operations
1.4 N EW DEVELOPMENTS IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS AFTER 1988 In 1990, however, the classical model of peace support operations was already
changing. The deployment of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia in 1989 marked the first of a new type of peace opera- tions.41These operations were deployed as part of a negotiated political settle-
ment and the responsibilities of peacekeepers included a range of new tasks such as disarmament, resettlement of refugees, police training and supervision and election monitoring. Such operations were referred to as complex, multi- functional or second-generation operations to distinguish them from first generation operations whose principal function was limited to separation of the parties.42United Nations Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali wrote in a 1993
article that it:
38 As expressed for example by the government of the Netherlands in a letter to parliament relating to the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Bijlagen Handelingen II 2000-01, 22 831, nr. 10, at17.
39 Seee.g.B. Janssens,Les Règles d’Engagement pendant les Opérations des Nations Unies en Somalie, 35 Military Law and Law of War Review 209 (1996).
40 United Nations,supranote 20, at 4.
41 Seee.g.N.J. Schrijver,Introducing Second Generation Peace-keeping: the case of Namibia, 6 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 1 (1994).
42 Seee.g.R. Lee,United Nations Peacekeeping: Developments and Prospects, 28 Cornell Inter- national Law Journal 619 (1995); M. Griffin, Retrenchment, Reform and Regionalization: Trends in UN Peace Support Operations, 6 International Peacekeeping 1 (1999), at 2.
is now almost always the case that operations undertaken by the United Nations must include civilian police, electoral personnel, human rights experts, information specialists, and a significant number of political advisory staff.
U.N. operations may now involve nothing less than the reconstruction of an entire society and state. This requires a comprehensive approach, over an extended period.43
In this period East-West relations improved and there was an unprecedented level of political will on the part of most of its members, most significantly the P-5, to address a broad range of conflicts leading to the establishment of five new operations in 1988-1989 alone.44This optimism was reflected in the
Secretary-General’s 1992 Agenda for Peace, a strategy document for United Nations action in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping.45
Two proposed departures from previous practice in An Agenda for Peace were critical. First, the document defined peacekeeping as the “deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned.”46Here was a clear signal that theUNmight, in some instances,
seek to deploy operations without consent of the parties to the conflict. Second, the document proposed the utilization of peace-enforcement units in cases where theUNis called upon to send forces to restore and maintain a cease-fire and this task exceeds the mission of peace-keeping forces and the expectations of peace-keeping force contributors. Such peace-enforcement units would be warranted under Article 40 of theUNCharter.
These proposals demonstrated a willingness to depart from the established principles of peace operations. In the same 1992 article referred to above, the Secretary-General wrote:
And when the established rules of engagement for peacekeeping operations are no longer sufficient, U.N. forces may need authorization to demonstrate a resolve to use force. If this is not effective, the situation may call for wider rules of engage- ment so that U.N. peacekeepers may react to force and, in some cases, use force to forestall an escalation in violence.
Between ChapterVI and ChapterVIIlie cases which are sui generis and where earlier certainties about actions with or without the parties’ agreement may need to be re-examined with each new approach.47
43 B. Boutros-Ghali,Beyond Peacekeeping, 25 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 113 (1992), at 115.
44 D. Malone & K. Wermester,The Changing Nature of UN Peacekeeping, 7 International Peace- keeping 37 (2000), at 39.
45 UN Doc. S/24111 of 17 June 1992, reproduced in 31 ILM 953 (1992). See specifically para- graph 3 for the optimism in United Nations action.
46 Id., para. 20.
These ideas played an important role in the establishment and management ofUNoperations in the former Yugoslavia and in Somalia, established in the wake of An Agenda for Peace. These operations were given the power to use force under ChapterVIIof theUNCharter for specific purposes other than self- defense, a radical departure from the established principle of the minimal use of force.48Some writers referred to these operations as ‘third-generation peace-
keeping’ because of this departure from established doctrine. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was established in February 1992 with a mandate to demilitarize three ‘United Nations Protected Areas’, monitor police activities and assist in the return of displaced persons to the protected areas.49When the conflict in the former Yugoslavia spread to Bosnia-Herze-
govina, the mandate of the operation came to include a number of activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including ensuring the security of Sarajevo airport and the protection of the delivery of humanitarian assistance.50The mandate
was expanded several times,inter aliawith the task of deterring attacks against towns designated as ‘safe areas’ in Resolution 824. Resolution 776 authorized
UNPROFORto use force to secure the delivery of humanitarian assistance under ChapterVII. Resolution 836 authorized it to use force to deter attacks against the ‘safe areas’, to monitor the cease-fire, to promote the withdrawal of military and paramilitary units other than those of the government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to occupy some key points on the ground under ChapterVII. It is well-known that this did not have the desired effect and that
air strikes byNATO, authorized under Security Council Resolutions 770 and 836, forced the parties to accept the Dayton Peace Agreements in 1995.
The Security Council established the second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) in March 1993 to take over from the United States-led Unified Task Force. The Secretary-General recommended a broad mandate for the force and the endowment of enforcement powers under ChapterVII
of theUNCharter.51He was especially concerned that the task of disarming
the parties should be enforceable.52 The Security Council adopted the re-
commendations of the Secretary-General in Resolution 814. The resolution gave the force a broad mandate, including monitoring the cessation of hostilities, protecting personnel, installations and equipment of the United Nations, its agencies and non-governmental organizations, assisting in the repatriation of refugees and disarming factions, and gave the force enforcement powers under ChapterVII to accomplish its mandate.53Over time hostility toward
the operation developed among factions in Somalia, and in particular the
48 Seee.g.C. Gray,Host-state Consent and United Nations Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia, 7 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 241 (1996).
49 Security Council Resolution 743 of 21 February 1992, UN Doc. S/RES/743. 50 Security Council Resolution 758 of 8 June 1992, UN Doc. S/RES/758. 51 UN Doc. S/25354 of 3 March 1993, para. 56-68.
52 UN Doc. S/25354 of 3 March 1993, para. 63.
faction led by Mohamed Aidid. On 5 June 1993 the force was ambushed when it tried to inspect a weapons storage site of Mr. Aidid’s faction and eighteen Pakistani peacekeepers were killed. The next day the Security Council adopted Resolution 837, which reaffirmed that “the Secretary-General is authorized under Resolution 814 (1993) to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks.”54Lalande explains that the:
reaction of theUNto the attack against its forces sparked a guerrilla-type war in Mogadishu, withUNOSOM IIbecoming a new warring party in the civil war, which was contrary to its mandate to restore law and order in the country.55
On 3 October 1993, United States Rangers deployed to assist the United Nations force yet remaining under United States command, launched an operation in south Mogadishu aimed at capturing a number of key aides of General Aidid who were suspected of complicity in the 5 June attack. During the course of the operation, two United States helicopters were shot down by Somali militiamen using automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades. In the fight that followed eighteen Rangers and one Malaysian member of the
UNoperation were killed. Following the events of 3 October 1993, President Clinton announced the intention of the United States to withdraw its forces from Somalia by 31 March 1994. This led other governments to do the same and ultimately led to the withdrawal of the United Nations Operation in the beginning of 1995.
United Nations operations in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia not only were authorized to use more force than previous operations, they also departed from the principle of consent. Kofi Annan (then Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations) wrote in 1994 that “the need for consent of the parties was overridden by humanitarian concerns.”56The weakening of the
principle of consent was related to a change in the type of conflicts confronting theUNfrom primarily interstate to much more complex intrastate conflicts
in which only some of the parties may give their consent or in which factions that give consent may not have full control over their areas.
At the same time the principle of consent was not totally abandoned, as illustrated by the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia when that state withdrew its consent for the operation.57
UNOSOM II also to a certain extent
54 Security Council Resolution 837 of 6 June 1993, Un Doc. S/RES/837, para. 5.
55 S. Lalande,Somalia: Major Issues for Future UN Peacekeeping, in D. Warner (Ed.), New Dimensions of Peacekeeping 69 (1995), at 92.
56 K. Annan,Peace-keeping in Situations of Civil War, 26 New York University Journal of International Law & Politics 623 (1994), at 624. See also O. Corten & P. Klein,Action Humanitaire et Chapitre VII: La Redéfinition du Mandat et des Moyens d’Action des Forces des Nations Unies, 39 Annuaire Français de Droit International 105 (1993).
relied on consent. Other factions than the one led by Mr. Aidid continued to co-operate with the operation.58
The operations in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia were generally considered unsuccessful.59The
UNwas also criticized for standing by while genocide took place in Rwanda in 1994 while aUNpeace support operation was deployed there.60This perception of United Nations failure led to a re-
thinking of peace support operations symbolized by a famous 1994 article by Adam Roberts entitled “The Crisis inUNPeacekeeping.”61Within the
UNthis rethinking led to a retrenchment. The euphoria that accompanied the end of the Cold War and the accompanying expectation that the Security Council would finally take center stage in the maintenance of international peace and security as the drafters of the Charter intended, an expectation that was re- flected in An Agenda for Peace, did not last. It was felt that theUNshould return to the principles of traditional peacekeeping: consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force. Departure from these principles was regarded as the cause of the problems with the operations in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia.62Peacekeeping and enforcement should be clearly distinguished.63
In 1995, the Secretary-General presented a supplement to An Agenda for Peace that reflected these ideas. The Secretary-General stated thatUNpeace- keeping operations should respect the principles of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defense.64According to the Secretary-Gen-
eral this was illustrated by the operations in the former Yugoslavia and Soma- lia. In both cases, existing peacekeeping operations were given additional mandates that required the use of force and therefore could not be combined with existing mandates requiring the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force. It was also not possible for them to be executed without much stronger military capabilities than had been made available. Peace- keeping and enforcement did not mix well because the:
logic of peace-keeping flows from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of enforcement; and the dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the political process that peace-keeping is intended to facilitate. To blur the
58 See also G. McDonald, Peace Enforcement: Mapping the ’Middle Ground’ in Peace Opera- tions, dissertation University of Geneva 2001 (unpublished), UNOSOM II, Consent. 59 M. Bothe, United Nations Forces, EPIL 1107 (1992), at 1113; C. Crocker,The Lessons of
Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong, 74 Foreign Affairs 2 (1995).
60 Seee.g.M. Boot,Paving the Road to Hell: The Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping, 79 Foreign Affairs 143 (2000); M. Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda (2002). 61 A. Roberts,The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping, 36 Survival 93 (1994).
62 Seee.g.S. Tharoor,The Changing Face of Peace-keeping and Peace-enforcement, 19 Fordham International Law Journal 408 (1995); R. Higgins,Second-Generation Peacekeeping, 89 ASIL Proc. 275 (1995).
63 M. Berdal,The Security Council, Peacekeeping and Internal Conflcit after the Cold War, 7 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 71 (1996).
distinction between the two can undermine the viability of the peace-keeping operation and endanger its personnel.65
The Secretary-General also stated that neither the Security Council nor the Secretary-General at present had the capacity to deploy, direct, command and control operations for the purpose of enforcement action, except perhaps on a very limited scale.66 He instead emphasized increased reliance on states
and regional organizations as a possible approach in enforcement actions, but also in peacekeeping.
Co-operation between regional organizations and the UN could take a number of forms including operational support and co-deployment. This new approach of a more important role for regional organizations has been followed ever since.67In 1999 Kofi Annan wrote:
In recent years, the Secretariat has seen a wide-ranging consideration of the ways in which regional actors can enhance their participation in United Nations work for peace. In view of certain practical and political limitations, such partnerships cannot be considered a panacea to the problems facing peacekeeping. However, they have, in certain situations and under the right conditions, proved crucial to advancing peace.68