Educational Differences in Union Formation 20

Research in the U.S. has found that the likelihood of marriage follows an educational gradient that has reversed directions over time. Goldstein and Kenney (2001) show that among American women born in the 1950s who entered adulthood in the 1970s, women with a college education were less likely to marry than less educated women. For women born in the 1960s who came of age in the 1980s, however, more highly educated women were more likely to ever-marry than the less educated. This more recent, positive

association between education and marriage for women has also been shown repeatedly in past research on American men (e.g. Manning et al., 2014; Manning, 1993; Oppenheimer et al., 1997). Men with a high school education or less have lower marriage rates overall than the more highly educated, and tend to wait longer after completing their schooling to marry because of difficulties securing a stable place in the labour market (Oppenheimer et al., 1997). However, more highly educated men are likely to delay marriage until they have completed their education, but typically marry soon after and have higher rates of ever being married (Raley, 2000).

The reversal in the association between women’s educational attainment and marriage found in the U.S. is also evident in Canada. Using the 1995 General Social Survey to examine Canadian born before 1971, Turcotte & Goldschider (1998) find that for Canadian men born before 1951 who came of age in the pre-1970s era, higher education was associated with a higher likelihood of marriage, but for women in this cohort, higher education was associated with a lower likelihood of marriage. The relationships reversed in subsequent cohorts; for women born between 1961 and 1970 who entered adulthood in the 1980s and 1990s, higher education was associated with a higher likelihood of marriage (Turcotte & Goldschider, 1998).

The association between education and rates of first marriage has changed in large part because of the changing role of women in society at large and in the labour force specifically (Goldstein & Kenney, 2001). Two very influential theories explaining marriage and marriage timing have come into conflict with each other in past research. The first is Becker’s (1973; 1974; 1981) economic theory of marriage which, simply stated, posits that marriage is an arrangement entered into rationally when the advantages

of marriage outweigh the utility of remaining single. Becker argued that the major gain of marriage stems from the exchange of specialized skills and attributes within the couple, which arises from the gendered division of labour. According to this theory, less educated women are more likely to enter into marriage as they have much to gain by trading their domestic labour for the financial support of their husbands. More educated women on the other hand, have less to gain by entering into marriage because of their increased earning potential and position in the labour market, so they are more likely to remain single. The second theory is the career entry hypothesis posited by Oppenheimer and colleagues which refutes Becker’s thesis that women’s economic independence has reduced the gains to marriage and extends the theory by focusing more specifically on the timing of marriage rather than marriage rates (Oppenheimer, 1988). Oppenheimer argues that women’s economic independence is not reducing the gains to marriage but that women’s economic independence, including increased educational attainment and labour market participation, is delaying the assortative mating process. The process is delayed because a longer period of schooling means that, just like it is difficult to predict men’s future attributes until they have completed their education, it is harder to predict women’s future attributes at young ages than it was when women offered only their domestic skills, which could be acquired at younger ages.

At their core, these theories diverge in how they conceptualize the family. Becker’s specialization and trading model appears to be well suited to explaining marriage in times and places where there is a strict gendered division of labour, such as in the U.S. in the 1950s. Oppenheimer’s career entry model, however, seems much better suited to explaining educational differences in marriage timing patterns in cohorts who are more

likely to form interdependent unions and have dual-earning households. The reversal of the association between education and marriage in the U.S. can be at least partly attributed to the changing nature of the economic relations between spouses and the waning of the explanatory power of Becker’s theory and the growing explanatory power of Oppenheimer’s, especially as the financial barriers to marriage increase.

Becker is largely silent on the issue of non-marital cohabitation but Oppenheimer also theorizes about cohabitation entry and timing. In her earlier works she briefly argues that cohabiting unions are temporary adjustments to the delays in the assortative mating process (Oppenheimer, 1988). In later works, she argues that although career maturity influences entry into both marriage and cohabiting unions, there are greater barriers to marriage than to cohabitation. She finds that employment instability prevents entry into marriage but actually promotes entry into cohabiting unions, implying that cohabitation may represent an adaptive strategy for young men who have yet to establish stable careers (Oppenheimer, 2003). It is not clear how Oppenheimer’s career entry theory of marriage timing holds up against further changes in the family and the rise of cohabitation among recent Canadian cohorts.

Past research on educational differences in the prevalence of cohabitation shows that in more recent cohorts, Americans with less education are also more likely to cohabit than the more highly educated, and the difference in propensity to cohabit between the most educated and least educated has widened over time (Bumpass & Lu, 2000; Bumpass et al., 1991). Cherlin (2004) argues that marriage has become a capstone in the union formation process; it is a marker of financial stability and couples will often choose to cohabit rather than marry if they feel they have not achieved this goal (Smock, Manning

& Porter, 2005). The increasing economic inequality in the U.S. may therefore partly explain the divergence in union formation behaviours as the less educated choose cohabitation over marriage because of their increasingly precarious standing in the labour market (Oppenheimer et al., 1997; Thornton, Axinn & Teachman, 1995). This is also indicative of growing social class differences in family behaviour in the U.S. (Cherlin, 2009; McLanahan, 2004), or what is often described as the ‘diverging destinies’ of the advantaged and the disadvantaged.

The timing of first marriage in Canada, like in the U.S., is stratified by education with the more highly educated delaying their marriage longer than the less educated (Ravanera & Rajulton, 2007). Yet, little is known about educational differences in timing of first cohabitation or first union among recent cohorts of Canadians. Among Canadians born before 1960, Turcotte and Goldschider (1998) found a positive relationship between education and the formation of a cohabiting union, especially for women. However, for Canadians born between 1961 and 1970, the association between education and cohabitation formation is non-existent (Turcotte & Goldschider, 1998). Ravanera and colleagues (1998a; 1998b) also examined educational differences in median ages at first marriage and first union and found that for both women and men, higher education is associated with delays in both marriage and cohabitation. Although they track overall changes in the median age at first marriage and first union across birth cohorts, their analysis of educational differences does not differentiate between birth cohorts. Given that the relationships between education and other aspects of union formation have changed across cohorts, an examination of how the association between education and union formation timing has changed across cohorts is needed.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully test Oppenheimer’s career entry theory because career maturity is a multidimensional construct (Oppenheimer, 2003) that is not captured by educational attainment alone. Insofar as educational attainment is an indicator of long-term economic outcomes however, my analyses are a preliminary step in assessing the utility of Oppenheimer’s theory of marriage timing to explain the timing of first unions in recent Canadian cohorts. These analyses will also greatly enrich our understanding of when Canadians are forming their first union given that cohabitation has increased dramatically since the 1970s.