First atttempt at Christian Democracy: the Centre Agreement
Poland’s transition to democracy was shaped by the settlement hammered out between Solidarity and the Communist Party in their roundtable negotiations of February-March 1989. After a landslide victory in the August 1989 elections the Solidarity liberal leadership pushed for liberals’ primacy in the first postcommunist coalition government under Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki.
The first Polish free parliamentary elections in 1991 (the 1989 elections had opened only one-third of the seats in the more important lower house of parliament, the Sejm, to democratic contestation, reserving the rest for the Communist Party and its allies) were fought in the context of Solidarity’s dissolution, caused by the “war at the top” waged by Lech Wałęsa and his associates against the liberal faction of Solidarity leading to the creation of the Tadeusz Mazowiecki governmental coalition. Marginalised from the first government, and preparing the 1991 Presidential election campaign staging Mazowiecki against Wałęsa, this group went about dismantling Solidarity as a political formation and create a European-style party system where parties would be based on clear ideological profiles..
The post-Solidarity political elite had a strong desire to erase the Communist period and take over political developments at the point where they were thrown off course in 1939. This is visible in the extensive quoting in party documents of pre-II World War politicians and party ideologies. Polish historical political identitites were therefore very important in the process of post-1989 party identity building. Party elites started by digging their historical roots. Christian democracy has a weak historical tradition in Poland, the
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interwar Christian democratic party (Christian Democratic-Labour Party) commanded a small support and was irrevelant in government.
Christian democracy’s appeal for post-1989 political elites was nevertheless obvious: in Poland the Catholic political identity was extremely strong, rooted not only in a widespread Catholic belief in Poland, but also of its politicisation by Solidarity as an opposition movement during the 1980s. The appeal of Catholicism and the family as political and economic identities, both central institutions in Poland gave Christian democracy a possibly strong support.142 Religious affiliation remained the most important determinant of voting behaviour and a CBOS poll in the late eighties revealed that 44 percent of the Poles accepted Christian democracy as a desirable centre-right ideology while only 24 percent of the respondents rejected it.
Faced with the task to define its political identity, Wałęsa’s sponsored party under the leadership of the identical twins Kaszynski, the Centre Agreement (PC), adopted Christian democracy, charaterising it as the profile that best suited a centre party. The party elites started establishing contacts with the German Christian democrats in order to attempt to integrate CD international movements. Equally strong within the PC was a nationalist rhetoric drawing on the traditions of Polish nationalist ideology (see next section). The PC’s programmatic documents frequently referred to Roman Dmowski’s assimilation between Catholicism and Polishness, on whose ideas it based a fierce anti-communism and the proclaimed moral superiority of the Polish nation.143
The nationalist rethoric of a part of the population clashed with the aspiration to
“build in Poland a strong centre as a factor of equality and political innovation”144 under the
142 Kitschelt, H. (1999), “Post-Communist Party Systems”, op. cit.
144 Deklaracja Porozumienia Centrum, (Declaration Centre Agreement), Warsaw: May 1990.
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aegis of Christian democracy. The PC’s concept of political community was based on the Catholic faith: “the PC counts on the support of the part of the society that follows the Christian message and is ready to build the Republic accordingly”.145 Its programme of social modernisation followed Catholic precepts. “The Polish national interest requires a major work of national economic, organisational, and social modernisation. This modernisation should respect the moral values defended by Christianity constituting our identity. Without this change of system we will never bridge the civilisational gap between Europe and us. (…) The bases of every change in Poland must be the restoration of our moral system. (…) The role of the Catholic Church is of immense importance to the build up of our moral system, bitterly attacked by the left-wing post-communist environment.”146
When the PC became the leading party in the Olszewski government in 1991, the party nationalist faction supported the lustration process, the process of excluding communist collaborators from public life, initiated by Justice Minister Antoni Macierewicz. Lustration can be interpreted as part of a nationalist agenda in the context of the Polish democratic transition from communism. Much more was at stake than the question of past collaboration. Indeed, the conflict seemed to centre on the nature of the Polish state. The project of the nationalist right-wing was to create a national political community of which the ex-communists were excluded. The nation’s natural historic progression should resume from where it had been forced off course in 1939. Moved by moral revulsion at the communist system and a sense of justice denied, Olszewski and his allies argued that communism was an alien period that should be excised from Polish history, its perpetrators punished and its victims rewarded.
Judging from the rhetoric, lustration was a nation-building task and a patriotic duty. The PC was also a supporter of economic de-communisation and denounced the “nomenklatura”
privatisation. Lustration was strongly opposed by liberal politicians prompted both by
145 POC, Deklaracja Programowa, (POC Programmatic Declaration), Warsaw: 1991.
146 Deklaracja Porozumienia Centrum, (Declaration of the Centre Agreement), Warsaw: May 1990.
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pragmatism and a civic vision that the political community should include the willing and not the deserving, argued that communism had left an indelible mark on Polish society.
The fundament of the party’s economic policies, the protection of families from distortions of market economy, shows a straightforward adoption of Christian democratic economic principles. Emulating the Catholic Church’s social doctrine the PC declared that
“our social policy is concentrated on the family as the central social unit.”147 The PC’s social policy featured a pro-family approach, with the party stating that its main objective was that of preventing the impoverishment of families in need.The important issue of support for family farming was also present in the party’s stances on agricultural reform.
The PC positioned itself on the economic left-right scale as a middle-of-the-road position, proposing a friendly attitude to market liberalism and opting for a gradual approach to reforms. The party stated modernisation and external competitiveness as twin goals: “The current economic and social structure condemns Poland to backwardness and being unable to compete in Europe and the world. If we do not compete in Europe, we will have our sovereignty threatened, first economically, and then politically.” 148 The PC programs excluded tax increases as a solution to the budget deficit and proposed favourable tax regimes for new enterprises to foster the competitiveness of Polish products in foreign markets. A rational fiscal and anti-inflationist policy implied a strong pledge for budgetary discipline. The programme supported efforts for a faster privatisation.149
The contradictions between nationalist traditions and the pledge for a centrist and Christian democratic ideological profile, that were latter to become a feature of the Polish right, played high in the PC’s desintegration. Prime Minister Jan Olszewski personified the
147 Program Wyborczy Porozumienie Centrum-Zjednoczenie Polskie, (Electoral Program Polish Agreement – United
Poland), Warsaw: 1993.
148 idem.
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incompatibility between an identification with nationalism and the party’s pledge for a Christian democratic identity and a centrist strategy.150 His later political career would show the predominance of nationalism and its incompatibility with European integration. In the complicated coalition politics after 1991 elections the PC refused to coalesce with the liberal UD, adding to the instability of the coalition governments. The PC dissolved in the wake of the conflict provoked by the lustration law151 proposed by the faction linked with Jan Olszewski, the PC’s vice-president noted that the party’s failure was due not only to personal infighting but was also a consequence of the impossibility of pursuing its identity consistently.
The liberal renaissance: the Union of Democracy
Like Christian democracy, liberalism had no strong tradition in Poland before the II World War. Paradoxically the communist period was a favourable environment for liberal thought to florish, as its suppression of civic and economic freedoms gave liberals a clear mission. The consitution of the Solidarity movement in 1979 was arguably possible only due to the association of intellectuals with the workers’ protest movement. In the eighties Solidarity’s revolution was supported by the idea of a parallel civil society independent of the communism.
In the context of Solidarity’s dissolution the liberal faction that had negotiated the Round Table compromise and the constitution of a coalition government created the Democratic Union (UD) in 1991. The UD was a party clearly based on political liberalism, and in the charged political debate on the relations between the Catholic Church and the Polish state, it took secular and liberal attitudes. Its leaders maintained that although “the state - its
149 Deklaracja Porozumienia Centrum, (Declaration of PC), Warsaw: May 1990.
150 Walicki, A. (1994), Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism, Notre Dame; University of Notre Dame, p. 23.
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system of law – is part of a defined system of values, which in our culture is rooted in Christianity and human rights”,152 it cannot be “taken over by any specific ideological group”.153 The party leadership opposed the nationalist and Catholic attempts to take over the state and define the political community through Catholicism. It extended its liberalism to the promotion of pluralism in the party and the support for a pluralist civil society. “We value the common action of all social groups, all active citizens who promote tolerance, avoid violence and adhere to an ethos rooted in the Christian tradition. We hope that these values are shown clearly in our positions and actions.”154 The party’s was to host “people from different worldviews and religions”.155
The party’s concern for strengthening the state draws a parallel with the early XIX century liberals’ efforts to strengthen the rational elements of the state against the power of traditional institutions. “The essential reference of the UD is a democratic state serving civil society. This fundamental idea synthesises the political thought of the UD and determines our political identity. The state, understood as a common haven for the citizens, should provide security and a homely feeling. However, we reject the understanding of the state as an absolute in the face of which everything else must be given up.” This limited state “must protect the freedom of the citizens (…) without discriminating on grounds of gender, age, nationality or way of life”.156
151 Lustration was the process of indentifying and barring from political life persons who had collaborated with the
communist security services.
152 Stabilizacja I Rozwój, Uchwala Programowa II Kongresu Krajowego Unii Demokratycznej, Broszura Wyborcza
Unii Demokratycznej, (Stabilisation and Development, Programmatic Decision of the II National Congress of Democratic Union), Warsaw: 1993.
153 Uchwala Programowa Unia Demokratyczna, (Programatic Resolution of the Union of Democracy), Warsaw: May
1991.
154 Deklaracja Zalozycielka ROAD, Biuletyn Informacyjny ROAD, (Founding Declaration ROAD, Stabilisation and
Development), Warsaw: June 1990.
155 idem
156 Stabilizacja I Rozwój, Uchwala Programowa II Kongresu Krajowego Unii Demokratycznej, Broszura Wyborcza
Unii Demokratycznej, (Stabilisation and Development, Programmatic Decision of the II National Congress of Democratic Union), Warsaw: 1993.
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The UD’s social and political liberalism was a novelty in Polish political history, since no liberal parties had existed either before or after the World War II, and no political group in exile had proclaimed liberalism as its ideology. The modern roots of Polish liberalism are found in the intellectual dissident groups that gave birth to Solidarity. For this reason, although Polish liberalism emphasises individual rights, the Solidarity experience stressed the need for organising society against the state. The free association of individuals, i.e., civil society, became the key political concept of the liberal faction of Solidarity. The “us against them”, “us” being a civil society against “them” the communists, demanded a collective identity. An individualist ideology did not provide a sufficiently strong base to fight the communists. Solidarity between individuals, the key experience of dissidents under communism, strengthened the associative aspects of liberal ideology. Belief in the value of individuals was complemented by the collectivist spirit that dissident groups within Solidarity had to forge to fight communism. The idea of civil society was put in practice not only by creating a pluralist party that would reflect the heterogeneity of society, but also by supporting civil society organisations. In early 1990s post-communist Europe liberal parties’ emulated XIX century liberals fight for the freedom of individuals against all oppressive institutions.
The UD defined itself as a rational and anti-demagogic party. “We serve the voters that value balance and measure, the voters that understand that in public life reason should prevail over emotion.”157 This stance emerged in an environment they perceived as highly polarised by National Catholicism. Practicing Catholics, such as former Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki justified his choice for creating a liberal party (at the time the Democratic Union). “Some people accused me of not creating a Christian democratic party, but I believed in the foundation of a pluralist group reflecting the history of the opposition movement, a group with different beliefs and world views.158
157 Idem.
158 Author’s interview with Tadeusz Mazowiecki, first pos-communist Prime Minister and Solidarity leader, July 2001.
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The UD’s clear political ideology contrasts with its contradictory economic propositions. The UD was divided between a liberal and a socialist faction, personified respectively by Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, the author of the shock therapy to the marketization of Polish economy and Labour and Social Policy Minister Jacek Kuron.
Contradictions between these two wings made it difficult for the party to formulate coherent economic policies and caused confusion among the electorate. In 1991 the UD, the party that in the previous year had imposed several measures implying severe and painful expenditure cuts to curb the budget deficit and inflation,, argued for spending measures of higher social protection, as well as micro-economic policies to alleviate the effects of shock therapy.159 In 1993 the party was still committed to both social cohesion and liberal economic policies, arguing that the two principles “kept together guarantee economic growth.”160 The UD’s leftist belief in the role of the state to provide equal life chances was openly displayed. “Thorough development of social security is a fundamental part of our programme. Health Services should be enlarged and remain state-owned.”161 In contrast, the party of 1991 Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki the Confederation of Liberal Democrats (KLD) had an ethos based on economic liberalism.
Nationalism: the Christian National Union and the Coalition for Polish Independence
Nationalism is the most elaborate home-grown Polish political ideology. The loss of Polish statehood in the XVIII century made the national question the most proeminent political issue thoughtout. At a loss to exercise power, the intelectual Polish classes argued
159 Uchwała Programowa Unia Demokratyczna, (Programmatic Decision of Democratic Union) Warsaw: May 1991.
160 Stabilizacja I Rozwój, Uchwala Programowa II Kongresu Krajowego Unii Demokratycznej, Broszura Wyborcza
Unii Demokratycznej, (Stabilisation and Development, Programmatic Decision of the II National Congress of Democratic Union), Warsaw: 1993.
161 Idem.
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over the terms and strategies of attaining independence. The main conflict in the late XIX and early XX centuries concerned the definition of the state’s borders, whether along ethnic or territorial lines. The advocates of an ethnically homogenous Polish state, the most proeminent of which was Roman Dmowski, conceptualised a symbiosis between the Polish national identity and Catholicism, which effectively submitted Catholic cosmopolitanism to nationalism.
In its 1902 major oeuvre Myśli Nowoczesnego Polaka (Thoughts of a Modern Pole) Dmowski favored what he called a "national state," a state in which the citizens would speak Polish and profess the Roman Catholic faith. The suppression of Catholic cosmopolitanism is most visible in Dmowski’s conception of international relations as a fight for survival and his vision of the state’s conduct from the point of view of cosmopolitan justice as a betrayal.162 Dmowski’s ideology is thus characterised by an acute sense of the importance of the state as the only guarantor of sovereingty, making no concessions to Catholic morality in the conduct of foreign policy.
The rival conception to Dmowski’s was that of General Pilsudski, who conceived (and conquered) a multi-ethnic Poland at the expenses of the Soviet Union. During the Russian Civil War Pilsudki's army made considerable gains and the Soviet-Polish Treaty of Riga (1921) left Poland in control of substantial areas of Lithuania, Belorussia and the Ukraine. Piłsudski believed in a wide definition of Polish citizenship in which peoples of different languages, cultures and faiths were to be united by a common loyalty to the reborn Polish state.
While the geography of Poland in 1921 reflected Pilsudski rather than Dmowski’s ideas, the redrawing of borders settled in Yalta, as well as Nazi extermination of Polish Jews resulted in the involuntary victory of Dmowski’s ethnically homogeneous Polish state. The self definition of Poles as Catholic thus became the most powerful ideological legacy after 1989.
162 Walicki, A., (2000), “The Troubling Legacy of Roman Dmowski”, East European Politics and Societies, 14(1):
12-46.
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From the multitude of parties that emerged from the dissolution of Solidarity (29 of them entered parliament in the 1991 elections) many espoused nationalist ideals. Most of these formations proved ephemeral, thus we focus here on those participating in the different 1991-1993 governmental coalitions. Two major nationalist parties competed in the right-wing camp, representing the different nationalist legacies from interwar Poland: the first the socialist nationalism of Josef Piłsudski – the Confederation for the Republic (KPN) - the other the Catholic nationalism of Roman Dmowski – the ZChN. In the 1993 elections, another party of nationalist character, the Coalition for the Republic (KdR), emerged by secession from the PC.
Pilsudski ressurected: the Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN)
The Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN) was the only party independent of communist rule before 1989. Leszek Moczulski, whose radical communism and anti-Soviet rhetoric made him condemn the compromises that the Solidarity leadership had made with the communist regime, established the party in 1979. The KPN uncompromising attitude mimicked Piłsudski’s call for the Polish elite to actively pursue independence. For the KPN, the nation’s salvation is the affair of a few chosen individuals, with no need for religious legitimisation. The KPN represented the most consistent of the radical independentist groups.
Although the great majority of political groupings – led by Solidarity – recognised full independence as a goal, the KPN emphasised independence above all else. “Independence is the pre-condition for solving all major problems: only in an independent state can democracy be implemented and problems solved."163 The democratic transition was seen exclusively in terms of the chance to attain independence. “We are the generation of change
163 Deklaracja Ideowa, Statut, Program Konfederacja Polskie Niepodległej, (Ideological Declaration, Program of the
Confederation of Polish Independence), Warsaw: 1989.
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in the long march of generations. The martyrdom of Poland in Yalta and under the Soviet Union is the basis for future action.” 1989 is the historic moment “that cannot be wasted”.164
The 1993 electoral programme of the KPN spelled out vague and populist economic proposals. The KPN demanded the end of privatisation, asked for higher levels of subsidies for agriculture, pensions and social security benefits and the creation of a statutory
The 1993 electoral programme of the KPN spelled out vague and populist economic proposals. The KPN demanded the end of privatisation, asked for higher levels of subsidies for agriculture, pensions and social security benefits and the creation of a statutory