The Duality of Prevention Measures

It was found much of the literature reviewed which surrounds prevention measures, deals with issues of crime and terrorism in isolation. However, it is widely accepted by both academics and practitioners that CTMs are principally based on traditional methods of CPMs. Within the UK, prevention measures are ‘responsibilised’ by developing and deploying it through multiple levels of stakeholders, at national, local, institutional, and international levels.

However, the disputed nature of the debate, which surrounds terrorism, will affect how the complex and multiple stakeholders in SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales ‘tackle something that these agencies cannot define’ (Fussey, 2007, p.184).

Hence, it is maintained that CPMs and CTMs are located in political, economic, and cultural discourses and are not neutral concepts. It is contended that CPMs and vice versa CTMs are not automatically suitable to deter and prevent the ‘other form of transgression’ and as such ‘do not necessarily and easily translate to the other’ (Fussey, 2007, p.180). Moreover, both criminological theories of situational (rationality - crime) and dispositional (emotionality - terrorism) should be merged in prevention measures as neither theory wholly accounts ‘for

the decision-making process’ (Hoch and Lowenstein, 1991, p.504, cited in Hayward, 2007, p.241) in transgressive activities.

One emergent theme from the interview data collected was the concept of the duality of prevention measures. As mentioned above, much of the literature on CPMs and CTMs are distinct and separate, occasionally within some research such as that of Clarke and Newman (2006), the association between the two forms of measures is recognised. As previously discussed in Chapter Three, the research has revealed that the crime prevention strategy of target hardening is being rapidly utilised for the prevention of terrorism. However, the basis of using CPMs to combat terrorism is restricted as they fail to account for the factors (emotional, religious, fiscal, political) lying behind decisions made by terrorists (Fussey, 2011).

Moreover, this research contends that within the space of SPIRS and other Category A railway stations, CPMs and CTMs should be individually considered in terms of their potential impact, conflict, and benefits because duality does not necessarily indicate they are suitable to for both purposes (Kappia, et al., 2009).

“We’re trying to look and work with industry to come up with innovative but also creative and the planners’ systems and schemes that will be accepted in the public realm. Do the job for us from a security perspective but again, not impact onto the eyes and concerns of the public because the last thing we want to live in is a fortified city when there’s no need to.”

(Security Advisor)

Furthermore, the research has revealed that there are distinct and separate agendas and funding for CPMs and CTMs. Since 9/11, there has been a direct political shift from ‘security to resilience’, with primary security worries being dealt with by expansion of ‘security-driven resilience’ policies predominantly those around measures to prevent terrorism (Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p. 294). However, participants felt that if policy and decision makers both at a national and local level did not appreciate the bigger picture, and they needed to understand there is also a duality of benefits for both types of prevention measures.

“If you look at what deters terrorists, it's actually pretty much what deters criminals.

So, CCTV, "people say you won't deter a suicide bomber" but actually you will because you will deter the hostile reconnaissance. It won't stop them, but CCTV won't stop...it will just record them, what's happened and make it less likely. So, if you look at the issue of staff presence and role of patrolling stations, if you look at the use

of better lighting, clear lines of sight, CCTV, that kind of thing. If you're building that in, if you wanted to you could flag that as a CT measure or an ordinary crime prevention measure.”

(BTP Senior Officer)

“There are some things which are CT specific, which are improvements to glazing, to stop fragmentation. The litter bins issue is CT specific, but actually, an awful lot of the other stuff is just sensible, you make the space easier to manage. And take away the dark dingy bits where druggies shoot up or where people get mugged, do away with that and you are reducing the likelihood of a terrorist attack.”

(BTP Senior Officer)

Conversely, when considering the CPMs and strategies implemented in SPIRS, one senior operational BTP Officer stated that there was a definite positive impact on CTMs,

“I look at measures and assess them in terms of well we're killing two birds with one stone here...because I look at terrorism as being a crime…So everything has got a knock on effect, so if you make it harder for the person who is intent on stealing a Mars bar then that is also going to make it difficult for who is loitering in the station or is looking at carrying out a terrorist attack”.

(BTP Operational Senior Officer)

Moreover, at a local level within, participants expressed resentment and tensions over the disconnection between the two different security agendas, crime and counter-terrorism prevention. The research highlighted that some BTP participants believed there is a significant lack of recognition from many of their colleagues over the benefits of the duality of prevention measures that come from the understanding of both crime and terrorism. The Government’s concept of operationalising ‘security-driven resilience’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p.294) through the processes of Governmentality implies a ‘top down’ approach for the shared ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996) for resilience and security within SPIRS and other Category A Railway Stations. However, tensions occurred in SPIRS when these stakeholders had to balance the national level security and resilience primacies originating from the Government and those security and resilience priorities of local stakeholders within the space. Thus, strains arose at a local level given that at a national level the Government controlled spending and budgets, which meant that the multiple stakeholders had limited

powers to contest the priorities of national security and resilience which took precedence over local crime prevention issues.

“There are only so many tactics to deal with both of them and these generally lead back or heavily influence by prevention, intelligence and operations. Money is invested into these strands of policing but not enough is invested into prevention.

There is a clear imbalance as much more is invested into intelligence and operations.”

(Retired Senior BTP Officer)

Hence, the research has highlighted contradictions between the rhetoric of

‘responsibilisation’ of resilience and its actual operationalisation by the multiple stakeholders within the space of SPIRS. The evidence has shown that although all the stakeholders should have a role in the resilience of the space against human malign threats, this, is played out with differing levels of importance. Some stakeholders had a greater level of responsibility placed on them, the BTP and Network Rail High Speed, and had to cascade this responsibility down via operational levels to their own grassroots staff. Moreover, the research revealed that despite the top down approach for the ‘responsibilisation’ of CPMs and CTMs, there was a level of grassroots apprehension that the costs of CTMs would impact and divert fiscal and manpower resources, which could potentially be utilised for CPMs for

‘non-terrorist crimes’ (ATOC, 2010, p.1).

Yet, the research has also shown that some participants maintained there is frequently a duality between CPMs and CTMs. Arguably, these methods can be interconnected and do not need to be exclusively used for the prevention of specific transgressions (Fussey, 2007).

Since 9/11 and 7/7 acts of terrorism, the protection and control of public spaces through technical and human surveillance are now considered legitimate, acceptable and standardised forms of dealing with ‘both crime and terrorism in the public domain’ (Fussey, 2007, p.174).

Furthermore, some of the research participants, specifically those working at an operational level in SPIRS for either the BTP or Network Rail, proposed that stations such as SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales being patrolled by the BTP offers both a deterrence and prevention in both terms of criminal and terrorist activities, equating to duality of usage. However, other participants felt that regardless of the duality of some