DISTRIBUTION

The extent to which the legislature of any state can shape governance and public policy as well as initiate reforms and push them to successful end depends on the constitutional provisions. The constitution as the ground norm sets parameter of

behaviour in any polity and demarcates the sphere of powers and or influences of each arm of government. A presidential constitution like that of Nigeria compartmentalizes governmental powers and institutions into three distinct arms with the executive, the legislature and the judiciary draw their powers from the constitution (See Sections 4–6 of 1999 Constitution, as amended). Indeed, the Section 4(1) of 1999 Constitution vests the legislative powers of the Federation in a National Assembly, which comprises of a Senate and a House of Representatives.

The constitution thus provides for a bicameral legislature with the composition of the Senate based on equal representation of three Senators from each State and one from the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja and the House of Representatives composed of three hundred and sixty members representing constituencies of nearly equal population (See Sections 48 and 49). Specifically, Subsection 2 of Section 4 of the 1999 Constitution invests National Assembly with “power to make laws for the peace, order and good governance of the federation …’ (FRN 1999).

The Constitution also gives National Assembly powers and control over public funds and other matters such as: the establishment of revenue fund, authorization of expenditure from consolidated revenue fund, authorization of expenditure in default appropriations, contingencies fund, remuneration etc. of the President and certain other officers, appointment of Auditor-General among others. Furthermore the constitution empowers the legislature to prescribe how money could be withdrawn from the federation account. Thus, the legislature is constitutionally empowered to control government purse and this allows it to shape government policies and programmes (Saffell 1989; Verney 1969).

This is achieved through legislative power to debate, deliberate, mould and/or amends the annual budgetary appropriation proposal by the executive. Also, the power to impose tax or duty is vested in the National Assembly, according to Section 163 of the 1999 constitution. Due to many challenges in the country such as: long history of military rule, lack of institutional accountability, corruption, mismanagement of national resources and dysfunctional public policy, the role of legislature in budgetary appropriation proposal is of essence in the Nigerian democratic system. Moreover, the oversight of the executive by the legislature is provided for in Section 88 of the Constitution. The Constitution provides that:

each House of the National Assembly shall have power by resolution published in its jour-nal or in the Official Gazette of the government of the Federation to direct or cause to be directed an investigation into (a) any matter or thing with respect to which it has power to make laws; and (b) the conduct of affairs of any person, authority, ministry or government department charged, or intended to be charged, with the duty of or responsibility for (i) executing or Administering laws enacted by the National Assembly, and (ii) disbursing or administering moneys appropriated or to be appropriated by the National Assembly”

(Section 88, Sub-sections 1(a)-(b) and 2(a)-(b)). Sub-section 2(a)-(b) of the same Section 88 provides that “the powers conferred on the National Assembly under the provisions of the section are exercisable only for the purpose of enabling it to (a) make laws with respect to any matter within its legislative competence and correct any defects in existing laws; and (b) expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the execution or administration of laws within its legislative competence and in the disbursement or administration of funds appropriated by it(FRN 1999).

Furthermore, Section 89 of the Constitution endows legislature with the power of investigation. According to Section 88, the legislature is authorised to procure evi-dence, invite and examine persons as witnesses to give evidence but such evidence must be given on oath. In addition, it is constitutionally empowered to summon persons to procure additional documentary or oral evidence and (where necessary) issue warrant to compel attendance by any person so required, and punish those who fail to honour such summon. From the foregoing constitutional provisions, it could be seen that the legislature is saddled with the responsibilities of ensuring good governance particularly prudency, fiscal discipline, efficient service delivery and rule of law in the country. Moreover, legislature is empowered to intervene in the judicial administration as shown in Section 233 and Sub-section 21 of the 1999 Constitution as amended. The legislature could override executive veto on any bill by using its two-thirds majority power to pass the bill into law. Therefore, such bills passed in this manner do no longer require presidential assent to become law (Fashagba 2013).

In the main, the legislative oversight functions of the legislature can be graphi-cally presented under the following thematic headings.

The Power to Make Approval To ensure good governance and public trust in the democratic process the legislature is empowered to perform certain oversight of the executive through approval powers of the former over some policies of the latter. For instance, it is mandatory for the President to send the list of nominees for top gov-ernment positions to the legislature for scrutiny and approval/rejection before such appointment could be made. For the first time under the fourth republic, the exercise of this power has been challenged by the Buhari-led administration, following the senate rejection of the executive nominee for the chairmanship of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) by the Senate. The president has disregarded the constitution by retaining a rejected nominee as the head of the EFCC.  Also, certain governmental policy proposals must be sent to the legislature which will properly examine and debate them before they are passed into law or otherwise.

These may include: proposal to raise funds through loan, ratification of treaties and/

or bilateral agreements with other countries, the need to carry out or embark on some policies, especially the ones that may not have been provided for in the consti-tutions, approval to embark on the establishment of developmental projects and pro-grammes, etc. That is, as a watchdog to the other arms of the government (Executive and judiciary), the legislature must be alert to its responsibilities and be ready at all times to treat all issues fairly and without sentiment and must be shielded from executive preponderance through financial strangulation and intimidation to force the legislature to support its policy proposals at all times.

The Power to Conduct Investigations The essence of the legislature conducting investigations on those matters appropriated to it by law is to ensure or make its legislation apparently effective for good governance. The national assembly has from time to time used this power to investigate the departments, ministries and agencies of government. In recent time, the investigation of subsidy disbursement in

2012, the utilisation of the subsidy re-investment funds and SURE-P fund in 2018 and others are clear examples of the power of the central assembly to investigate the executive organ. Aside the constitutional provisions, is an established democratic practice for the legislature to conduct investigations for the good governance of the country, but the question is, how effective and transparent is the legislative houses in carrying out these investigations?

Impeachment as an Instrument to Guarantee Good Governance One of the most important constitutional responsibilities assigned to the legislature in the legislative processes, which gives room for good governance and constitutes a subtle check on executive excesses and discretion is perhaps the impeachment power. The impeachment of the Chief Executives and their deputies is one of the highest sanctions given to these elected officers, which must not be based on sentiments, but on evidence of gross misconduct or bad governance. Away from the impeachment of the Chief Executives and their deputies, impeachment could also be carried on the principal officers of the legislature, which include the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President and the Deputy President of the Senate. While there has not been any case of executive President being impeached in Nigeria, there are cases of impeached Governors, Deputy Governors, Senate Presidents, and Speakers of State House of Assemblies (Nkwede, Ibeogu and Nwankwo 2014). Worthy of note is that most of these impeachments are done not to improve governance but are mostly to settle cheap political scores and most of them never complied with constitutional provisions.

Supervision and Monitoring of Projects by the Legislature Another oversight function of the legislature to ensure good governance is through supervision and monitoring of projects and programmes embarked upon by the executive arm of government. Constitutionally, the executive is saddled with the responsibilities of executing developmental projects through the use of funds appropriated by the legislature. On the other hand, the executive is monitored and kept under constant surveillance by the legislature. The legislature is charged to check, raise questions and where necessary directs the executive through the political heads (ministers) of various ministries to appear before the appropriate committees of the parliament or on the floor of the house to defend allegations levelled against their ministries, especially as relates to performance or compliance with the laws. Thus, Akintola (1999, p. 52) argues that supervision of the executive by the legislature, sometime assumes the nature of legislative control when exercised through questions addressed to ministers or through the rejection of executive proposal or bill forwarded to the Houses of parliament. Therefore, this makes the executive arm, under democratic settings to live up to its responsibility and ensure good governance.

Effective Representation as a Responsibility of the Legislature As the represen-tatives of the people, it is expected of the parliamentarians to provide effective repre-sentation to the electorates by taking decisions or making laws that are not detrimental to the survival of the electorates. This must have informed the emergency seating

convened by the 7th House of Representatives on Sunday 8th January, 2012 to move against the deregulation of the downstream sector of the Petroleum Industry and the increase of pump price of Premium Motor Spirit (P.M.S) by Dr. Goodluck Jonathan’s led government from sixty-five Naira (N65.00) to one hundred and forty-one naira (N141.00). The intervention of the lower chamber and the mass protests of various coalitions of civil society organizations (CSOs) forced the government to reduce the price to ninety-seven naira (N97.00). Also, the legislators as elected representatives of the people must constantly be closer to the people they represent with a view to educating them adequately about the activities of government.

The Power to Raise and Control the Spending of Public Fund (Budget) In a bid to ensure that government (the executive) performs her statutory responsibility of catering for the welfare of the people, the law empowered the legislature to ensure effective management of public fund. The legislature also has great influence (monitoring and supervision) over the borrowing powers of the state. All these are to ensure prudent management of public fund and promotion of good governance.

To be sure, Section 81(1) of the 1999 Constitution provides that “the President shall cause to be prepared and laid before each House of the National Assembly at any time in each financial year estimates of the revenues and expenditure of the federation for the next following financial year.” Also, Section 80(2–4) provides that no moneys can be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund or any public fund of the Federation except to meet expenditure for which such funds are meant through Appropriation Act, Supplementary Appropriation Act or an Act passed by the National Assembly. In line with the legislative powers of the legislature to raise and control public spending, section 59(2) of the 1999 Constitution states that where there are differences between the proposal and amendments made by the Senate and House of Representatives, a joint Finance Committee of the two Houses shall be convened by the Senate President, to resolve the differences. The final version mutually agreed to by the joint finance committee must be referred to each of the two Houses (sitting jointly or separately) for approval, before it is sent to the President for assent.