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Document captured in 1977, published as an appendix in Clarke, (1986), 251-253.

OHA.E>TER:

41 Document captured in 1977, published as an appendix in Clarke, (1986), 251-253.

could not work in the new system chose to retire or went into Provisional Sinn Fein or the INLA.^z

The new structure had become functional by 1979 and PIRA has continued to use it since then. It had also changed the pattern of violence in Ireland as the PIRA became increasingly removed from their origins as

guerrilla fighters and began to resemble the European Terror groups of that time. Firstly, because of their need for security, the cells began to become removed from the normal day to day life of the nationalist community despite the new role for PSF.^s Secondly, the nature of the cells would need increased organization and lengthen the time spent on the planning operations. This meant that PIRA would have to plan an operation weeks in advance increasing target selection and largely

concentrating on terror tactics such as assassination rather than the guerilla warfare (fighting with uniformed soldiers on duty etc) of the early 1970's. This meant an increased use of soft targets like off-duty police and members of the UDR. This has led to a substantial drop in casualties, especially of soldiers who are no longer on the frontline, as it were, which had changed from the security forces on active duty to the off-duty l o c a l s .*4

This has meant increased success in the British attempts to contain violence in Ulster rather than to stop it.

However, in introducing the new structure the left of the Provisionals probably saved their organization from defeat, and as such ensured that violence would 42 DAILY TELEGRAPH, 30 October 1979.

43 O'Ballance, (1981), 81.

continue to be a feature of Irish politics for many years and so maintain the sterility of the political debate. This sterility is probably the Provisionals greatest ally as this maintains the sectarian nature of the conflict resulting in greater support amongst the

Catholic/nationalist community because of their traditional role as defenders of the ghettos.

The use of left-wing theories, especially those of Che Guevara, Mao Tse-Tung, and Carlos Marighela were

important in inspiring the changes suggested in the staff report especially in regard to the political role

envisioned in it for PSF. This may seem initially rather surprising as they spoke from a specifically Developing World anti-imperialist perspective, and preferred

rural/guerilla warfare to terrorism unlike the European groups that are the PIRAs peers. The European groups grew up from the 1960's student groups and this is reflected in the makeup of the groups members in that they largely came from the middle class and so perceived themselves to be an anti-government revolutionary terror groups aimed at radicalizing the masses.*5

On the other hand, the PIRA draws its members

largely, though by no means exclusively, from the working class, so they frequently have little formal education beyond school l e v e l .^6 %ts members also do not perceive

themselves as a terror group but as the legal inheritors of the second Dail and so the legitimate legal government 45 US Government, TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1988, 61.

of all Ireland.47 In this context they see themselves as a resistance group fighting an anti-colonial war against an illegal occupying force. It must also be borne in mind that they regard themselves as the successors of over eight hundred years of resistance against the English going back to the Norman invasion of Ireland in 116948, This resistance to the English included incidents like the Ulster rising and Cromwell’s suppression in the seventeenth century, the United Irishmen’s rebellion under Wolfe Tone in the eighteenth century, the Fenian movement in the nineteenth century, and the Easter Rising of 1916 in Dublin. This strong romantic and often

romanticized tradition has created a mythology which attracts recruits into the PIRA who have no real

political view save for a strong feeling of nationalism and possibly a wish to tread along the same path as their forefathers.49 This has created an organization that is at once both revolutionary and conservative which

despises its ideological European peers, and looks upon itself as fighting a war more in the context of the

liberation movements of the Developing World with similar simple objectives; such as the Palestine Liberation

Organization (PLO) and the African National Congress (ANC). The PIRA also feels sympathy with the nationalist organizations within Europe like the Basque separatists 47 Bishop & Mallie, (1989), 15.

48 The GREEN BOOK states that Irish,

civilisation was a shining light throughout Europe prior to the Norman invasion of 1169 with which there commenced more than 8 centuries of RELENTLESS AND UNREMITTING WARFARE that has lasted down to this very day.

Published as an appendix in Coogan, (1988), 683. 49 Clarke, ( 1986), 1.

Fatherland and Liberty) and the Cypriots who fought the British under General Grivas in EOKA {Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston-Eational Organisation of Cypriot

Fighters).so

Another possible reason for Guevara's influence which must also be taken account of is simply fashion. Most of the so called northern junta came of age in the 1960's when Guevara was as much admired for his image of rebellion as for his views (a revolutionary James Dean!). Guevara not only recommended an additional role for the revolutionary as a social reformer, but also

interestingly stated that one should not use violence if there was even an ineffectual form of democracy. Adams and his allies realised that they needed violence to

remain an important force and argue that the Six Counties are a gerrymander and that the only legitimate political unit would be the Thirty-two Counties.si The role of PSF in trying to involve itself in the campaigns to improve conditions in Dublin's more notorious housing estates, and the advice centres in Ulster, are both examples of this attempt to gain support over issues outside the normal areas of its appeal. This also links in nicely with both Marighela's and Mao's guerilla theories which were advocated by Adams in Republican News under his covername of Brownie in the mid- 1 9 7 0's .^ 2 these articles he called on the whole community to become involved in the "struggle". As Mao states co-operation 50 O'Ballance, (1981), 79.

51 Guevara, (1969), 45-47. 52 Clarke, (1986), 30.

with civilians is vital for the survival of the irregular fighter on enemy ground.

Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemies rear. Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship

that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be linked to water and the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together?^ ^

It is also the case that Marighela felt that the urban fighter had a dual role of soldier and of

propagandist, suggesting that an alternative press should be established to inform the workers and students of the guerillas aims so that the people know the slogan: "Let him who will do nothing for the revolution at least do nothing against i t " A view which the PIRA and PSF, given the large numbers of Catholics who vote SDLP but live in republican areas , would be keen to promote.

In all of this probably Guevara's most important influence was in supplying a theory of irregular warfare that involved long term conflict at a time when the

Provisionals needed it, after their first strategy of the "year of victory" had been discredited. This has allowed PSF to say that they feel that their victory will not come for many years without losing to much support.

The final recommendation of the staff report was that the movement should take a far more active role in electoral politics while also using violence at the same time. This was to see the end of abstentionism in any Irish political body though not Westminster by 1986.

53 Mao Tse-Tung & Che Guevara. GUERRILLA WARFARE. London: Cassell, 1968, 67.

54 Carlos Marighela, FOR THE LIBERATION OF BRAZIL.