Disarmament & Demobilisation Process

The DD programme began on 7th December 2003 and ended on 31 December 2004. By the end of the programme a total 103,019 adults and children had been disarmed. Of this number 11,780 children (9,042 boys and 2, 738 girls) were formally registered (UNICEF, 2006: 9).

After disarming at the cantonment sites, children went to Interim Care Centres or Drop in Centres (DIC). The Interim Care Centre (ICC) is defined as a residence to provide temporary care, services and protection for CAAFAG and other separated children while family tracing and reintegration activities are on-going. The children stayed at the centre for a period of 4-6 weeks and should never exceed 12 weeks (UNICEF, DD Evaluation 2006:61-2). However, the children who had returned to their communities before the official DD came at the DIC. UNICEF (2006:74) defines a DIC as a facility where CAAFAG and those who had participated in the disarmament and demobilisation process could access case management services and psycho-social care and support closer to their homes. Most of these children accessing these facilities will have already reunited with their families prior to their participation in the DDRR and therefore do not need the family reunification services and overnight facilities offered in the ICCs. At this point the process of tracing for their parents started. The social workers supported the children. At the ICC is where the first batch of their demobilisation package, the Transitional Safety Allowance (TSA) was paid out.

From the children interviewed, some of them did not go through the formal demobilisation process. This was acknowledged by the children and CWCs. Several reasons were advanced, which ranged from fear of being blacklisted not to travel to America which they treasured highly to find new opportunities. There are a number of Liberians in America and it is a dream of most Liberians to go to America. They felt if

135 your name appears as CAAFAG, your chances to go to America would be significantly reduced. Some children were very far from demobilisation centres and also lacked materials or proof to present, like bullets or a gun to qualify for demobilisation, since some children were not involved in direct fighting. Many children were actually left out of the formal demobilisation.

UNICEF (2006:14-16) indicates that there was a lack of understanding by the people who the boys and girls supposed to demobilise actually were, although the Liberian DDRR programme strategy does clearly state who were child soldiers according to the Cape Town principles. The report goes to state that most Military observers (MilObs) found the inclusion of boys and girls without weapons confusing and subject to changing orders by superiors. Some MilObs expressed their opinion that it was wrong to include children who did not know how to operate weapons into the DD programme. This was on the premised opinion that children, who did not know how to use weapons and inflict damage, were not a security threat. Determining the age of children was yet another challenge. Some eligible children were turned away due to the dispute of their ages, as birth records were not issued in Liberia.

Some of the former commanders, on realising there was payment to CAAFAG, submitted the names of their relatives, who were not even involved in the fighting to ensure that they accessed the financial resources. The information flow was equally poor especially for children who were in rural areas.

From the interviews with the children, it was clear there are many children, who did not come forward for formal demobilisation. They just returned to the community. Over half of the children who were interviewed acknowledged having friends they knew who never disarmed. One girl said:

“We were six in a group (5 girls, 1boy) three of the girls were very small, including me. Out of three girls, it is only me who disarmed. Others did not have the materials as proof to disarm”.

136 The community members and CWCs also confirmed that many children in the communities never came up for formal demobilisation. One CWC members said:

“I am new in Tappita community; I know at least 10 that never went through the DD. In

Central Tappita and other communities, I know close to 8 who never went through the DD”

One boy said: “I had five friends, four never disarmed”.

The community members interviewed observed that children who did not go through the formal DDRR had more challenges than those who did. This is affirmed by the Liberian TRC (2009: 97) which observes that while it is considered largely successful for those children who rightfully went through the process, numerous gaps still remain. The TRC found that a significant number of CAAFAG who testified before the TRC never went through the DDRR process. Some former CAAFAG who never went through the DDRR process had difficulties reintegrating into civilian life and were particularly vulnerable to exploitation and homelessness.

The community and the children asserted that there was a remarkable difference between those that disarmed and those who did not. Those that did were able to be rehabilitated and were able to acquire a skill. The DDRR process helped them to stay with the community peacefully. It linked them to community members, who in the end acted as a source of support. The CWC members interviewed, observed that the children who never disarmed, hardly came for community meetings. They never liked cooperating with CWCs.

Some community members however observed that even those that went through the DD, required more time to recover. Some had not abandoned their behaviour they had in captivity. There were still a few cases of crime committed by these former CAAFAG in the community. One CWC member said:

137 “I at times say there was no need to train CAAFAG. A group of 13 boys started singing war songs. They ended up singing abusive songs. I followed up some of their parents about their behaviour; they are spoiling our children who were not part of the war.”

Neither the community structures nor the social workers made a deliberate attempt to include the excluded in the programmes. The first criteria to access the programmes especially for the skills training, was a formal demobilisation identity documents (ID), which they did not have. The situation was compounded by the fact that some CWCs thought that when children never demobilised, they were not part of their mandate and did not train them any skills.

One of the criticisms of the DD process is highlighted in DD evaluation (UNICEF 2006:14-15), considering the atrocities committed by some CAAFAG in their communities of origin. The preparation of the communities ought to have been a very important component of the programme. There was however, no functional allocation of funds to mobilise the communities. The communities were therefore not engaged in discussions relating to their role in accepting children or the possibility for initiating reconciliation mechanisms, such as traditional curative or cleansing ceremonies. These ceremonies would have strengthened the reintegration of the CAAFAG, providing mutually beneficial support by the community. The lack of these roles and functions fulfilled in the reintegration process by community members lead to the dysfunctionality of the process.

Functionalists see conflict as a temporary disturbance in the social system. These disturbances are quickly corrected as society evolves (Haralambos and Holborn 1990:9- 10). The disarmament process was an important attempt to re-engage the social institutions which include the formal (government) and informal (community structures) in reconstructing children‟s lives. The government as a defender of children rights ensured the children were back in the rightful positions, where their social development took place. The community which includes the clan, extended relatives, neighbours and

138 other community members started to pass on some of the cultural values to children that are vital for survival and maintenance of society and sustainable reintegration.