DESIRE AND EXCITEMENT

Concupiscent Appetite and Irascible Appetite

In Aristotelian philosophy a very definite line is drawn between man's sensuousness and his rationality, but at the same time the strict relation between them is clearly established. This relation occurs in the field of cognition where the senses are meant to establish a direct contact with objective reality and at the same time supply, so to speak, the raw material for the mind; this conception is justified inasmuch as man cognizes the external world, the world accessible to sense, and simultaneously constitutes the objects of that world by means of intellectual structuration. It is why man's knowledge of what is "accessible" to sense is not the same as the manner in which it is presented by sense. Moreover, intellectual cognition extends far beyond the givenness received in sensory experience. The relation between sensuousness and rationality occurs also in the realm of what in classic thought has been conceived of as appetite. A sensory experience is the foundation of cognition, so the appetite of volition, sensitive appetite, supplies material or objectives for volition. In certain respects it may function as "rational appetite," though in other respects man's

sensuousness is a source of specific difficulties for the rational exercise of his will. Let us recall that already in the discussion on self-determination we saw the term

"appetite" covered such meanings as striving and concupiscence though it was broader than either of them.

Concerning the will itself, we may ask whether we can attribute to it a concupiscent character; certainly there seems to be no difficulty in this respect in the case of sense; sensuous desire is a fact well known from actual experience. In order to describe precisely this experiential reality St. Thomas discriminated between

"concupiscence" or the "concupiscent appetite" and "irascibility" or the "irascible appetite," each representing a specific, one may even say a typical, version of the sensitive appetite.⁶⁹ This distinction allows us to see in it, though in germinal form, an outline of a sort of typology. It rests on an axiological rather than psychological basis inasmuch as the difference between the concupiscent and the irascible appetites lies primarily in the differences between the types of objective, that is, their end, in the value accessible to sense; in the former case this is but an object of desire and in the latter an objective to be attained only by overcoming obstacles or opposition. According to Thomas Aquinas the two forms of concupiscence are

simultaneously the basis for the differentiation of human sentiments and passions. In this form we find in his writings an integrated interpretation of the human psyche and the psychical dynamism on the side of sense; we also find there, as already noted, elements for a sort of typology of the human individual. This typology seems even to be confirmed to some extent by actual observation, for we know

concupiscence is a dominant trait in some people and irascibility in others.

Excitement as a Distinct Emotive Fact

The discussion in this study stresses and brings to the forefront the emotive nature of the human psyche. The point where our approach meets again the traditional anthropology is the stress we put upon a definite experience of an emotive nature which is the experience of excitement. Excitement "happens" in the subject and thereby reveals his psychical potentiality; it is an emotive instance that differs from feeling, to which we have rightly attributed a certain cognitive intentionality. No such cognitive tendency of the psyche is present in excitement, whose character is never cognitive. But does it not show a desirous nature? "Desiring" consists, however, in pointing toward an object whereas excitement is essentially self-sufficient; it consists in the exercise of its process with which it is totally absorbed. Thus it seems that its nature is primarily and essentially emotive though its emotivity may show

differences in quality and tone. Excitements occurring in man may be of an irascible or a concupiscent type. That is, indirectly excitement has an appetitive bent but what we have in view and put stress directly upon is the essential nature of the

excitement as such. It does also entail an intentional bent "toward" or "against"

something. As such, it is a manifestation of emotivity, a typical emotive activation of the human psyche.

Such activation is usually very distinctly set in the framework of somatic reactivity.

Excitement is always manifested in a definite reaction of the body, indeed in a whole complex chain of reactions of the organism (blood circulation, breathing, a quickened heartbeat, etc.), which are very distinctly felt. It is a specific sensation of the body contained in the feeling of excitement itself; we feel and have the experience of the emotive and the reactive moment as one dynamic fact, and this circumstance allows us in a way to call the fact a "reaction." The somatic element accompanying

excitement may then be seen as an extension to the body of a dynamism that is itself psychical. We have, however, to distinguish here between it and the

"excitement" of the body as such, which itself is but a reactive fact producing but an emotive resonance. This near and readily felt relation to the body leads to the conclusion that excitement is something sensuous, a dynamic manifestation of sensuousness. It is usually accompanied by sensations of special intensity, by a rich sensational reflex, which adds to the vividness of the experience of excitement.

The Difference between Excitement and Elation

Nevertheless, to reduce excitements to sensuousness alone would be an

oversimplification. The source of excitement, the stimulus that provokes it, does not necessarily affect the senses. The stimulation may come from the experience of a value that is entirely inaccessible to sense or from wholehearted acceptance of ideals; then, however, we tend to speak of "elation" rather than of excitement.

"Excitement" as such remains indicative of the sphere of sensuous stimuli or

stimulations; elation, being spiritual in nature, may be accompanied in the subject by sensuous or even bodily excitement of greater or lesser intensity. It seems,

moreover, that such excitement may to a certain point help the elation of the spirit but if too strong it becomes an obstacle. This assertion supplies additional evidence for the need for integration.

Excitability

In this case integration must comprise not only the particular excitements but the whole of human excitability, which is the term we apply to this particular emotive element of the psyche. "Excitability" is the capacity for excitement; its direction and its tone can differ as can the excitements themselves. It designates also a certain sphere of human capacities that seems to be rather closely correlated with man's sensitivity. Though the two are interrelated there is also a clear-cut difference between them; excitability relates to other emotive facts than does sensitivity, with which, however, they are usually associated; for excitability itself, as well as

excitement, which is its dynamic catalyst and nucleus, constitutes in man what may be called the "explosive sphere" of emotions. It seems, however, that this refers also to the quality of these emotions and to their subjective intensity. We thus see that there are reasons to distinguish between excitability and emotionality, which will be discussed separately. Excitability, in fact, tends to refer to an awakening of

emotions, and because this is often rather sudden we have characterized it as

explosive. The source of emotions is then seen as irrational and their experience is in itself "blind" - these are the same features that, apart from emotive intensity, we attribute to passions. Excitement establishes certain forms of human emotions and feelings, but obviously it does not exhaust their enormous wealth of tone and variation.

Excitability as a Constituent of Instincts

Sensuous-emotive excitability appears to be particularly well rooted in the soil of human instincts. In the preceding chapter we uncovered the somato-reactive layer in the instincts of self-preservation and reproduction; we also noted that an instinct could not be reduced to the dynamism of this one layer alone. It also has its own appropriate psychosomatic center, which apparently inheres in a particular excitability, it may be the sexual excitability or any of the different forms of

excitability associated with self-preservation. In either case this consists in a special capacity for stimuli or, in other words, the aptitude for excitement. Nevertheless, this aptitude is insufficient to exhaust the notion of "instinct," just as the notion cannot be fully accounted for by the more or less determined reactivity of the body, the body's definite sexual reactions, or the reactions associated with self-preservation. A much more convincing understanding seems to be that both reactivity and

excitability remain at the disposal of the powerful forces of nature that steer them in the direction of the most elemental and fundamental value that is existence itself.

6. "STIRRING EMOTIONS" AND EMOTIVITY

"Stirring Emotions" Differ from Excitement

Our analysis of human emotivity brings us now to a sphere that demands separate treatment, because if the reductive method were to be applied to it, its distinctness could easily be lost. The sphere is that of the experience of deep, stirring emotion, which differs from excitement. Such stirring emotions represent an entirely different kind of experience, a different subjective event, than does excitement. Although in either case we are dealing with essentially emotive and psychical events, the nature of a stirring of emotions is distinctly separate. The specific character of the

experience involved seems best described as a deep emotional stirring, which differs from other emotions and feelings not only in its intensity, but in "depth," in "moving"

and bringing to the surface man's psychic dimension otherwise remaining unnoticed.

An emotional stirring, like excitement, "happens" in the man-subject, but these two psychical states are easily distinguished from each other and from among the various passions of the soul. (It is worth recalling here that the term "passion" derives

etymologically from the Latin word for "to happen.")

Excitement, far more than deep emotion, appears as we have pointed out to be closely related to the sensuousness of man. While both are accompanied by some kind of somatic reaction, excitement is seen as more embedded in this reaction than even very deep emotions. We experience emotions as manifestations of a pure emotivity, as that activation of the psyche itself in which somatic under-layers are less clearly pronounced. This is the reason why in the experience of several types of

deep emotions bodily feelings may appear to give priority to spiritual feelings;

moreover, the content of such emotions is strictly related to the spiritual life of man.

We may for instance experience an aesthetic emotion generated by the perception of something beautiful, a cognitive emotion that arises from the discovery of a truth, or various kinds of deep emotions connected with the sphere of good, in particular, moral good or evil. The last of these experiences, which Scheler sees as the deepest manifestations of man's emotivity, develops in strict relation to the processes of the conscience; remorse at a committed wrong is not only a judgment of oneself, but this experience of truth entails, as we well know from actual life, an unusually stirring emotional component. The same applies to the processes of repentance, justification, or conversion, when man's actual departure from evil and acceptance of good, at any rate in the initial stage of his acceptance, are also accompanied by deeply felt emotions. The content of all these emotions, and with it also their emotive tone, differs diametrically; man passes from the gnawing remorse of his conscience and the sometimes deep distress almost bordering on despair arising from his sense of guilt to a state of mental peace and equally deep joy, to a state of spiritual bliss.

The "Stir of Emotion" as the Core of Human Affectivity

We have been speaking of different emotions and feelings, of different manifestations of man's affectivity. At their root there is always a stirring of emotion; this emotive core may be said to be

radiating internally and thus to produce every time a different emotional experience.

It is this experience that we call "emotion." Each emotional experience is different, unique, and irreproducible, even though among them there are those that in respect of their emotive content are similar or indeed almost identical; they often differ in some detail of tone or intensity but their essential content is nevertheless the same.

The sameness of content always has its experiential origin in a stirring of emotion, which is simultaneously colored by this content and subsequently, because of its internal radiation, spreads it to the whole of man's psychical sphere.

In this way an emotion springs forth and develops in man and fades away.

Occasionally it may be fixed in what we may call an "affective state." While every emotion, a transitory one, represents an emotional state of the man-subject, an

"affective state" is spoken of most appropriately only when an emotion has become fixed, though to what extent an emotion once fixed still remains but a stirring is another matter. What we call an "affective state," however, seems very often to have already departed from its original emotive core, which was a definite stirring of emotion, and has since been taken over by the will. The question of the penetration of emotions to the realm of will and thus also of the transition from emotional states to affective attitudes is of great significance in any discussion on the integration of the psyche, which is precisely the theme of this chapter.

The Multifarious Richness of Emotions

We must here return to the specific nature of emotions. We have just seen that it is also the specific nature itself of that emotional stirring or movement which spreads and infuses the psyche. When we try to characterize emotions and call them by different names, we in fact distinguish between the different ways emotions are stirred. For instance, different emotional stirrings mark the feelings of sorrow and of

joy, of anger and of tenderness, of love and of hatred. The world of human emotions is rich and diversified, in many respects like the colors, tones, and shades on the palette of a painter. Time and again psychologists and to some extent also moralists have attempted to describe and discriminate the principal emotions, according to which the great wealth of man's emotional life could then be classed. It cannot be denied that they have had some success in their efforts, though the domain of human emotions, somewhat like the painter's palette, manifests an infinite spectrum of individual colors, tones, and shades. Moreover, emotions, like colors, can be mixed, they overlap and interpenetrate, they also enhance or complete and destroy each other. They constitute a separate and powerful realm within man, a separate sphere of the human subjectivity. Since emotions happen "in" man, subjectivity is here understood in the particular sense that has been distinguished earlier in this study. Their happening in man comprises their emergence, their growth, and their passing away. Emotional dynamism is at least to a large extent independent of the efficacy of the person. Already the Greek philosophers noticed that emotions did not depend on the mind and in their essence were "irrational."

Some Criteria of Differentiation

This alleged "irrationality" of human affectivity has perhaps been the cause of the one-sided and oversimplified tendency to identify it with sensuousness. Our views on this matter were propounded earlier and here we only have to stress once again the specific difference between the stirring of emotion and excitement. On the one hand, the difference lies in their distinctive natures, and not just in the degree or intensity of experience. (Even the strongest stirring of emotion is not excitement.) The components of the accompanying somatic reactions of the two seem also to be different. On the other hand, excitement is presumably necessary to initiate an emotional experience when an emotional stirring alone is insufficient: but then it is not so much the question of the intensity itself of an emotion as of the level at which man's emotive capacity is operative. Apparently it is this difference of level that we have in mind when we speak of an "emotional stirring" as of something different from excitement and when we discriminate between man's excitability and his affectiveness. But if we can refer to different levels, it means that in the emotional life itself there are inherent possibilities of its transformation, that is, of a transition from one level to another, for instance, from the level of excitement to that of emotion;⁷⁰ in this respect, the functioning of the human being is capable of

"sublimation." Psychologists commonly agree to the distinction between the "lower"

and the "higher" emotions. They also take note of the different "depth" of emotions as well as of their more "peripheral" or more "central" positional features. These distinctions presuppose an innerness of the man-person, something like an

immaterial space, where on the ground of the role of feelings we may differentiate between the "central" and the "peripheral," where it is also possible to establish different levels of "depth" (though these levels are not to be confused with the levels of emotions, which, as we saw, may be either "lower" or "higher"). From another point of view, the different "levels of depth" point to a certain integration in the man-subject of his emotional stirrings (with the ensuing emotions) and project on the efficacy of the person.

This seems to show that the dynamism of emotions is specifically interrelated with the whole system of sensations and feelings, which penetrate to consciousness to determine in every particular case the form and the actual character of an emotional experience.