2 derived from God are the foundations of progress."

Through supplying the subjective aim to the occa­ sions, God can be termed the creator of each temporal actual entity,-^ However, this would be, in Whitehead's own admission, "misleading". There are several reasons why this is the case. First of all, as noted earlier,

each actual entity is self-created. Although it receives the general outline of its character from the past, it still has a significant part to play in its own becoming.

^Ibid., p. 377- ^Ibld.

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this through the decision involved in its subjective aim. In this respect, the actual entity is conditioned but not determined by its subjective aim; it remains free and in its freedom creates itself. Secondly, to describe God as creator would be inappropriate because it suggests

"that the ultimate creativity of the universe is to be ascribed to God's volition" whereas the "true metaphys­ ical position is that God is the aboriginal instance of this creativity. . . That is, God too, as an actual entity, is a creature of creativity.Thirdly, God can­ not be termed the creator of the temporal actual entities because there is no meaning to "God" apart from the tempo-

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ral creatures. This last point has reference to White­ head's rejection of the traditional Christian view which regards God as "the transcendent creator, at whose fiat the world came into being . . . .

It is clear, then, that in Whitehead's speculative system God cannot be justly called creator. Nevertheless, in the philosophy of organism God plays a major and sig­ nificant part as the actual entity which makes the emergence

of novelty possible . We will now turn to a more detailed study of the concept of God in Whitehead's philosophy.

With reference to his doctrine of God, Whitehead ^Ibid.. pp. 135, 373. h b i d .. p. 344. ^Ibid.. p. 344. ^Ibld.. p. 519- ^Ibid., pp. 33, 46.

frankly states some matters of great importance. He con­ cedes that his theory of God is an interpretative element

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in his cosmology, and that no "proof" is offered. What he does undertake is a dispassionate investigation as to what his metaphysical principles require concerning the nature of God. That is, "God is not to he treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification."-^

In compliance with the metaphysical principles of Whitehead's system, and specifically with reference to the ontological principle, God is regarded as an actual entity. As stressed above, only by being an actual entity could God function as the principle of concretion, the organ of novelty since, according to the ontological prin­ ciple, only actual entities are agents, that is, are

effective. Much discussion has centred around whether Whitehead intended God to be viewed as an actual entity

or a series of actual entities. The controversy is not sheerly academic but has to do with further implications concerning the nature of God and his relationship to the world. Three such important matters--only mentioned here but discussed later--are (l) Can God be described as per­

sonal? (2) Does God literally include the temporal actual ^Ibid.. p. 518.

^Ibid.. p. 521. ^Ibid.

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entities, that is, is it a doctrine of panentheism, and (3) is God able to preserve value in the universe? To these matters we shall return later and we shall deal at the moment only with the question as to whether God is an actual entity or a series of entities.

Much of what has been written in this chapter already has made reference to God as "an actual entity". This

has not been an effort to prejudge the issue but is rather an attempt in this research to reflect Whitehead's own usage. While insisting that actual entities differ among themselves, he states that "God is an actual entity, and so is the most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space." In dealing with the ontological principle in the context of the potentiality of the universe he writes,

"the general potentiality of the universe must be some­ where . . . . This 'somewhere’ is the non-temporal actual

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entity." As noted earlier in direct quotations from Whitehead, God is described as "that actual entity" which

supplies the initial subjective aim of each occasion^ and as "the final entity" which makes novelty possible

In view of the explicit statements by Whitehead that God is ap actual entity, it may seem unusual that any dis­ cussion should arise concerning the possibility that he intended to describe God not as a single entity but rather

^Ibld.. p. 28. , p. 374.

as a series of entities. Among those who hold that White­ head may really have regarded God as a series of actual entities are Robert Whittemore and Charles Hartshorne. Hartshorne's position will be the object of our attention

in the following chapter. Whittemore believes that Hart­ shorne's assessment that Whitehead may have viewed God as a series of actual entities is correct. Whittemore reaches this conclusion on the basis that Whitehead him­ self draws attention to the fact that God does differ from other actual entities. That Whitehead does indeed dis­ tinguish between God and other actual entities is certainly true, but such qualifying statements do not have any refer­ ence to the question concerning whether God an actual entity; they have reference to distinctions between God as the primordial actual entity and the temporal occasions. Cobb, who adopts the view that God should be regarded as a series of actual entities, rightly concedes that such a conclusion differs from Whitehead and that Whitehead him-

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