginning with a move into Thailand but, from mid-November, there was accumulating evidence of a more direct and imminent threat to Malaya.36 Meanwhile, further intercepts, including
the “winds alert message” on 25 November also indicated that the Japanese anticipated a high likelihood of imminent hostilities with Britain and the US.37 On 28 November, the