Figure 5: The indicators developed, with examples.
Risk Contingency Options
Examples
Indirect balancing
x Military spending.
x Arms transfers.
x Security cooperation with states with similar goals.
x Military modernisation
x Increased procurement, importing of weapons.
x Increased defence diplomacy, agreements and interactions such as joint exercises and personnel exchanges
Dominance Denial
x Closeness of relations with the major powers in the region.
x Increased economic and diplomatic relations with Russia, US, India, and Japan.
Returns Maximising Options
Examples
Economic Pragmatism
x Is China a top trading partner?
x Trade dependency.
x FDI.
x Is China in the top ten as a trading partner?
x What is the volume of imports and exports between the countries?
x What does this highlight about the economic relationship?
x What are the investment flows? Binding Engagement
x Attempts to increase lines of communication with China.
x Degree of interaction at bilateral and multilateral levels.
x What has been the nature of diplomatic relations?
x Tensions within economic and diplomatic relations.
x Bilateral relations such as Official Development Assistance.
x Multilateral interactions such as China-Japan-South Korea trilateral summits.
Limited Bandwagoning
x Degree of indifference towards Chinas key foreign policy objectives of:
o Territorial integrity o Sovereignty integrity
x Degree of indifference over issues such as the Senkaku islands, and Exclusive Economic Zones.
x Sovereignty integrity focuses on economic and diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
Risk contingency options
Indirect balancing
Kuik updated his definition of indirect balancing to include soft balancing (Kuik et al., 2012). The idea with this option is to minimise the threat of the rising power through military means. For instance, a state may upgrade its military capabilities and pursue security cooperation with other states that have the same goals. However, it is not directly targeted at the rising state
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(Kuik, 2008; Kuik et al., 2012). The researcher has developed three indicators to measure indirect balancing. Two are statistical indicators; military spending and arms imports, which will provide an overall view of defence spending. These will then be used to consider what this reflects about the focus of the defence policy more broadly. For instance, if South Korea’s defence spending is trending up does this reflect a policy of military modernisation or is this being driven by something else more benign such as education. The third indicator is non- statistical and will focus on if the state has been fostering security cooperation with other states with the similar goals. These relationships have largely been identified through South Korean and Japanese Diplomatic White Papers as well as the literature on the countries. This indicator will be analysed by considering if there have been increases in defence diplomacy and security cooperation.
Dominance denial
This strategy is political in nature rather than military. The aim is to prevent the rising power becoming a dominant power by utilising political influence. This once again is not aimed directly at a particular power, but as Kuik states it is ‘cultivating a balance of political influence among the major players in the region’ (2012, p. 319). This is more confrontational than binding engagement. This is because dominance denial means that a smaller state will take the attitude that it won’t be dictated to and if a major or rising power does try to do this the smaller power will move towards other major powers instead (Kuik, 2008; Kuik et al., 2012). Kuik (2008) indicates in his analysis that maintaining relationships with all the key powers in the region is a key indication of dominance denial. Therefore, the analysis will focus on the degree of close relations that South Korea and Japan have with the major powers in the region; US, Russia, India and for South Korea this will include Japan. These relationships will be analysed by focusing on economic and diplomatic ties which will highlight if relations with these powers are increasing or not.
Returns maximising options
Economic pragmatism
This strategy is quite simply that the smaller state will try to maximise its economic gains from the threatening power. This is usually done through direct trade and investment between the two states. This strategy is irrespective of any political tensions between the states. However, economic relations can be the foundations for relations both politically and diplomatically to develop (Kuik, 2008; Kuik et al., 2012). To gauge if this policy is being utilised the researcher has chosen three key indicators. The first will be to ascertain if China is a top ten trading partner. Bilateral trade statistics focused on imports and exports will be used to measure this.
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The second indicator is trade dependence, which is an indicator adopted from Chung’s (2009b) analysis. The results of these will then be used to discuss more broadly trade between China and the country in question, and will include any areas of tension. Finally, the FDI flows will be used to measure investment. This will also be followed by a broader discussion of what the statistics highlight about investment relations. The combination of these indicators will give a clear indication of if economic pragmatism is at play.
Binding engagement
The aim with this strategy is to maximise the diplomatic returns to the smaller state by increasing the channels of communication with the threatening power. This is achieved firstly through engagement which involves developing and maintaining diplomatic links with the threatening power. Secondly, binding of the great power to the status quo is achieved by enmeshing it in to the established order. This is a very similar strategy to dominance denial, but as discussed above, that strategy is quite confrontational. Binding engagement is more subtle. The ultimate end goal is to be able to change the threatening powers actions through persuasion. This is achieved by reminding it that it has a vested interest in the status quo as a result of binding. Binding engagement is not as easily empirically measured as other strategies such as economic pragmatism. Thus this section of analysis will focus on attempts to increase lines of communication with China as well as the degree of interaction between the countries at bilateral and multilateral levels. This will be achieved by focusing on the current status of diplomatic relations between China and the country in question. To build up a picture of this the analysis will take into account; high level exchanges, dialogues, summits, agreements, any areas of tensions which have affected diplomatic ties, and the nature and degree of bilateral and multilateral interaction.
Limited Bandwagoning
This strategy focuses on maximising the foreign policy returns to the smaller power. The smaller state collaborates with the threatening power on areas of interest and vice versa, however the key is that the smaller power is not subordinate in this collaboration. This is different to pure bandwagoning where a smaller state is dominated by the larger power. Limited bandwagoning allows the state to retain its own identity by only collaborating on selected issues and thus also enables it to retain its relations with the hegemon (Kuik, 2008; Kuik et al., 2012).
The key indicators here will be based around two areas that are highlighted by Kuik (2008) as clear indicators of limited bandwagoning behaviour. The first will focus on the degree of indifference over China’s key foreign policies objectives. China has identified it’s foreign policy
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as comprising of five principles of coexistence; mutual respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, non-interference, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009; Jakobson, 2013; D. C. Kang, 2007; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2013). Sovereignty and territorial integrity have been selected as the most relevant indicators to analyse limited bandwagoning because these two have been reflected in what China has termed it’s ‘core interests’ (Campbell, Meick, Hsu, & Murray, 2013; Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009; Jakobson, 2013; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2013). In particular the sovereignty analysis will focus on Japan and South Korea’s relations with Taiwan. Taiwan has been chosen because it has been identified by this thesis as China’s key sovereignty issue; other options included Xinjinag and Tibet. However, Taiwan is the most prominent of these three and the one that has had the most impact on China’s relations with a wide variety of states. The territorial integrity analysis will focus on the territorial disputes these countries have with China. The interactions between the countries over these issues will highlight if China is dominating Japan and South Korea over these issues or if they are retaining some independence.