Doping as a Form of Coercion

2.3.1. Ambiguity in the Coercion Argument

Introducing biotechnology into sports creates a second area of concern. This common argument goes as follows. If athletes were permitted to use performance enhancing substances then other athletes who otherwise would be morally opposed to their use would be put in a terrible dilemma. They either can do something against their own moral conscience, or they can refuse to take these substances and so fail to achieve the level of competition appropriate to their talents. The general use of coercion in the doping debate includes a less than accurate definition of coercion. This section intends to clarify what is meant by coercion as well as how it specifically relates to doping in sport.

Critics are quick to point out that coercion can be a very subjective and, therefore confusing, term. They rightly suggest the common usage of ‘coercion’ in the doping discourse often means nothing more than placing someone in a position where he or she must make a difficult decision. Doping advocates point out the fact that

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athletes who wish to remain competitive are coerced all the time. The athlete who trains six days a week is coerced by another athlete who trains seven days a week. If the first athlete wants to have the same opportunities as the second athlete he or she will be required to train an equal amount of time and equally as hard.

When defined by these standards there seems to be little wrong with coercion.

As Thomas Murray states, ‘there is, then, an inherent coerciveness present in these situations: when some choose to do what gives them a competitive edge, others will be pressed to do likewise, or resign themselves to either accepting a competitive disadvantage or leaving the endeavor entirely.’¹⁶

The problem of coercion is not limited to co-competitors. Coaches and trainers demand athletes do more extensive and harder work than they are comfortable with.

That is what is required to stay on top of their respective sport. Robert Simon points out the reality of elite level competition. ‘No one is coerced into world class competition….

If they find the cost excessive, they may withdraw.’¹⁷

Nevertheless, if doping were legalized those who wish to remain ‘clean’ may be coerced by more than their own desire to remain competitive. For example, assume that a clean athlete is competitive enough to stay at the highest levels of competition. In spite of his or her superior performance, the owners of the organisation for which he or she competes may require the use of performance enhancers to make the athlete’s performance even better. If the athlete refuses he or she may be threatened with dismissal from the team. Do the owners have a right to put this burden on the athlete just as a boss in any other place of employment may demand certain job requirements from an employee?

However, this begs the question of the athletes’ suitability for elite competition if they are not willing to do what is required of that level of sport. In order not to get ahead of ourselves we can set aside for the moment issues of fairness and health risks and look specifically at whether or not the coercion argument carries enough merit on its own account to justify prohibiting biotechnology. Many have made the claim that it does not. In part this is because the argument has made coercion synonymous with pressure. In this context coercion has come to mean the obligations one does not like having imposed upon oneself by the activity. This understanding of coercion is evident in other areas not related to sport and even in areas that are not necessarily competitive.

16 Murray, ‘The Coercive Power of Drugs in Sport’, Hastings Center Report 13, no. 4 (1983), 27.

17 Simon, Fair Play, 78.

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Musicians, dancers, lawyers, students, and the like all have pressure from inside and outside sources to be the best in their field. Robert Simon remarks, ‘the problem with such claims is that all competitive pressure becomes “coercive.” As a result, the term

“coercion” is deprived of any moral force because virtually no competitive behavior is left over that would not be coercive.’¹⁸

There is something instinctive in humanity that drives a person to be not only the best but the best that he or she can be. Add to this the fact that spectators demand to see increasingly difficult accomplishments. Not only do fans love to see their team win they love to see records broken. This type of atmosphere compels athletes to seek out progressively more strenuous training methods. Does this mean the fans are guilty of coercion as well? Take a non-sport example. Students must study hard to be among the top of their class. If they want to get into the best universities to get the best jobs they must study harder than if businesses did not place so much emphasis on education and academic performance. Can blame rightly be placed on the potential employers or the teacher for this requirement? In teasing out the argument Simon continues,

Isn’t it more plausible to say that although there are pressures on athletes to achieve peak physical condition, these amount to coercion no more than the pressures on law or medical students to study hard? Rather, the athletes (or the students) have reasons to try hard to achieve success; the pressures are self-imposed.¹⁹

The motives certainly vary depending on the athlete but as Simon points out those who reject the coercion argument often do so by claiming athletes willingly submit themselves to such rigorous training so they can be among the best. Yet, as Simon again points out ‘if we use “coercion” that broadly, it becomes unclear who, if anybody, is left free.’²⁰

2.3.2. A More Specific Understanding of Coercion

Such an ambiguous definition of coercion fails on several accounts. This type of argument not only defines coercion too broadly, it effectively neutralizes coercion altogether by placing the source of the pressure within oneself. In this case, no coercion

18 Ibid., 76.

19 Ibid., 75 (emphasis in original).

20 Ibid., 75. A further point of my own reflection is worth noting about the schooling analogy. To be sure, competitive pressures exist among legal, medical, or any other kind of student to finish at the top of the class to improve their post-schooling career prospects. But this is often an indirect competition whereas sport is an explicit and immediate competitive structure. In a race there can be only one winner but there often are many good jobs to be had post-education. Therefore, the analogy is not as strong as its advocates would suggest.

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is present since the pressures are internal. The coercion problem arises when one’s motivations are forced upon another. It is in this sense that the anti-doping argument objects to coercion, not the broader definition promoted by doping advocates. It could be argued that other forms of employment typically do not require employees to alter their bodies. Coercing employees to do something is very different from coercing them to do something to their bodies. It is a difficult proposition to accept that club management have the right to force the athlete to impose physical changes to his or her body.

If they are willing to do what is necessary to remain the best, do certain other individuals have the right to force athletes to risk bodily harm? The primary example of this is the increasing expectation of athletes to compete injured. First-rate athletes are often required to play in spite of an injury. Insufficient treatment of a sports related injury may result in long term health effects.²¹ What is being questioned here is not the voluntary participation in professional sports but whether coaches or other athletes should be able to coerce a player into significantly risking his or her post-career wellbeing. This still does not escape the charge that athletes voluntarily submit themselves to the pressures of elite sports and the requirements that come along with competing at that level.

Norman Fost makes an important observation about coercion when he says,

‘athletes confronting the choice of whether to use steroids face an opportunity to be better than they are, admittedly at some risk, but with no loss of property, health, or basic rights if they refuse.’²² He goes on to add, ‘the worst consequence is that they might fail to gain some extraordinary honor, such as a gold medal or a financial reward.

Great opportunities are typically accompanied by extraordinary demands and risks.’²³ In Fost’s view, the accusation of coercion requires the athlete be placed in a position where he or she ‘will be worse off by failing to act in the suggested way.’²⁴ Since he does not believe this is the case he argues that we can dismiss the coercion argument. Defining coercion in this way, however, does little to help clarify whether or not coercion is an acceptable justification for prohibiting doping in sport. His criterion is too ambivalent. Who and what determines the standards for ‘worse off’ and how is one

21 Angela Lumpkin, Sharon Kay Stoll, and Jennifer Beller, Sports Ethics: Applications for Fair Play (New York: McGraw-Hill, 3^rd ed. 2003), 147.

22 Norman Fost, ‘Banning Drugs in Sport: A Skeptical View’, Hastings Center Report 16, no. 4 (1986), 7.

23 Ibid., 7.

24 Ibid., 7.

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to arrive at that conclusion given the number of possible scenarios in which an athlete is pressured to do something without which he or she would be none the better? An athlete potentially would be worse off, in a competitive sense, for failing to take the illegal substance. So too would the athlete be worse off by failing to train properly. His definition does not address these types of distinctions.

Fost also believes the ‘clean’ athlete’s loss is limited to competition since, as he states above, the worst that can happen in refusing to take steroids is that the athlete does not win. This response to the coercion problem neglects the point being made that the fate of athletes who refuse enhancements would be more than a simple experience of not winning. It would be the loss of the ability to compete at all in the higher levels of athletic competition.

2.3.3. Coercion and The Freedom of the Athlete

In addition to this point, permitting doping in sport places the freedom of the individual athlete above the sport one participates in. It is suggested that the collective interest in sport by society is being subjected to the autonomy of the athlete.²⁵

Nevertheless, autonomy is not a self-sustaining supreme rule. This has been well noted by Beauchamp and Childress who are accredited with establishing autonomy as one of the four principles which have saturated many medical ethics policies in the United States. ‘Morality generally demands that we not override individuals’ rights to maximize social consequences.’ ²⁶ In this context that would mean it would be wrong to prohibit athletes from subjecting their own bodies to the effects of doping simply because it might negatively affect the sale of tickets. ‘But if we can more effectively protect almost everyone’s interests by overriding some property rights or autonomy rights, this course of action might not be wrong merely because it contravenes conventional morality and pursues the goal of social utility.’²⁷ That is, if doping jeopardizes the wellbeing of society (by, say, undermining the social values within sport) it becomes morally problematic.

Superseding autonomy, then, may be acceptable when it serves the greater good.

Many governments and sports organisational authorities have adopted this principle and

25 For a more detailed discussion of the tension between an athlete’s private privileges and public responsibilities see my treatment of Richard Rorty’s influence on philosophy of sport in section 3.4. of this thesis.

26 Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 5^th ed., 2001), 349.

27 Ibid., 349.

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uphold strict standards and policies against doping.²⁸ Governments have found it in the public’s best interest to intervene in certain athletic training methods. The important issue here is that governing bodies are only intervening in very specific circumstances.

This can be attributed to the fact that there are right ways and wrong ways to control an outcome. To be sure, there are other ways of controlling substance use without condoning it. The fact that some will use performance enhancing substances regardless of the rules is not a justifiable reason to allow everyone to use them. The medical side effects on the few using them illegally certainly would be inconsequential compared to the side effects on everyone using them legally, even with appropriate medical supervision.

Rather than beginning with the pressures imposed I would suggest the real concern in the coercion argument should be the moral nature of the activity one is being pressured to do. The employee seeking a promotion justifiably may be pressured by superiors to complete menial tasks but being sexually coerced to receive the promotion rightly ignites moral outrage. The pressure to advance, in the business and sports world alike, is unavoidable. The question of coercive doping in sport is more about the morality of the underlying pressure than it is about either the act of pressuring or what the athlete might gain or lose as a result of those actions.

Yet the coercion argument continues to focus on the more trivial issue of being pressured to stay competitive. So long as the dominant motivation in sport is to win the pressures for a competitive advantage will not subside. The coercion argument against doping is more powerful and instructive than it may first appear but it only offers a superficial response that is unable to address the root problem. Coercion will continue to be a problem until the sports culture recognizes an authority in sport other than winning.²⁹