E) Party structure

General discussion

The structure of parties is key to understand how they accommodate to a multi-level competition scenario (Thorlakson 2013: 714) in partially federal and federal states (Dardanelli 2019: 8-12), where the regional level plays an important

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role. Parties in multi-level systems face strong challenges that are directly related to the organisation of the state (Deschouwer 2006: 291-291). In this case, parties need to adapt in order to merge their electoral performance (Deschouwer 2003: 217) and the possibility to hold a position in office at the different levels (Thorlakson 2013: 714). The main purpose of these multi-level integration is to maintain their image amongst the voters as a way to defend their interests. Therefore, these internal dynamics condition party performance (Hopkin 2003: 228). In this thesis, this applies especially to SWPs. The ways in which the state- wide party and its regional branches articulate their relations determines the ways in which they position themselves in the different dimension of the political space.

The support that SWPs receive comes from two main sources (Thorlakson 2013: 714). The first source is the state-wide support that the party receives, normally in general elections. The second source comes from the support that they receive from sub-national arenas, such as regions and municipalities. The balance between these two sources is where the internal structure plays a major role. The way in which the checks and balances are articulated between the state- wide party and regional branches form the way in which both can benefit from each other without undermining the position of each other in their specific competition level (Filippov et al. 2004: 195). A multi-level system puts upon SWPs major challenges in their electoral performance (Hopkins 2003: 231-233), internal integration (Mueller and Bernauer 2018: 565-566), and ideological cohesiveness (León 2017: 2). When competition shifts from the national to the regional level, this is reflected in the internal cohesion of parties, and therefore, power balance also shifts (Hopkins 2003: 230)

Vertical integration is understood as the organisational links, cooperation, and the relations and interactions between the state-wide party and regional branches (Thorlakson 2009: 161-162). This is, the intra-organisational aspect of the same party (Deschouwer 2003: 216). An important feature of this vertical integration is that, although they compete under the same name and despite the fact that they can have programmatic variations in the different elections in which they fill in candidates (Klingelhöfer 2016: 2-3), they share a common goal and loyalties (Filippov et al. 2004: 192). The common goal and loyalties refer to the relation with the core level of the party as a whole (Deschouwer 2003: 216-217).

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In other words, taking into considerations the existence of differences between the state-wide party and the regional branches, both are merged in a single integrated party (Thorlakson 2013: 716).

Horizontal integration is understood as the differences between the actions taken by the regional branches of a party in their specific regional contexts (Thorlakson 2006: 39). The key issue to understand the horizontal integration of parties is the highly regionalised context in which regional branches act. Policy heterogeneity might be key for electoral and office success (Mueller and Bernauer 2018: 567), and therefore, certain programmatic autonomy of regional branches is necessary. Every region possesses its own characteristics, being this cultural, historic or economic. If the behaviour of parties is understood as a reflection of the social context in which they act (Mueller and Bernauer 2018: 569), then the variation across regions is inevitable. The behaviour of regional branches in regions with a specific language is not the same as the behaviour in regions where this marker is non-existent. The more the party is able to regionalise its strategies and structures, the more it can benefit from electoral success (Roller and van Houten 2003: 4-5).

Some authors, such as Thorlakson (2009; 2011), differentiate vertical and horizontal integration from autonomy. The latter refers to the degree of autonomy that the state-wide party has to act with no constrains from the regional branches (Thorlakson 2009: 162-163). In multi-level party competition, this can be further applied. Parties need to take into account that the regional level is highly contextualised, shaped by the interests of the regions. Therefore, this need to be addressed directly. Due to the fact that every region is distinct vis-à-vis the others, the autonomy of the regional branches is at the same time affecting the vertical and the horizontal integration of parties. The main result of this is that the conceptualisation of autonomy can also be applied to the regional branches (Fabre and Swenden 2013: 345). Therefore, autonomy can be also understood as the degree of action that regional branches have to act with no constrains from the state-wide party (Fabre and Méndez-Lago 2009: 103). By doing so, the state- wide party benefits from the direct link between the regional branches and the regional demands (Klingelhöfer 2016: 2). This takes into consideration the link between the location of the loyalties and core level of the party as a whole

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(Deschouwer 2003: 219-220), and the necessity to adapt to the regional demands and interests in a multi-level system (León 2017: 1-3).

In order to maintain their influence and performance in regional elections, SWPs provide their regional branches with some degree of autonomy. This involves not only some sort of autonomous organisation (Jeffery 2010: 139-141), but also some sort of autonomous positioning on the different axes of competition in comparison to the state-wide party (Grofman 2004: 39). This applies especially to regions where specific characteristics or markers that tension the centre- periphery cleavage, such as those that have cultural or identity distinctiveness (van Houten 2009: 141). The main result is the appearance of tensions with their core levels and loyalties (León 2014: 399). This autonomous organisation and positioning are also applied horizontally, and each regional branch is granted some sort of autonomous action to adapt to the specific region in which they are acting. The behaviour of the regional branches is therefore highly regionalised, like for example, in the articulation of their electoral programmes (Müller 2013: 178). This puts tension on the horizontal integration of SWPs. This is better explained by the delegation model between SWPs and their regional branches (van Houten, 2009a; 2009b).

This can be summarised in the degree of integration of the SWPs. The more integrated the structure of the SWP is, the less autonomy the regional branches have. The less integrated, the more autonomy the regional branches have. SWPs that have a more integrated structure are expected to have milder pro-periphery positions or even pro-centre positions. The autonomy given to the regional branches is enough to regionalise their discourses but not to have a high degree of variation amongst the different regions and regional branches. This is designed to have a strong internal cohesion in defence of the interests of the elites at the centre. In contrast, SWPs that have less integrated structures can be expected to display a more regionalised performance depending on the region in which they act. The pro-periphery positions are therefore stronger because their discourses are highly contextualised as the regional branches have more freedom to adapt to the specific characteristics that they face. One can find more horizontal variation in SWPs with less integrated structures. This stronger pro- periphery positions put more tension on the internal cohesion, as regionalising

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discourses might put pressure on the interest of the elites at the centre, and even more in regions with distinctive characteristics (Roller and van Houten 2003: 4- 5), such as having a strong identity or language.

The effect of the structure that SWP have when competition along the centre-periphery cleavage is hypothesised in general terms as follows:

H10-SWPs that are less integrated are able to have stronger pro-

periphery positions

Party structure applied to Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands

This variable is only applied to these three regions. The reason for this is that there is no consistent measuring scheme that can be applied to regionalist parties and provide the same results as for SWPs. Regionalist parties can also have local branches, like CC, which is a regionalist party with, on one hand, a strong island-based identity, and on the other hand, island-based branches. In comparison, the PA/CA has a different structure, which is expected due to the different characteristics and historic development of Andalusia. This makes measuring the structure of these regionalist parties difficult for the purpose of this investigation. To avoid this difficulty, this variable is only applied to the PSOE and the PP to test the expected behaviour theorised above. The hypotheses to test this are:

H10.A-the greater autonomy of the regional branches of the PSOE makes them

emphasise more the importance of the regional level in comparison to the PP, resulting in more horizontal variation

H10.B-the greater autonomy of the regional branches of the PSOE increases

the possibility to articulate a more differentiated constitutional status of the regions in comparison to the PP, resulting in more horizontal variation

H10.C-the greater autonomy of the regional branches of the PSOE increases

the possibility to call for more and more important competences for the regions in comparison to the PP, resulting in more horizontal variation

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H10.D-the greater autonomy of the regional branches of the PSOE increases

the possibility to reinforce the coexistence of multiple identities in comparison to the PP, resulting in more horizontal variation

3.4.F) Interaction between the three party-level control variables focused on