3 Comparing Social Security Crises: Design and Method
3.5 Different Outcomes
The conundrum faced in this study is between markedly divergent outcomes produced by similar crises and, moreover, that these crises took place in comparable policy systems. A presentation of the nature of the outcomes and an assessment of their differences is, therefore, obviated.
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The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, cutbacks of social security are not a new policy feature. In the 1980s, several measures were pursued. Most of them did not focus on disability insurance, but instead on social security benefits in general (such as the benefit reductions of 1985). In 1987, the first disability insurance in- tervention took place; it would no longer be possible to include the labor market situation in a disability assessment (see chapter 6). This had so little effect that the government decided to pursue more drastic reforms in the early 1990s. The main reforms in the early 1990s are listed below.
These reforms were drastic, and it is necessary to understand why this was so. First and foremost, these changes had a large impact on beneficiaries and
Table 3.3 Reform in the Netherlands
Title of reform Year Contents
Act on the Reduction 1992 Act provided positive incentives (bonus) to employers
of the Disability for hiring disabled and negative incentives (fines) for
Volume (TAV) producing or releasing impaired employees.
Disability Benefit 1993 a) Introduction of a duration limit to the full benefit:
Claims Reduction after a few years (depending on claimant’s age) the
Act (TBA) benefit would be reduced considerably (reduction again
depending on claimant’s age and employment record). b) The concept of ‘commensurate’employment was adjust- ed to include all generally accepted work instead of only the kind of work that one used to do before the occurrence of an impairment.
c) Regular reassessment of disability was introduced. d) Re-examination of beneficiaries younger than 50. e) Benefit claims had to be actively made, instead of auto- matic evaluation after fulfilling the one-year waiting peri- od (sick benefit year).
Social Security 1995 As a consequence of the conclusions of the parliamen-
Organization Act (OSV) tary inquiry (1992-1993) on the administration and imple-
mentation of social security legislation, a reorganization of the administrative structure was conducted.The social partners were (in their own words:) ‘thrown out’of the in- stitutional structure. From then on, the government would be primarily responsible and it would privatize the admin- istrative bodies in order to introduce competition among them.
future claimants. The duration limit coupled with a reduced benefit level, particularly for younger claimants, meant that their income level would be more than halved in cases of full disability (Aarts and De Jong 1996: 62). Meanwhile, partially disabled persons would only receive a fraction of this halved income compensation. In addition, beneficiaries who had already been disabled for years had to be reassessed, and would thus also be affected by the new rules. The altered and more stringent definition of ‘commensu- rate employment’ meant that the incidence of disability was much less likely. All of the beneficiaries dependent on disability insurance would be affected by these new rules. In total, these plans would save the incumbent govern- ment 4.4 billion6guilders (2 billion euros) on sickness and disability benefits
in the next two years, which was a substantial part (approximately 13%) of the total sickness and disability insurance budget.
Second, the government intervened drastically with regard to the social partners, who had been the initiators of the social insurance arrangements, and who had been responsible for its administration for almost a century. They were stripped of this duty, and legislative changes were introduced that altered their advice from obligatory to optional in social policy matters. It took some time before those administrative reforms were finally enacted (1995), but the discussion started in 1991, in the wake of the conflict over the Disability Benefit Claims Reduction Act (tba, which came into effect in 1993). The reform processes are closely connected – as will be substantiated in chapter 7 – but it all started with the government’s 1991 decisions to in- tervene drastically in the disability insurance system. Strikingly, the discus- sion of the allocation of administrative and supervisory responsibilities had been building up for decades. Before the 1990s, it was practically impossi- ble to pursue a reform of administrative structures. All previous discussions had been to no avail, until the parliamentary inquiry conducted in 1992- 1993.
Belgium
By contrast, Belgium witnessed only minor changes, both in programmatic and systemic terms. The Global Plan of the Dehaene government contained a wide range of small measures. The intention was to cut 14.6 billion Bel- gian francs (24.5 million euros) in total on unemployment insurance in 1994 and the same amount in 1995 (FET931118). Taken together, this is a
small amount compared to the Dutch target of 4.4 billion Dutch guilders (2 billion euros). The planned Dutch cutbacks on sickness and disability insur- ance were almost 50 times larger than the combined 1994 and 1995 Belgian
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Table 3.4 Programmatic and Systemic Reform in the Netherlands
Programmatic Systemic
TAV At first, the fines had much more effect
than the bonuses. In 1994, Dfl 26 million were paid as bonuses as opposed to Dfl
225million received in penalties (Aarts
and De Jong, 1996: 63). Success of penal- ties heavily outweighed success of the bonus system. Success was not long- lived, however. Courts decided that the penalties conflicted with Article 6 of the European Human Rights Treaty and so the TAV was abolished in 1995.
TBA The benefit cuts and more stringent eli-
gibility criteria had a direct effect in the year following implementation of the re- forms.Total number of benefits dropped by almost 3% (first occurrence of no in- crease). Number of annual recoveries per
1000beneficiaries increased by 30%
(Aarts and De Jong, 1996: 40). Benefit cuts were compensated in collective rein- surance arrangements—which cover roughly 85% of the employees.
OSV The Social Insurances Organization Law
did not directly affect the contents of the benefit program—its consequences will thus be discussed as systemic changes.
Partly because of its short existence, and because of its character as provider of di- rect incentives, this reform included no systematic change.
The introduction of TBA was a shock to the system. New eligibility criteria and cuts in the benefit levels and their duration final- ly clarified for everyone that social rights such as income compensation for disabili- ty cannot be taken for granted.The changes were primarily programmatic but its effects on public opinion and politi- cal decision making can also be consid- ered structural.
The Social Security Council was replaced by the National Institute of Social Insur- ances (LISV) and the Committee on Social Insurance Supervision (CTSV).The social partners were represented in the LISV management (which coordinated and fi- nanced social insurance administration) but not predominantly.The creation of the CTSV separated administration from su- pervision, since the CTSV members did not represent the social partners (Aarts and De Jong, 1996: 65). Of the prior adminis- trative bodies, the bipartite ‘industry boards,’ the five largest survived and would compete for clients.The industry boards that conducted administration from a ‘sector-specific’angle now became responsible for a more generic clientele, driven by competitive incentives.
cutbacks on their social insurance system. The Dutch target had to be met by the end of the then-incumbent government’s term (within two and a half years).
The measures of the Global Plan with respect to unemployment insurance comprised a decrease in social security premiums (with 2,480 euros/year per employee) if employers hired an unemployed entrant, or a low-educated employee or used work time reduction. It was stipulated that starters work against 90% of the full wage in the first year. A resolution to increase efforts to combat moonlighting (untaxed employment) was introduced. Plans for public employment creation were announced and the qualifying period for starters to receive unemployment benefits was increased from six to nine months). In addition, the price indexation was trimmed by 1.59% because the price increases of ‘unhealthy’ products such as tobacco, alcohol, and gasoline were no longer included – this caused a slower level of growth among future benefit levels.
Why are we able to characterize these reforms as incremental, compared to the Dutch reforms? Of course, considering only one reform package in Belgium (as opposed to a number of reform packages in the Netherlands), Belgian reform cannot equal the size of the Dutch intervention. However,
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d i f f e r e nt o utc o m e s
Table 3.5 Programmatic and Systemic Reform in Belgium
Programmatic Systemic
Global - Positive incentives for employers
Plan to hire unemployed or low-educa-
1993 ted applicants.
(including - Wage reduction (10%) for start-
measures ers in their first year to make it
until 1996) more attractive for employers to hire them.
- Increased control of moonlight- ing among unemployed social se- curity beneficiaries.
- Public employment creation:
85,000 additional jobs.
- Increase in the qualifying period for unemployment benefit eligi- bility.
- Government trimmed the price indexa- tion—a sacred cow in Belgium.This rocked Belgian industrial relations, and later caused a structural slowdown of wage and benefit increases. It also allowed the government to raise the VAT on products excluded from the index without any negative consequences for state finances (to the contrary). - Government joined the supervision of so- cial security administration. Instead of a matter between social partners only, it be- came a ‘tripartite’concern.This change oc- curred during the ‘global management of so- cial security financing.’Premiums previously separate for each arrangement were collect- ed as a single contribution and centrally dis- bursed among social insurance schemes to pay out the benefits. Distribution formula adjusted annually after evaluation of needs.
each single reform package in the Netherlands saved much more that the to- tal amount of money saved in Belgium (even the unsuccessful tav reform yielded the government 3.5 times as much as the cutbacks on Belgian social insurance in the same year – 1994). The Dutch reform process included nu- merous actions, but they were initiated in the wake of a single crisis narra- tive in 1991.
While the Belgian social partners had to accept the government as a new partner in the supervisory bodies of social security administration, the Dutch social partners were thrown out of the social security administration altogether and weathered a hostile takeover. The social security beneficia- ries were hit more gradually in Belgium with the low levels of sacrifice ap- plied to future increases of benefits. By contrast, the Dutch beneficiaries experienced a total freeze in 1994 and 1995, and also experienced cutbacks on their future benefit level of sometimes 40% or 50% (depending on age and employment record). In sum, even the systemic reforms in Belgium had a much more incremental character.
The divergent outcomes between Belgium and the Netherlands are not ex- plainable simply by examining the varying depth of the problems each of these governments faced in the early 1990s. Neither the objective problems nor the crisis mood were any larger in the Netherlands than in Belgium. In order to identify the factors that can explain the difference in the reform outcomes, we need to probe deep into the black box of the reform process. The qualitative method employed in this book should lead to a deeper un- derstanding of the reform events studied and of the relation between increasing rigidity and drastic change in reform processes. The crisis per- spective helps to capture the interaction of many different variables that play a role with respect to policy change.
The following chapters reflect the findings of this study, with two chapters devoted to each case. The first chapter for each case includes both a descrip- tion and an analysis of the institutional context of the reform process. The second chapter gives an in-depth view of the process of reform and an analy- sis of the factors that played a role in the different reform processes.