DEVELOPER MUNICIPALITY

FIGURE 6.1 Actors and interdependency (source: Focus groups results, empirical research, 2012)

Figure 6.1 is a diagram of the interdependent relationships among all of the actors who participated in the focus groups in both cities.61 _{At the top are the two main actors}

in housing policy: the end-beneficiary of the subsidy; and the low-income owners,

60 Their work involves a series of workshops and activities with owners as informative meetings but also commu- nity building. During these workshops, social entrepreneurs identify leaders in the community that can assume roles on the board of homeowners.

61 Social managers appear in a dotted box because their presence is exceptional; only a few social entrepreneurs were found. Considering the system as a whole, the norm is that there is no social entrepreneur.

who are directly connected to the policies of the housing ministry since they form the target group. The developer, the municipality, and the lender appear at the second level; they are related to the actors above and below them. Other actors such as the social manager and the property manager are critical to the relationship with the lender and developers. Finally, the owner´s association is the collective actor that closes the circle of interdependent relationships in this network. Once it has been constituted, the association finishes the development phase and takes over the governance and management responsibilities. The position of the social manager is different and its box is therefore drawn with dotted lines suggesting porous boundaries. Although he/ she is the only actor that is not regulated by the law, the social manager is nevertheless part of the policy network.

§ 6.4.3

Closedness

Actors in this policy network of affordable housing under a condominium regime respond to certain steering policies, especially the ministry’s rules for subsidy

allocation. When they do not respond to steering policies, or other interventions, it can be said that the actor demonstrates a closedness characteristic within the network (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2012).

However, the process for developing housing in coordination with a set of actors that will use the subsidy is not specified in detail and is thus left to governance dynamics. In this context, from a network perspective, some actors will be less responsive to steering policies than others. Also, some actors have veto power within the network, meaning that their level of autonomy allows them to choose whether or not to participate in policy the network, or even to stop the process until there is compliance with their own rules. Differences in how actors respond to steering policies reflect each actor’s frame of reference, which is built on the core values of its organization. Some closedness to the steering signals of policy is necessary. In the dynamic political context of Colombia and Ecuador, in which national policies for subsidy allocation adhere to political trends, some level of closedness is beneficial, as it ensures continuity in the provision of housing thanks to the autonomy of certain players.

Closedness as expressed by the property registry, that was also perceived by the developer on the part of the registry is also necessary to some extent. If the dwellings are to be owned, the property registrar will be a key actor, ensuring the legality of the process and assuring that the documentation is complete.

It is relevant to point out some closedness characteristics of the developer. These vary, depending on whether the developer is a private enterprise or whether it is the municipality acting in that capacity. The developer’s position is strong, but also vulnerable. If developers’ financial interests are not assured, they will not enter the policy network, putting the ministry in a difficult position with respect to achieving policy goals.

Closedness on the part of the developer can provoke conflict. Once the property rights have already been established as collective ownership, the owners can become more active and exercise their self-governance powers. However, this is not convenient for the developer until the project is completely finished. Closedness of the developer is mediated by the temporary property manager or by the social manager, if there is one. In cases where there is neither a property manager nor a social manager, some owners have taken on leadership roles. Based on their recently acquired property rights, they can mediate with the developer to make the co-owners’ voice heard.

§ 6.4.4

Conclusion about characteristics of the network

Network characteristics such as multiformity (of goals and values), interdependence, and closedness give information about the behavior of actors and their positions in a process that requires collaboration in order to achieve the goals of each one. In this analysis, the property manager and the social manager stand out as those actors that had contacts with families in both cities. Other actors, such as the municipal departments and developers reaffirmed their interdependent role, demonstrating that they are part of a network.

Actors from both cities mentioned that during the policy implementation process they relied on stable municipal rules for housing development and that finance actors were crucial to achieving their goals. In this regard, there were no differences between the networks of Bogota and Quito.

A difference was found between the cities regarding the role of the cadaster. In Bogota, this actor did not attend the focus group sessions, implying a lack of interest in getting to know or in participating with other actors in the network. The opposite occurred in Quito, where the role of the cadaster is critical to housing development.

In summary, the system of housing policy implementation in both Bogota and Quito can be described and analyzed in terms of network theory since it is clearly

not a hierarchical structure anymore. In general, the actors acknowledge the need to collaborate, since they see their own position in terms of interdependent relationships.

§ 6.5

Perception of maintenance problems

The second activity during the focus groups sessions in Bogota and Quito included discussion of a vignette. The participants were presented with the scenario of an affordable housing complex, built by a private developer, which starts to deteriorate as soon as people move in. The same hypothetical case was used in both cities. It was presented in Spanish, so the version below is the translation.

VIGNETTE

Hypothetical case presented (with pictures):

A housing developer is ready to build an affordable housing project. After two years the dwellings are built and about 120 families will start moving into the housing complex. These dwellings are in a closed housing complex arrangement, and families are now supposed to take responsibility for maintenance of the complex. One owner will say, “I didn´t know I have to pay this fee, no one told me, I already pay the bank.”

Two more years pass and the housing development project starts to show signs of a lack of maintenance and deterioration. Some parts of the common property need finishing and the community is not doing much to change that.

Participants of the focus groups were asked two broad questions:

1 What went wrong, what causes deterioration?; and 2 What can be done to solve the problem?

The methodology called for active participation. This entailed writing ideas on cards and then placing these on a flip-over board. Participants were asked to draw a line on the paper-board to represent the timeline of housing provision, dividing it into the three phases of production, transaction, and consumption (see picture). The timeline of housing provision was used to guide actors to think of responses and situations that occur in each phase. Each focus group had a paper-board to work on and to affix the cards on which they responded to the questions regarding the case presented in the vignette (see chapter 3 for more detail).

The responses reveal how the actors perceived the deterioration path presented in the vignette. The following sections analyze the responses in relation to each of the three phases of housing provision and draw comparisons between the perceptions in Bogota and Quito.

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