Describing the Highest Good: Nirvana, Eudaemonia, and 3.2.2 A Person's Function

eudaemonia. Keown (2009) claims, "eudaemonia and nirvana are functionally and conceptually related in that both constitute that goal, end and summum bonum of human endeavor" (p. 195). As explained in (i), for nirvana and eudaemonia to be conceptually and functionally related in a way that demonstrates Buddhism to be a type of virtue ethics requires a clear structural link between the highest good and virtues.

Keown argues that both nirvana and eudaemonia can be characterized as final and self- sufficient. Keown (1992) writes,

Whatever else nirvana is, it is indisputably the summum bonum of Buddhism and may be characterized, like eudaimonia... (a) it is desired for its own sake; (b) everything else that is desired is desired for the sake of it; (c) it is never chosen for the sake of anything else. (p. 199)

Surely the goals of many religious systems could be described in such a way as to qualify as a highest good in this sense. For the purposes of a virtue theory, what is distinctive about the Aristotelian description of the highest good is not that it is a final and self-sufficient end, but that it is an expression of the human function, and further that it is accompanied by certain elements that enable a person to function well, namely virtues. If nirvana is to be equated with

eudaemonia in a way relevant to supporting the claim that Buddhist ethics is a species of virtue ethics, it needs to be demonstrated that it has a similar relationship to virtues.

Eudaemonia is described as activity in accord with a function that relates to what is distinctive about being human (1098a15, EE II.1, 1219a38-9). Nirvana, however, is never described as an activity, much less an activity relating to what is unique about being human. It is described in terms of a negation, the absence of suffering and its cause. The Buddha equated nirvana with the third noble truth, cessation, which he described in his first teaching as follows: "‘Now this, Bhikkhus, is the noble truth of the cessation of suffering: it is the remainders fading away and cessation of that same craving, the giving up and relinquishing of it, freedom from it, nonreliance of it’" (Bodhi, 2000, p. 1844). Here nirvana is not described in terms of the function of a person, and, more importantly, there is no mention of it being constituted by virtues to qualify it as a life well lived. Instead, it is described as a total and permanent cessation of suffering and its causes. In the Pāli canon, the Buddha is recorded asking his student Sāriputta,

"Friend Sāriputta, it is said, 'Nibbāna, Nibbāna.' What now is Nibbāna?"

"The destruction of lust, the destruction of hatred, the destruction of delusion: this, friend, is called Nibbāna." (Bodhi, 2005, p. 1294; SN 38:1; IV 251–52).

Moreover, nirvana is not described in terms of virtues either emotional or rational but is described as unconditioned. The Buddha explains,

"Monks, I will teach you the unconditioned and the path leading to the unconditioned. Listen... And what, monks, is the unconditioned? The

destruction of lust, the destruction of hatred, the destruction of delusion: this is called the unconditioned... And what, monks, is the destination? The destruction of lust, the destruction of hatred, the destruction of delusion: this is called the destination" (Bodhi, 2005, p. 364; SN 43:1–44, combined; IV 359–73).

It is clear that nirvana is not an activity, but is a state consistently described in negative terms as a lack of suffering and the causes that lead to suffering. Here there is the mention of the absence of vice, but there is no description of a conceptual link between virtue and nirvana.

Keown (1992) finds such descriptions of nirvana to be unproblematic. He points out that the Buddha continued to engage in ethical practices after his awakening and is described not only as intellectually perfect but also morally perfect (p. 114). While it is true that, having achieved enlightenment, the Buddha continued to engage in many activities including eating, sleeping, and so on, this does not meanthat nirvana can be considered a type of activity. Importantly, the fact that the Buddha is described as having engaged in activities while in the state of nirvana does not imply a necessary relationship between nirvana and virtues. These activities, and specifically virtues, are not necessary constituents of nirvana. Nirvana is described as uncompounded and permanent, so it would be strange to characterize nirvana by these mundane activities simply because they happen to accompany it. Nirvana is the mere absence of suffering; it is a state that may be accompanied by moral acts, but should not be equated with them.

Moreover, Keown is referring to the first of two types of nirvana, nirvana with remainder. Nirvana with remainder refers to an arhant who has eliminated the causes of future suffering but still possesses a body and the other four aggregates. The second type of nirvana, nirvana without remainder, occurs when the arhant passes. It is the second type of nirvana, not the first type, that represents the final goal of the Buddhist path. So the nirvana Keown is referring to could not be the highest good as it is not final (teleion).

In order to provide a link between virtues and nirvana, Keown turns to the Buddhist account of mental dharmas. He argues that the Buddhist understanding of the mental elements of human nature can be reduced to two basic components: the emotional and the rational, and so that the Buddhist account has the same form as the Aristotelian. He claims that nirvana represents the perfection of these two aspects. Keown writes,

The goal or terminus of human perfection described as eudaemonia or nirvana is conceived of as embracing a bilateral perfection. The parameters of the goal are determined by the facts of human nature and its potential for development. (p. 195)

Here, Keown argues that the highest good in Buddhism appeals to human nature to determine its content, and is thus similar in nature to the Aristotelian account. Although Keown attempts to relate the highest good in Buddhism to human nature, his account is nevertheless devoid of the most important feature found in the Aristotelian presentation of the human good: an account of human function based on the unique characteristics that distinguish humans. The reason for Aristotle's examination of human nature in book one of Nicomachean Ethics is that he believes the unique and distinguishing properties of human nature can inform us about the human

function, which he equates with the human good. However, the uniqueness of human function is not relevant to the Buddhist goal. The absence of suffering is not related to the distinctive feature of a person or any form of sentience. The highest good in Buddhism is the same for all creatures. Actually, for Buddhists to be born is to suffer, so nirvana constitutes the complete opposite of the distinguishing feature of ordinary existence. While Aristotelian ethics describes the final good in terms of action and function in an attempt to describe what it is to live well, the Buddhist ethical approach attempts to solve the problem of suffering. The solution to the

problem of suffering requires an investigation into the causes of suffering and how to remove it rather than an investigation into the unique qualities and function of a person. For this reason, nirvana is described in these terms: the absence of the suffering and its causes, ignorance and craving.

Although Keown focuses on the Theravāda tradition, it might be thought that the

Mahāyāna goal of Buddhahood, rather than the nirvana of an arhat, provides a better analogue to eudaemonia, since Buddhahood is described not only as a freedom from suffering, but also in

positive moral terms. While this might offer a solution to the present problem relating to

activity, it does so only to present those in favor of a virtue ethics reading of Buddhist ethics with a different but equally problematic obstacle. As I have explained,for Aristotle the highest good is necessarily a final good. It could be argued that Mahāyāna Buddhahood is not a final good since Mahāyāna enlightenment is desirable for the sake of another goal, the elimination of the suffering of all beings.

Moreover, like nirvana, Mahāyāna enlightenment is unrelated to the distinctive features of humans and, as will be discussed next, the virtues that are associated with Mahāyāna

enlightenment are unrelated to the function of humans. Finally, as will be discussed in later chapters, virtues in Mahāyāna Buddhism are not considered good unless they are accompanied by a particular way of taking up the world, a correct metaphysical view. Part of my argument for Buddhist ethics being a kind of moral phenomenology rather than a kind of virtue ethics, is that this view of the world precedes excellent virtue, and that this virtue is contingent upon this correct metaphysical view, and does not constitute it.

Carpenter (2015) argues that Nāgārjuna provides us with two ends: happiness

reconceived as well-being, which is gained through good conduct, and liberation, the highest end, which is gained through wisdom and which is a sufficient means. However, by pursuing well-being through good conduct, one naturally comes to the wisdom required of the highest end. Pursuing happiness leads to the highest good. Carpenter observes,

This gradual leading from one [i.e., well-being] into the other [i.e., liberation]… is

possible because the normative ground all along—for which pleasures and pains are to be pursued and avoided, and when; for which behaviors are to be encouraged or repudiated; for what is good practice consists in—is determined from the first by whatever it is that beings situated as we are need to do in order to be led to wisdom, and to a desire for definite goodness itself. In this sense the two ends are not independent, but rather related, and the one dependent upon the other. (p. 39)

Carpenter understands the wisdom that leads to liberation as the ultimate good in virtue of which other virtues are made good. On this reading, virtuous actions may lead us to the final good, but it is not the virtues that make the final end good. Instead, it is the final end that makes virtues good. I suggest that this reading of Nāgārjuna’s ethics is moving in the direction of an

appreciation of the centrality of moral phenomenology to Mahāyāna ethics because it

understands wisdom, a metaphysically accurate way of seeing the world, to be the ultimate good. In Chapter Five, I will argue that Mahāyāna ethics is best conceived of as a kind of moral

phenomenology, by drawing on the ethical writings of two other Mādhyamika thinkers,

Āryadeva and Śāntideva, and also the Perfection of Wisdom literature, which is regarded as the primary source for Nāgārjuna’s philosophical position.