The Discursive Construction of Existential Threats # #54 !

So far I described the coded data of each document individually and compared the documents in order to find out common patterns. These patterns serve as indicators of discourses among the Commission officials. In the following chapter I evaluate the meaning of the common patterns through the lens of the securitization theory and assess the influence of crisis events on the implementation of the list of PCI in the NSI East Gas corridor. My underlying assumption suggests that the Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes in 2006 and 2009 served as an impetus of a securitization process among the Commission’s officials and influenced the implementation of the list of PCI. In this chapter I want to evaluate the causal link between these initial crisis events and the Commission’s perception of an existential threat.

The patterns regarding “threats” constitute generally of negative impacts respective external energy security. In this context “crisis” is the key pattern all the others refer to. It is related to the other dimensions and reveals why certain events have a negative impact and are regarded as existentially threatening.

The events I assume being existentially threatening are the two gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009. The patterns (see Table A.7) portray a general picture of crises and supply disruptions and leave space for interpretation. Nevertheless, the two disputes match the general context of crises, supply disruptions and import dependence, because they resulted in major disruptions in Eastern European states, being mostly dependent on Russian natural gas. BG, SE, LV, EE, FI, LT and SK, receive their natural gas exclusively from Russia178. Especially in the case of Bulgaria and Slovakia, being cut off from Russian gas in 2009 for two weeks in the winter, the consequences can be interpreted as existentially threatening, because natural gas is used mainly for electricity generation and heating. Consequently, the well-being and humanitarian situation of the citizens was greatly diminished. The pattern concerning “specific threats” (see Table A.7) indicates that the Commission interprets especially the Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes as an existential threat. The second dispute in January 2009 is emphasized due to the prolonged disruption and greater impact.

Another pattern fitting the context of the gas disputes of 2006 and 2009 is “political instability”. According to the former prime minister Medvedev, Russia resembles a weak democracy with an ineffective economy, being stuck in a semi-soviet sphere, with negative demographic trends and an unstable Caucasus179_{. In addition, the major natural gas company,} Gazprom, is state owned, making it possible to be used for political purposes180. The problematic aspect of this issue has been shown through President Putin’s personal decision to cut Russian gas to Ukraine, in order to punish Ukraine for threatening to stop transit in 2009181. It is considered that the decision was irrational and commercially imprudent at a strained phase between Russia and Ukraine182. Consequently, the company’s actions are less predictable and the risk that Russia uses the company as a “gas weapon” remains.

Another dimension of the existential threat is reflected through the patterns concerning the negative economic influence through “market fragmentation” and “economy”. The former does not appear necessarily as existentially threatening. But when examining the consequences of gas crises and disruptions, the connection between fragmented markets and existential threats becomes clear. The disputes touch on the economic competitiveness of the effected countries because certain sectors (e.g. service, industrial, health sector) cannot work, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 178_{!COM!(2013b,!P.!16)!} 179_{!Harding!(2009,!September)!} 180_{!Pirani!et.!al.!(2009,!P.!31)!} 181_{!Pirani!et.!al.!(2009,!P.!60)!} 182_!Ibid.!

or function only restricted without electricity. This was especially shown in the case of Bulgaria, where important industrial plants had to be shut down and Slovakia had to declare the state of emergency183184. In cases of gas crises or disruptions, a well-interconnected energy market helps to alleviate the negative consequences. In case of supply disruptions, a country can use other routes in order to receive the needed amount of gas. Subsequently, a fragmented market, where this procedure is not feasible, constitutes of an existential threat. The second economic condition is related to competitiveness. As illustrated through the case of Bulgaria, it is likely that EU member states, being dependent on a single supplier, cannot maintain their industry or other crucial sectors for maintaining or increasing their GDP. If disruptions are prolonged as in 2009, it means postponing delivery dates or paying workers who are not producing goods. The extra costs posed on producers discriminate against them in such a way that they lose their economic competitiveness. Consequently, the economic competitiveness of a country depends strongly on the supply of natural gas.

The pattern concerning “specific threats” (see Table A.7) proofs that the Commission interprets especially the Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes as an existential threat. The second dispute in January 2009 is highlighted due to the prolonged disruption and, consequently, greater impact. In COM1 and COM3 the unique role of Russia as the main natural gas supplier is stressed as well as the gas crisis in January 2009. Combining these two interpretations, one understands that the gas crisis in the beginning of 2009 is not seen as an individual event and that the Commission assumes that such situations are possible to occur in the future. Hence, the Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes were interpreted as existential threats, with the possibility of occurring again.

The existential threat constituted generally of crises and supply disruptions and the Russian- Ukrainian gas disputes in 2006 and 2009 match this portrayal. High import dependence and no or minimal diversification are responsible for the severe consequences these crises had. In the next chapter I present the discourses, examining who is affected by the presented threat.