States that invest in Africa typically offer development projects, both infra- structural and socioeconomic, as inducements for African participation in bilateral partnerships. These “trade and aid” packages accomplish several strategic tasks. From the perspective of Africa’s external partners, offering development initiatives lubricates their economic negotiations with African political leaders, allowing external partners to claim that their engagement with African states is mutually beneficial and certainly not predatory, because ordinary African people stand to benefit by the provision of basic services. Aid packages that target the refurbishment, reconstruction, or outright develop- ment of infrastructure such as roads, ports, and airports benefit local African communities for whom these axes of transportation are often insufficient. China’s efforts to rebuild African infrastructure is a centrally important con- tribution to the betterment of the lives of African communities. In contrast, refurbishment and extension of infrastructure were sorely neglected through- out the continent during the final decades of the twentieth century, when trade and aid to Africa were dominated by Euro-American partners.
Investment in projects that (re)construct basic infrastructure is also essen- tial to transport African resources to ports of exit efficiently. In this respect, Chinese (re)development of roads, railroads, ports, and airports mirrors the self-interested construction of these facilities during the European colonial era. For example, the cartography of colonial railroads along the West African
coast illustrates that, rather than serving the purpose of connecting African markets and communities within the continent, the rail lines were constructed to transport resources from the interior of the continent to coastal port cities, where European-owned vessels brought them directly to European industries and markets. To take but one example, the colonial construction and con- temporary Chinese reconstruction of the Benguela rail line in Angola, which runs from the Angolan coast directly eastwards toward the rich mining zones of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia, illustrate that such large-scale projects are designed primarily with overseas commercial interests, rather than domestic African interests, in mind. Yet, it is important to empha- size that despite the clear necessity of infrastructural networks to the eco- nomic objectives of external partners, their current revitalization—in large measure by China—is simultaneously of vital importance to the economies of African states and their citizens.
The link between trade and aid is unambiguous; packages of aid to African partners have proven influential in securing trade deals for external partners. As part of its massive effort to redevelop Angolan infrastructure that was dev- astated by the decades-long civil war, in 2004 China extended $2 billion in soft loans to Angola in exchange for Angola’s promise of unrestricted flows of crude oil to China. This agreement in turn paved the way for China to secure a monopoly on access to deepwater oil sources, outbidding both European investors backed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Indian enter- prises. Bilateral trade between Angola and China reached $5 billion in 2006; Angola is now China’s second-largest African trading partner, supplying China with 15 percent of its oil imports and surpassing Saudi Arabia’s oil flows to China.21Yet, the details of China’s trade and aid deals with Angola
remain murky, despite—or perhaps because of—their enormity. Estimates of China’s loans and aid to Angola range from $2 billion to $9 billion; neither China nor Angola has been forthcoming with even the most general infor- mation. Similarly, estimates of Chinese laborers in Angola range from 10,000 to 80,000; accurate figures are elusive.22This obscurity serves the interests of
the Chinese and Angolan states simultaneously, as neither international observers nor domestic civil society groups are easily able to challenge Angola’s use of the enormous receipts it has gained from China.
In addition to the clear potential for corrupt arrangements that benefit African leaders, Chinese efforts to overhaul Africa’s crumbling infrastructure also serve the political interests of African elites. On the watch of many African leaders, transportation and communication networks throughout the conti- nent have fallen into disrepair. African leaders now stand to benefit from the
Chinese assistance in refurbishing these national necessities; Africa’s political elite leverage on the improvement of infrastructure, taking political credit for having negotiated these important deals with the Chinese state and its eco- nomic subsidiaries. High-profile construction projects, such as building resplendent stadia to house national football teams, have proven effective in sweetening popular perceptions of both the Chinese economic presence in Africa and the African leadership that has midwifed Chinese involvement in African economies. In this sense, the cementing of relations between Africa and China may lead to entrenchment of current African political regimes, which take credit for having negotiated China’s contributions to national development—the same efforts that some African leaders have been unable or unwilling to undertake on their own.
That African observers express ambivalence regarding Chinese-built infra- structure reflects deeper concerns about the long-term trade-offs of Chinese involvement in the continent’s development. On the one hand, China quickly builds infrastructure that is desperately needed. African elite note the lack of planning meetings, environmental impact reports, and other bureaucratic hurdles that typify projects sponsored by Euro-American nations and inter- national lending organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. They view the Chinese approach as a refreshingly efficient change. Senegalese Pres- ident Abdoulaye Wade publicly expressed his sense of relief that African nations have a newfound power to choose not to accept funding from tradi- tional Euro-American partners, a sense of power so fresh that he—and Sene- galese elite in attendance at a recent public forum—seemed giddy at the prospect of embracing Chinese efficiency and snubbing former overbearing development partners.23But African civil society organizations and commu-
nities in areas that have seen Chinese developments unfold are keenly aware of the potential negative repercussions on African social and natural envi- ronments as a result of this expedited approach. Many African commentators note with trepidation the environmental degradation of China’s own land- scapes and resources, and express serious concerns about uncritical acceptance of Chinese development initiatives in Africa. Africans’ uncertainty about China’s support for their national leadership reflects deeper ambivalence toward the current state of political affairs in many nations where China seeks increased ties. While Africans may appreciate their new national stadia, they perceive unalloyed Chinese support of their often despotic leaders—through the building and renovation of presidential palaces and the funding of their militaries—to be detrimental to serious African efforts to achieve political reform in their own nations.
In addition to providing the hardware for national development, China has stepped forward to establish socioeconomic programs to improve the daily lives of ordinary Africans. While China trumpets its contributions to the socioeconomic welfare of Africa, its contributions in this area remain rela- tively modest: the provision of 100 Chinese agricultural experts to staff 10 agricultural technology demonstration centers; the building of 30 hospitals and 30 malaria treatment and prevention centers, including a grant to supply Chinese-made arteminisin to malaria patients; the construction of 100 rural schools; and the dispatching of 300 Chinese youth volunteers.24
Contributions in the area of education are more significant: China has pledged to train 15,000 African professionals (although details of this training, and in what professional areas, are not readily available) and has committed to sponsor 4,000 African students at Chinese universities.25These initiatives
have tremendous potential to advance Africa’s class of technicians, profes- sionals, and managers, enhancing African self-reliance and future stability.
Ironically, China’s efforts to improve the socioeconomic conditions in African communities remain divorced from China’s direct economic activi- ties. Communities that are located in regions where China undertakes its extractive, industrial, or commercial pursuits often do not see direct benefits from the Chinese presence. Unlike large extractive industries during the late colonial era, which often included housing for tens of thousands of workers and their families, as well as dispensaries, schools, training facilities, and other social amenities, Chinese industrial investments in Africa tend to be “socially thin.”26Industries such as mining and petroleum extraction, activities enthu-
siastically undertaken by Chinese state-owned enterprises in many regions of the continent, require high levels of capital investment but tolerate low levels of social investment in surrounding communities. Particularly where these industries employ primarily Chinese labor, the extractive installations may be barricaded physically from neighboring African communities by means of razor wire and armed security forces, leading to the isolation of the Chinese enterprise, its management, and its workers, thus arousing suspicion and resentment among African neighbors. African workers who do succeed in landing employment with Chinese extractive firms have found wages, bene- fits, and basic safety measures to be lacking, igniting vitriolic and even violent protests against the Chinese industries’ presence, as in Zambia’s Chambishi mining zone during 2006. Thus, while the Chinese government has made a concerted effort to extend a degree of socioeconomic assistance as part of its partnership with African nations, its state-centered approach has resulted in a fundamental decoupling of these programs from the often rural communities
that would most benefit from them, and the people whose lives are directly affected by the presence of Chinese extractive industries.