Where does flow fit within the findings of this study?

While this study investigated all kinds of performance experiences, its main focus was to gather data on, and better understand, performances that are assessed as ‘highly enjoyable’. As discussed in Chapter 1, optimal experiences are often studied through the construct of flow. While there is some confusion about the meanings that have been conferred upon the construct, flow refers mainly to an altered state of consciousness in which individuals are optimally aroused and fully engaged in an activity that they experience as intrinsically rewarding, an activity in which the process itself is more important than its end-goals (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002). When pondering on the findings of the Exploratory Study, I wondered to what extent the construct of flow corresponds to the experience performers described when they referred to their last ‘highly enjoyable’ performance.

First, the construct of flow primarily emphasises the process itself, as opposed to its end-goals. In contrast, my findings showed that performers related their joy to the performance enabling them to establish connection with the audience, to contribute, to feel competent. It appeared that the performance was ‘highly enjoyable’ because it was a means to an end that they highly valued, because it was meaningful. Like the ‘strong’ performance experiences studied by Lamont (2012), the ‘highly enjoyable’

performances described in this study appeared to be mainly characterised by a eudaimonic route to happiness: meaning and purpose are inextricably linked to the experience. Therefore, given the importance performers confer on the outcomes of performance (what the performance could afford), I cannot deduce from these findings

that they viewed these ends as less important than the process itself, and therefore I prefer not to use the term ‘flow’ to describe their experience. A second reason why I prefer not to use the term ‘flow’ to describe the performers’ ‘highly enjoyable’ experiences is because the degree of absorption that flow implies appears to be incompatible with the simultaneous experience of positive emotions, and performers described the highly enjoyable performance in terms of such emotions. And thirdly, because the type of mental state to which flow refers might be incompatible with the multiple kinds of cognitive processes that a musical performance requires (see Chapter 1).

Therefore flow may be incompatible with the positive emotions performers described and with the cognitive challenges of a performance, and may be unfit to render the meaningfulness of the experience the performers reported; however, it may shed light on one of the aspects of the ‘highly enjoyable’ performance that performers described: the ease of a process that appeared to take place without the performer’s effortful control (see Chapter 1). In fact, half of the participants described their ‘highly enjoyable’ performance as an instance during which they felt themselves to be

‘channels through which the music just flowed’, and an even higher percentage reported feeling the music as ‘flowing freely from deep within’. The ease with which music appeared to flow suggests that the performers were not preoccupied by whether or not they would be able to perform up to their standards (the outcomes of the performance), but that their attentional capacities were fully available for the activity itself (the process). I think that it is only this aspect of the performance experience that may be rendered by the construct of flow. This is why it is in this restrictive sense that I will use the term flow in the rest of this discussion.

In summary, meaning, positive emotions and flow (i.e. effortless engagement) are the three integral components of the ‘highly enjoyable’ performance experience

investigated here, as they were an integral part too of the ‘strong’ performance experiences studied by Lamont (Lamont, 2012; Seligman, 2002). However, I argue further that meaning plays a particular role in the performance experience, as it is not just part of the experience, but precedes the experience and impacts on the likelihood of performers experiencing positive or negative emotions in performance and, possibly, on the likelihood of them accessing the flow state. I base my argument on the findings of

this study, showing that performers’ narratives predict the likelihood of experiencing joy or anxiety in performance. If the meaning performers make of performance impacts in such a way on the quality of their experience, it is reasonable to hypothesise that it might also impact on the likelihood of them accessing a flow state.

While it has been stated that the flow state cannot be taught or made to happen, it can be facilitated (Jackson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1999), and I argue that narratives might either foster or prevent its occurrence. For instance, flow seems to require that individuals perceive the challenges of a situation as matching their own skills. I contend that this perception of match results from the kind of narratives individuals have about

performance and its challenges, and from the narratives they have about their skills. I suggest that narratives that help performers perceive their performance as an activity within their reach increase the likelihood of them experiencing flow.

I suggest that the joy-promoting narratives identified in this study facilitate flow because they increased the performers’ perception of match between challenges and skills, building trust in their resources to cope with the challenges of performance. For example, the self-transcendent narratives identified here make sense of performance as a collaborative work between the performer and something external to the conscious self (i.e. the audience, the music, the source or something magical). These narratives promote the belief that performers are not entirely on their own whilst on stage, but that they could count on external support, guidance or inspiration to rise to the challenges of performance. I suggest that even the self-oriented narrative, which cultivates trust in one’s own good preparation, may help performers rely on the work that has already been done, on the processes that have already become automatic. Such preparedness may become something external to the conscious self on which the performer can rely. I argue that narratives that cultivate such trust might increase the likelihood of performers experiencing flow.

Additionally, the narratives identified in this study make sense of performance in terms of opportunities rather than threats, and in terms of meaningfulness, and I suggest that these factors may facilitate flow too. I would argue that, even if skills and challenges were perceived as matching, performers would not enter flow if they appraised performance as a threat, or as a meaningless activity. Accordingly, I contend that

meaning-making narratives might be viewed as antecedents of flow, and that they might facilitate its occurrence when they help performers to: first, appraise the performance as a meaningful event, an opportunity to obtain something valuable (rather than a threat), and second, build confidence in their resources for coping (Lazarus, 1991). The joy- provoking narratives identified in this study did both, and I suggest that this may contribute to performers experiencing their ‘highly enjoyable’ performance as an occasion on which the music ‘just flowed’. I argue that the hypothesis that narratives might be viewed as antecedents of flow deserves further investigation.

But I would like to conclude this discussion by pointing out that what we know about flow is based on individuals’ retrospective self-reports, which likely suffer from the characteristic biases and distortions of memory processes. However, and most importantly, what we know about flow is in itself a narrative, an account of the storyteller self about a past experience that by its very nature cannot be consciously accessed or reported while it takes place. Flow is perhaps a narrative that people create retrospectively in order to explain to themselves the amazing exploits of their ‘implicit system’ when trained and trusted, when the ‘explicit system’ restricts its intervention to the minimum required by the activity at hand. Investigating flow through the lens of narratives might bring some clarity onto a construct that, at present, contributes little to the understanding of the ‘highly enjoyable’ performances investigated in this research.