Discourse Analysis and Macro/Micro Relations

Within the section entitled overcoming the macro/micro polarity, Silverman (1985, p82) puts forward a research-based strategy which he argues as a useful approach for research bridging the macro-micro divide. Drawing upon Foucault’s focus on discourse in relation to power and knowledge, and by considering Foucault’s case studies, particularly Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality (Foucault 1977, 1978), Silverman suggests a research agenda that integrates the macro and the micro through the analysis of discourse (Silverman 1985, Jupp 1989). Burr (2003) who also considers differences and debates in micro and macro social constructionism argues that these approaches to conceptualisation should not be viewed as mutually exclusive when she states, ‘there is no reason in principle why they should not be brought together in a synthesis of micro and macro approaches’ (Burr 2003, p20).

Within the first section of Silverman’s account of macro and micro relation, Silverman draws upon research studies that have presented largely macro or largely micro levels of analysis. In doing so, he draws attention to the limitations of each approach, suggesting that:

‘A narrow concern with social structures precludes a proper understanding of the processes of interpretation through which they are reproduced and, sometimes, changed. Conversely, interactional sociology has constantly to be aware of the real structures which constrain and enable social action. There is an urgent need to synthesise both approaches’ (Silverman 1985, p77).

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Both Silverman (1985) and Jupp (1989) argue that it is possible to bridge the gap between macro and micro perspectives by focusing upon Foucault’s works on networks of power relations. The argument for Silverman is based upon the question where does power reside; Silverman suggests that for Foucault, power (that is inherent in discourse) does not stem from one source, for example from purely an institutional level (macro) or from a purely individual level (micro), but rather, power is exercised within discourse and dispersed between institutions and relations (Silverman 1985, Jupp 1989).

Following this line of reasoning, the direction of the analysis of this study has, in part, been inspired by Silverman’s claims outlined above. In the sense that, by bringing together and exploring the scientific discourses of risk assessment practices as an administrative technique for measuring, regulating and governing offending behaviour within the context of criminal justice (macro), juxtaposed with exploring the first- person accounts of young offenders’ experiences of their offending and the meanings that young offenders attach to their behaviour within the context of their everyday lives (micro), this study aims to provide an analytical account bringing together macro/micro discourses of risk. However, the focus of this study is not solely invested in the interests of power, this is because poststructuralists approaches to discourse analysis are less interested in who has knowledge/power and more interested in exploring how and under what conditions particular discourses have come to shape reality and who/what this constrains. This study is concerned with the way in which risk is constructed within expert discourse, the practices that risk discourses produce and sustain, and how risk discourses position young offenders. In contrast to a dominant discourse of risk within criminal justice, this study is also concerned with exploring how young offenders understand risk and what meanings they attach to offending to establish differences or similarities between different approaches to framing risk. Therefore, this study aims to provide a poststructuralist influenced discourse analysis of risk inspired by Silverman’s (1985, p88) analytical observations, which draw together several points to put forward an analytical discourse method. These are now discussed in relation to the analytical direction of this study:

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1) Not institutions but techniques: for Foucault, knowledge and truth (that are produced out of power struggles between different disciplines and institutions) produced by the social sciences are utilised to authorise and legitimise workings of power through administrative techniques to measure, regulate, and control people and their behaviour – namely bio-power (Danaher et al 2000). Here Silverman suggests that the focus of analysis should not concern itself with central locations of power, but rather (using the prison as an example) analysis should look towards the analysis of particular techniques that exemplify the working of power. As has been discussed previously, within criminal justice, risk assessment has become a popular and commonly used practice for the purposes of assessing and determining an offender’s level of risk. This is one example of the way in which criminal justice employs administrative techniques for the purposes of measuring, regulating and governing offenders and their behaviour; it was for these reasons that this technology was selected to explore risk discourses.

2) Not intentions but practices: for Silverman (1985), Foucault does not intend to determine the motives of individuals in relation to power interests. Instead, we should begin to understand the nature of certain practices and their effects. In this sense, the analysis is not to look to the causes of crime, nor is it aimed at speculating why risk assessment practices aim to govern and regulate offenders and offending behaviour but rather to determine how risk assessment practices are able to govern and regulate offenders and offending behaviour. The aim here is to understand how risk assessment practices have become a significant method of assessing offending behaviour, and how, as a method of assessing offending, they are able to produce an effect of governing and regulating offenders and their behaviour.

3) Not classes but webs of power: for Foucault, power is not bound with a privilege of one class over another, instead power is diffused through discourse. This means that there is no one single discourse, but rather a number of different discourses (Danaher et al 2000). Silverman suggests that it is the way in which mechanisms of power function that must be investigated. This would suggest that expert discourse provides only one

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account of risk and risk-taking and that it is this account that is accepted as the dominant explanation. It would also suggest that there are other discourses of risk to be considered. For example, where there are the effects of one discourse (for example expert discourses of risk assessment) there are also competing discourses (for example a young person’s account of their offending).

4) Not individuals but constructed subjects: the argument here is that identity does not originate from the person, but rather discourses work to construct and produce our identity (Burr 1995). This means that an individual’s identity is created by the discourses in which they are implicated (Jones 2003), and thus identity is tied to institutional structures and social practices (Burr 1995). This suggests that a young person’s identity is constructed by the discourses that they are implicated in, as would be the case for those practitioners who practice within criminal justice.

5) Not ideologies but knowledge: for Silverman (1985), although Foucault recognises that ideologies can be identified in institutions he rejects attempts that have been made to relate ideology with power. Foucault sought to show how the development of knowledge were intertwined with the mechanisms of power (Danaher et al 2000). Foucault emphasised the relationship between power and knowledge, suggesting that what counts as knowledge is constituted within powerful discourses and powerful discourses are able to establish what counts as knowledge. Modern forms of knowledge are for Foucault deemed necessary to control and police bodies in modern environments (Jones 2003), and that the apparatus of institutions are by design able to assert knowledge claims. Foucault does not suggest that power and knowledge are synonymous, but rather, that knowledge or what counts as knowledge is not neutrally determined (Smith 2006). This draws attention to the body of knowledge that authorises risk assessment practices, and how an expert discourse of risk has come to be accepted as a dominant explanation.

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