The previous section looked at the development of modern virtue ethics and the differences in development between the theological and secular versions. This section will cover some of the more fundamental differences, mainly by looking at Aquinas and Aristotle. There are a great many similarities between these two thinkers, and these have been explored in depth elsewhere. I do not want to deny the close connection between them, but for my present purposes it is their
differences and not their similarities which are important.
The first major difference is in their understanding of the good life for
humanity. I said above that both Aristotle and Aquinas are eudaimonist; the virtues
are defined in terms of the flourishing, happy, fulfilled life as those traits which lead to and are part of that state. They differ, though, over the specific nature of the fulfilled life. As I have said, Aristotle’s term is eudaimonia. The Thomist equivalent is beatitudo. There are some similarities between them. For example, both Aristotle and Thomas think that the good life consists in contemplation: ‘We have already said that it [happiness] is a contemplative activity’.33 Aquinas, referencing the above section from Aristotle, says that fulfilment is to be found through the
speculative intellect, and hence ‘happiness consists principally in such an operation, viz. in the contemplation of Divine things’.34
Although he draws on eudaimonia for his concept of beatitudo, Aquinas goes beyond Aristotle in two important ways. The first is his clear identification of
beatitudo with God: ‘God alone constitutes man’s happiness’.35 The second is that he has a twofold description of the good. As far as Aristotle is concerned, happiness is something to be achieved (or not) in this life. This means that it is subject to worldly needs such as basic health, food and comfort. It may also be affected by luck, whether it is the luck of being born into a situation which provides for our needs, or bad luck which prevents our lives from ever being eudaimon. Such is the case of Priam, who met with terrible tragedy in old age.36 Aquinas agrees that there may be things which prevent happiness in this life, but says that there is a better, more complete happiness available in the next life. In the next life we will not be subject to the needs we have in this life and will be able to clearly contemplate the divine:
The last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect happiness, such as can be had here,
33 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by J.A.K. Thomson and Hugh Tredennick (London: Penguin, 2004), 1177a 15-20.
34 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Notre Dame:
Christian Classics, 1948), 1a2ae 3:5.
35 Ibid., 1a2ae 2:8.
36 Aristotle, 1100a 5-10.
consists first and principally in contemplation, but secondarily, in an operation of the practical intellect directing human actions and passions.37
This means that unlike Aristotle, Aquinas allows for the possibility of complete fulfilment for everyone. Both Aristotle and Aquinas define virtue in terms of the life well lived; but Aquinas sees this good life as twofold – one life in this world, one beyond – with both parts focused on God.
The next major difference between Aristotle and Aquinas is the role of natural law in their thought. The natural law – our inherent, embedded recognition of the eternal law – is a major part of Aquinas’s ethics. So much so that a great deal of Thomist scholarship identifies him as primarily a natural law theorist, rather than a virtue ethicist. Porter’s work in The Recovery of Virtue has shown this to be an error, but her most important work on natural law is in Nature as Reason. She shows that natural law and virtue are intertwined in Thomas’s thought, such that one cannot be understood without the other. The natural law prescribes acts of virtue; and virtue inclines us to act according to the natural law. This feature of Aquinas’s thought will be explored in more detail in subsequent chapters, especially Chapter 2. For now, it is enough to note that there is no such focus on the natural law in Aristotle’s ethics. He does mention it very briefly in discussing the difference between it and political law; and there are certainly arguments that this passage is important for understanding the rest of his ethics.38 However, it is not as significant for him as it is for Thomas. Just as importantly for my purposes, neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics often avoids Aristotle’s natural teleology, meaning that it tends to shy away from that part of his thought which provides the basis for natural law. Natural law is therefore a much more significant feature of the Thomist tradition.
The categories of virtue are the next difference between Aristotle and Aquinas. Both have the two categories of moral virtue and intellectual virtue, but Aquinas adds a third – theological virtue. Moral virtues are good habits and
37 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1a2ae 3:5.
38 Tony Burns, ‘Aristotle and Natural Law’, History of Political Thought, 19 (1998), 142-166.
dispositions of the appetite or desire; intellectual virtues are good habits and dispositions of reason. The theological virtues are different from either of these and are so called for three reasons: ‘First, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation’.39 Thomas thinks that the theological virtues are beyond our nature and are necessary for the supernatural happiness which is only possible in God.
The final important difference between Aristotle and Aquinas follows on from the previous one; they have a different list of virtues. This is important, because they both think that the virtues partly constitute eudaimonia and beatitudo. A different list of the virtues suggests a different idea of what the good life is, and so a different explanation of the task and goal of ethics. Someone who identifies honour, pride, courage and ambition as central virtues will have an entirely
different understanding of fulfilment from someone who prioritises creativity, social awareness, wit and artistry. The difference between Aristotle and Aquinas is not as great as that. They do share many virtues, but differ on some. This is a concern for Hauerwas in particular. Contrasting Aristotle’s virtue of magnanimity with the theological virtue of charity, he argues that the Greek virtues are essentially virtues of war whereas the Christian virtues are those of love and peace.40
Above is a short description of the key differences between Aristotle and Aquinas’s ethics. Although similar, they do not agree on the nature of the good life, the categories of virtue and the role of the natural law. All of these individual differences are important and all have an impact on the nature of secular and theological virtue ethics. However, there is one further difference between them which is even more significant, because it is a difference in method as well as specific beliefs. Theological ethics is, understandably, ethics done from within a theological framework. This means that it is committed not just to careful and consistent moral thinking but also to a wide range of ontological and
39 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1a2ae 62:1.
40 Hauerwas and Pinches, ‘Virtue Christianly Considered’, pp. 294-304.
epistemological claims. Some examples include: belief in the existence of God;
belief in some form of moral absolutism; acceptance of basic Christian claims about Jesus Christ; belief in an afterlife; belief in a natural norm and telos for humanity;
and belief in the Holy Spirit.
It is not always immediately obvious how these commitments impact on the moral claims made by theology. Demonstrating that they do has been a significant part of the work of theological ethicists – in particular, O’Donovan has shown how central Christian beliefs cannot fail to shape Christian moral thinking, and that an ethics which does not allow this will not be a truly theological ethics.41 Secular ethics tends to be done as much as possible from a blank canvas; it will make few assumptions and avoid large claims not immediately related to the discussion at hand. On the other hand, theological virtue ethics makes claims like those above and operates on the basis that they are true without always arguing for them or making them explicit. This is made possible by the fact that it is ethics done from within a tradition of thought which provides or attempts to provide those
arguments, and so it is not always incumbent upon each individual ethicist to make those claims again.
I will not be arguing for these claims in this thesis. Instead, part of my task will be to show that if they are accepted, they become a significant resource for the ethicist, allowing for new and sometimes stronger responses to criticisms of virtue ethics. Some but not all of them are specifically Christian claims. It seems possible that some of what I have to say could be of use to non-Christian traditions. I will not investigate whether this is the case, since I am simply interested in showing how a theology which does accept these claims may find them useful in defending virtue ethics from criticism.
41 O’Donovan.